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This project seeks to retrieve and defend a simple idea: thought and consciousness are not 
coextensive. It is a project of retrieval, since the idea that thought and consciousness are identical 
is a relatively recent invention, a piece of modern doxa or ideology. But I want to put this 
nonidentity in a positive form, that is: there is an unconscious of thought. I will defend this 
positive claim by exploring the unconscious of thought as it is articulated in the metaphysics of 
ideas of early modernity, and in particular in the work of G.W.F. Leibniz, Benedict de Spinoza, 
and David Hume. These thinkers, I will strive to show, were highly sensitive to profound 
dimensions of unconscious thought, a domain that is not just unconscious accidentally, in the 
sense that there are ideas of which I may happen not to be conscious, but unconscious 
structurally, essentially, or necessarily, in the sense that there are elements of thought of which I 
am constitutively incapable of becoming directly conscious. Stronger still, these unconscious 
elements constitute conditions for the possibility of consciousness at all: without them, there 
could not even be consciousness. I argue not only that there is an unconscious of thought, but 
that we must actively work toward a devaluation of consciousness. To the extent that 
philosophical modernity effects an elevation of consciousness at the expense of the unconscious 
of thought, this project might even be called reactionary. 
It is a project of retrieval, then, but also a project of invention or rereading, since the 
positive terms in which I am putting this claim were not available as such to the thinkers in 
question. None of them said explicitly that there is an unconscious of thought. My task is to 
demonstrate that they nevertheless held this position. To do this I will undertake close readings 
of certain specific aspects of their philosophical works. In a sense, these readings should be able 
2 
to stand alone, but by threading them together I try to show that they all point toward and clarify 
a robust concept of the unconscious of thought. 
In this introduction I attempt to do three things. First of all, I try simply to get the concept 
of the unconscious of thought on the table, which involves sketching out what is involved in the 
concept itself as well as giving the reader a sense for the motivating stakes of the project. As I 
see it, the problem that gives the concept of the unconscious of thought its clearest stakes is the 
problem of akrasia, or akratic desire, that is, how it is possible to ‘see the better but do the 
worse’. Why do we persist in wanting what we know is bad for us? I hold that ‘voluntarist’ 
paradigms in which one’s actions follow from, and are thus fully explicable in terms of, 
conscious decisions or volitions are incapable of giving a satisfying account of this possibility. 
By contrast, I think a much better account of akratic desires and behaviors can be given on the 
basis of a conception of the mind and ideas that accords the unconscious dimension of thought its 
proper place, in which one’s actions are significantly determined by unconscious elements of 
thought rather than by conscious, voluntary decisions. For this reason, I will sometimes speak of 
an ‘involuntarism’ common to the three major figures treated.1 As for the concept of the 
unconscious of thought itself, it can only be sketchily introduced at the outset; it will become 
increasingly concrete as the individual chapters unfold. I have something of a Hegelian worry 
here about the limits of introductions. I think that preliminary gestures at what is meant by ‘the 
                                                          
1 I am adopting the term ‘involuntarism’ from François Zourabichvili, who used it as early as 
1996 to describe Deleuze’s metapolitical orientation. See François Zourabichvili, “Deleuze et le 
possible (de l’involontarisme en politique),” in Gilles Deleuze. Une vie philosophique, ed. Éric 
Alliez (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1998). The term also has a life of its own 
beyond these continental walls; in as different a context as a journal devoted to the analytic 
philosophy of mind, it was recently used to discuss Hume’s position on the nature of belief. See 
Hsueh Qu, “Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism,” Mind 126:501 (2017): 53-92. 
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concept of the unconscious of thought’ will be necessarily abstract, and that only the work of the 
chapters themselves will give the concept the determinacy it really involves.  
Second, I present some methodological considerations, most importantly those 
concerning how I try to read and present these thinkers synoptically. That is, I try to indicate 
some principles that are guiding me in my efforts to synthesize these three philosophers. The 
basic problem is that I am not reading for any one particular concept or problem, but instead for 
a pattern of thought across diverse concepts and problems. What I am looking for is a kind of 
metaphilosophical orientation, in which the active power of thought is sought out and affirmed 
not primarily in consciousness but below or behind it. Reading these thinkers with a view toward 
understanding this orientation gave rise to the particular analyses that I carry out below: it led me 
to the petites perceptions in Leibniz, to inadequate ideas and involuntary desire in Spinoza, and 
to unconscious habits in Hume. I will argue that in each of these cases, the philosopher in 
question makes the unconscious of thought absolutely central to their analysis, which in my 
estimation helps account for both their novelty as well as their remarkable explanatory power. 
Third, I will try to situate this project. Against the potential objections of voluntarist 
moral philosophers, I hold that determinism by way of the unconscious of thought does not 
commit one to nihilism or quietist stoicism, let alone moral relativism. I also suggest that this 
project’s philosophical orientation is in accord with a kind of (basically Althusserian) materialist 
epistemology, and (Deleuzian) transcendental empiricism. Once again, I think that these sorts of 
claims can only be sketched in rough outline in an introduction. The work of the chapters will 




1. Philosophy, Genealogy, Symptomatology 
This dissertation constitutes a philosophical contribution to the history of ideas. I claim that in 
the works of certain early modern philosophers, in particular Leibniz, Spinoza, and Hume, we 
can discern the development of a concept of the unconscious of thought. But how to write a 
history of an idea? To go about constructing such a history, one might comb the archives for the 
earliest appearances of the term, note its conceptual contours as its deployment in successive 
contexts forced or reflected its historical development, and, depending on the ambition or 
perhaps the precocity of the historian, suggest that some feature of this developmental arc has 
abiding relevance for the present, whether in everyday practice or as an aspect of contemporary 
discursive formations. Following Foucault, we might call this a genealogical approach to 
constructing the history of a concept.2 
That would be highly valuable and fascinating work. John Shannon Hendrix goes quite 
far in this direction in his Unconscious Thought in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. That text is 
also impressive for its ambition of scope and breadth, especially when compared with other 
histories of the concept, such as Henri Ellenberger’s The Discovery of the Unconscious. 
Ellenberger allows that the conceptual foundations of modern psychoanalytic categories must 
have a long history, and traces them back to so-called magical thinking in archaic societies, but 
nevertheless focuses primarily on the work of early figures from the history of psychoanalysis 
such as Jean-Martin Charcot, Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and Carl Jung. He even 
                                                          
2 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Michel Foucault, Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. 
Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
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gives a precise date—1775—for the birth of dynamic psychoanalysis.3 By contrast, I find 
Hendrix’s genealogy to be more robust and adventurous: he speculatively proposes that the first 
thinker of the unconscious is in fact Plotinus, and dedicates whole chapters to exploring how the 
concept is already operative in the Peripatetics, Ibn Rushd (i.e., Averroes), and German idealists 
like Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. Hendrix writes:  
It is necessary to look to philosophy and psychoanalysis to understand the possible roles 
that unconscious thought plays in more advanced intellective activities. How is 
unconscious thought known, conceived, and apprehended by conscious thought? Is 
conscious thought possible without unconscious thought? In order to ask these questions, 
it is necessary to consider, not just pathologies, as introduced by Freud, but the history of 
philosophy, and the ways in which an unconscious element of thought has been 
conceived, prior to the coining of the term ‘unconscious’, and after.4 
 
I agree with the spirit of this claim entirely. And in fact, some of the very questions that Hendrix 
raises here will also be raised in the chapters below. However, the historical sequence that 
Hendrix presents has a major gap: it rather abruptly jumps from Ibn Rushd and Robert 
Grosseteste, medieval philosophers and theologians of the late 12th and early 13th centuries, 
directly to Kant. But for scattered occasional references to Leibniz and Berkeley, which are all 
made just in order to paint a more complete picture of the sources of Kant’s thinking, Hendrix’s 
reader might come away with the impression that early modernity contributed essentially nothing 
to the development of the concept of the unconscious. Spinoza and Hume, who I will here argue 
develop conceptions of desire and habit that have extremely robust unconscious dimensions, are 
                                                          
3 Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of 
Dynamic Psychiatry (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994). 
 
4 John Shannon Hendrix, Unconscious Thought in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 2. 
6 
not mentioned by Hendrix at all. If it is helpful for the reader, this dissertation may be 
characterized as an effort to fill in this conspicuous lacuna in Hendrix’s work. 
That said, the sort of genealogical approach Hendrix employs is not exactly my own. Of 
course, none of the figures I treat have the word ‘unconscious’ in their vocabularies. The term 
itself was apparently coined later, by Schelling.5 There are points at which they come close. 
Leibniz can probably be said to come closest to directly pointing at the concept, by means of his 
distinction between apperception and perception, since this comes down to a difference between 
conscious and not-necessarily-conscious perception. Spinoza says that infants are “as it were, 
unconscious of themselves [quasi sui inscius]” (E V P6s / CWS I.600 / G II.285). Hume 
sometimes speaks of ideas of which we are ‘insensible’, even though they play a role in the 
operations of our mind. But even here, it is a bit of a stretch to say that any of them make the 
positive claim that there is an unconscious of thought. And other figures that are central in this 
dissertation, like Descartes and Locke, stand at an even farther remove. Indeed—and I hope in 
this regard that I have not produced any strawmen—in the chapters below they are frequently 
invoked to play the role of a negative foil, examples of thinkers whose real lack of a concept of 
the unconscious makes the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume stand out all the more. My 
argument is that, despite the conspicuous terminological absence, there is in fact a robust concept 
of the unconscious of thought that these thinkers articulate when read in the correct light.  
The set of readings presented here, then, seeks to distinguish between the real lack of a 
concept in certain figures and its merely apparent absence in others, in whom, however, the 
indispensible functioning of that very concept hums beneath the surface at almost every key 
                                                          
5 W.F. Bynum, E.J. Browne, and Roy Porter (eds.), Dictionary of the History of Science 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 292. 
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point. Rather than being simply genealogical in a Foucauldian sense, the kind of approach 
adopted here thus also resembles the kind of symptomatic reading that Althusser discusses in 
Reading Capital, in which the conspicuous absences of a text can bear as much significance as 
what it says outright. This kind of reading, he says, “divulges the undivulged event in the text it 
reads, and in the same movement relates it to a different text, present as a necessary absence in 
the first.”6 Since, moreover, Althusser argued that the first thinker even to philosophically pose 
the problem of reading was Spinoza, I have to confess that I find very appealing the idea of 
reflexively performing a symptomatic reading of Spinoza’s own texts—much in the same way 
that Althusser himself claimed only to be following Marx’s protocol for symptomatically reading 
the classical texts of political economy in taking up Marx’s texts themselves.7 In short, if 
symptomatic reading treats the explicit statements of a doctrine as answers to a question nowhere 
explicitly asked, in this dissertation I proceed on the hypothesis that the unasked question of the 
metaphysics of ideas in early modernity is: what is the unconscious of thought? 
Finally, I described this project not just as a contribution to the history of ideas, but as a 
philosophical one. This is because I am interested in tracing out the deployments of the concept 
of the unconscious of thought as a necessary element within (a particular set of) philosophical 
systems. The necessity of a given conceptual element is determined by the conceptual 
                                                          
6 Louis Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” in Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, 
Roger Establet, Pierre Macherey, and Jacques Rancière, Reading Capital: The Complete Edition, 
trans. Ben Brewster and David Fernbach (New York: Verso, 2015), 27. Like Althusser in reading 
Marx, I make no pretension of ‘innocence’ in constructing my readings of early modern 
metaphysics: “a philosophical reading of Capital is quite the opposite of an innocent reading. It 
is a guilty reading, but not one that absolves its crime on confessing it. On the contrary, it takes 
the responsibility for its crime as a ‘justified crime’ and defends it by proving its necessity” 
(Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” 13). 
 
7 See Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” 14-7, 27-9. 
8 
architecture of the system in which it plays a role, and refers ineluctably to the particular 
philosophical problems whose resolution conditioned the development and structure of that 
architecture. This is, incidentally, the sense of ‘dialectics’ that Deleuze defends in Difference & 
Repetition: ideas as the necessity of problems.8 If it is true that the sense of a given concept is 
determined by its role in the systematic unity whose necessity is occasioned by a specific 
problem, this is why it is so difficult to consider abstracted pieces of philosophical systems 
without seriously compromising their coherence and integrity. The typical reception of early 
modern philosophical concepts is overflowing with valuable examples of this point. Consider the 
ostensible absurdity of Leibniz’s claim that ‘this is the best of all possible worlds’ or 
Malebranche’s occasionalist denial of secondary causation, or even the received wisdom 
regarding what constitutes Hume’s ‘empiricism’: when cut out from the context of the systematic 
thought that provides their sense, these are reduced to highly impressionistic concept-sketches, 
and are thereby invariably distorted, to such a degree that they can even appear ridiculous.  
My emphasis on philosophical-systematic context means that I am arguing for the 
necessity of an idea. It is one thing to claim that Leibniz, Spinoza, or Hume happened to have 
some intimation of what today we call the unconscious, and quite another to argue, as I try to do 
here, that their philosophical systems involve the unconscious of thought as an integral concept, 
one that is necessary both as a condition for these systems to function, and also as a consequence 
elaborated by the very functioning of those systems. Programmatically, then, I can say the 
following: I contend that a rational reconstruction of the philosophical systems of Leibniz, 
                                                          
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Continuum, 2001). See 
Dan Smith, “Deleuze, Kant, and the Theory of Ideas,” in Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012); and James Bahoh, “Deleuze’s Theory of Dialectical Ideas: 
The Influence of Lautman and Heidegger,” Deleuze Studies 13:1 (2019): 19-53. 
 
9 
Spinoza, and Hume is in some way incomplete, or inadequate, if it is missing a concept of the 
unconscious of thought.9 
The present work is the result of an approach to the history of ideas that freely—some 
would object, I am sure, too freely—draws on all three of these methodological approaches: it is 
by turns genealogical, symptomatic, and philosophical. I argue that the epistemological 
frameworks and metaphysics of ideas of early modernity, particularly in Leibniz, Spinoza, and 
Hume, necessarily involve and explicate an unconscious of thought insofar as they conceive of 
thought as being objective, and as having a less-than-essential relationship to consciousness. 
Together they insist that the unconscious of thought is not negative: it is, instead, positively 
structured and structuring. There are unconscious perceptions, unconscious elements of 
understanding, volition, and desire, and unconscious habits of thought. These are not defined by 
their absence, as though ‘unconscious’ meant that they are negations of thought insofar as it is 
essentially conscious. Instead, they are positively differentiated determinations of thought insofar 
as it is objectively real. Thus this work is an investigation into the metaphysics of thought more 
than it is an evaluation of merely epistemological categories. 
In at least one sense, my central claim is not a particularly surprising or novel one. The 
notion that what is not consciously recognized has an objective structure might even be called 
the central tenet of Platonism, and it would be absurd to suggest that this idea has somehow gone 
                                                          
9 This is in the spirit of Maimon: “I feel I have comprehended a book only when, after I fill in all 
its gaps, all its ideas cohere with one another” (Salomon Maimon, The Autobiography of 
Salomon Maimon, eds. Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Abraham P. Socher, trans. Paul Reitter 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018], 50). This approach to the history of philosophy is 
what Martial Gueroult called dianoematics (see Martial Gueroult, Dianoématique, vol. 2 [Paris: 
Aubier Montaigne, 1979]). On Gueroult’s dianoematics as a philosophy of the history of 
philosophy, see Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2014), 69-73.  
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unnoticed in the history of western philosophy. But early modern philosophers explored these 
structures of the unconscious of thought in extremely rigorous and important ways that genuinely 
bear little resemblance to those of their predecessors. For Leibniz, consciousness is an 
integration of unconscious elements of perception, imperceptible differentials without which 
consciousness would not even be possible. For Spinoza, thought is one of the attributes of the 
one substance, Deus sive natura, and so has an ineluctably necessary and objective structure 
irrespective of any particular consciousness of it. The desire that each individual is, according to 
Spinoza, is a striving that is only partially accessible to consciousness under certain very precise 
conditions. For Hume, the habitual associations by which the mind moves from one idea to 
another are almost always unconscious, and are certainly formed unconsciously; moreover, any 
efforts to bring them to consciousness in order to attempt to correct them, as Hume 
countenances, are extremely precarious and difficult. In each case, we are not dealing with 
thoughts or ideas that merely happen not to be conscious, but which are structurally and 
necessarily unconscious: perceptions too minute to register in the conscious mind, desires that 
are determined unconsciously by virtue of the unknown ideas that obscurely constitute them, 
associations and habits that are unconsciously formed in the very process of constituting a mind.  
When we read these thinkers together in this light, I claim, we are able to formulate 
answers to questions about the limits of consciousness—and the consequences that follow from 
those limits, which are most obviously epistemological, but which are also crucially ethical and 
political—that have greater explanatory power than those given by philosophers either prior to or 
after the early modern period. If part of my argument is that these early modern thinkers develop 
a genuinely novel concept of the unconscious of thought avant la lettre, my investigation is also 
guided by the intuition that it is a more robust conception than that of many subsequent 
11 
philosophical traditions as well. The former claim is probably less than surprising, precisely 
because the very concept of consciousness was itself coming into being during early modernity. 
As for the latter intuition, I would argue that one of the features of philosophical modernity, in 
particular after Kant, is a kind of overemphasis on consciousness, which I might characterize, 
perhaps somewhat polemically, as an overzealous optimism with regard to the possibility of 
subjectivity transcending its own constitutive limits. Perhaps due to their notable lack of—or 
even, in Spinoza’s case, outright opposition to—a philosophy of history in which the concept of 
history is identified with the idea of teleological progress, the early modern philosophers in 
question here are extremely skeptical about the prospects of such historical transcendence by the 
historically constituted subject. The unconscious of thought that they elaborate, consequently, is 
in no way minimized or downplayed, but instead is allowed to take on the full scope of its proper 
determining power. It is as if the unconscious of thought were somehow unleashed during the 
reflections of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before an increasingly confident modern 
subjectivity repressed it with its imperial consciousness. And part of the dissertation’s implicit 
claim is that this peculiar feature of early modern philosophy—as well as others not discussed 
here, surely, and in other periods as much as in early modernity—is best accessed by a reading 
that allows itself to engage with the history of ideas genalogically, symptomatically, and 
philosophically, as the investigation demands. 
 
2. The Unconscious of Thought 
To get a sense for what I mean when I say that the concept of the unconscious of thought allows 
for a rigorous reframing of longstanding philosophical problems, let us briefly consider, by way 
of example, the ancient problem of akrasia, that is, incontinence or lack of self-control. I take 
12 
this problem to be paradigmatic here: I hold that its proper articulation, and consequently its 
resolution, is only truly possible by means of the concept of the unconscious of thought. Spinoza 
obsesses over this problem, which informs the whole of his work: how is it possible that we see 
the better but do the worse, a possibility that seems to be confirmed by daily experience?10 The 
locus classicus of this problem is Plato’s Protagoras, in which Socrates explicitly states that 
what one understands to be good is irresistibly desirable: 
[No] one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, 
something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing 
what is better. To give in to oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to control 
oneself is nothing other than wisdom. […] 
 
Now, no one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in 
human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to 
the good. And when he is forced to choose between one of two bad things, no one will 
choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser.11 
 
If Socrates is right about this, then we seem to have to accept that when people act in ways 
contrary to their well-being, this must express a lack of knowledge on their part, since if they had 
adequate knowledge their desires would be correctly determined in accordance with what really 
is good for them. Hence the Platonic conclusion here is that the only real evil is in fact ignorance, 
since the actual possession of knowledge immediately solves the problem of misguided desire. 
On the one hand, this Platonic framing is very close to Spinoza’s line of thinking when he 
argues that human beings, insofar as they are determined ex ducto rationis, or according to 
reason, always agree and act in such a way that is beneficial for themselves and others, whereas 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., E III P2s / CWS I.496 / G II.143. 
 
11 Plato, Protagoras, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 
358c-d. 
13 
by contrast, insofar as they are determined ex suo ingenio, or in accordance with their own 
idiosyncratic temperament, which is a product of chance encounters, they tend to disagree and 
are led to do what is worse.12 However, on the other hand, Spinoza clearly disagrees with this 
Platonic argument in a crucial way. For Spinoza, in fact, the problem is that even when we have 
adequate knowledge, our desires can be determined such that we act otherwise than what this 
knowledge countenances as the best course of action. That is, contra Socrates, Spinoza does not 
think that if only someone knew what was really better, they would never do the worse. As 
Spinoza writes: “No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it 
is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (E IV P14 / CWS I.553 / G II.219). 
Because “nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar 
as it is true” (E IV P1 / CWS I. 547 / G II.211), our affective determination can remain 
stubbornly backward even when someone presents a convincing argument about why it is 
incorrect, or about what would constitute a genuinely better way to act. The real issue, in other 
words, is that not even consciously recognizing the truth of the true necessarily determines us to 
live rationally, so that the problem is not simply ignorance. Spinoza recognizes that the truth is, 
in fact, relatively impotent on its own; a true idea can determine us to act, but only insofar as it 
engenders a more powerful affect than those that presently structure our desire—that is, not 
insofar as it happens to be true. The question of the power of an idea, for Spinoza, is importantly 
disarticulated from that of its veracity. 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., E I App. / CWS I.440 / G II.78); and IV P39s1 / CWS I.565/ G II.236. On Spinoza’s 
concept of ingenium in the phrase ‘ex suo ingenio’, see Pierre-François Moreau, Spinoza: 
L’expérience et l’éternité (Paris: PUF, 1994), part II, chapter 3; and François Zourabichvili, 
“Individual Identity in Spinoza,” trans. Gil Morejón, Parrhesia (forthcoming). 
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Martin Lin has recently argued that Spinoza’s account of akrasia hinges on the difference 
between temporally distinct motivations of the will—that is, he argues that the lesser intensity of 
rational desires based on a potentially positive future outcome can be overruled by the greater 
intensity of irrational desires in the moment.13 Now it certainly seems correct that this 
occasionally happens, but I do not think it gets at the heart of the matter. At the very least, I 
doubt that this disparity between short- and long-term cost-benefit analyses was sufficiently 
interesting to Spinoza that it would motivate the incessant references to the problem of seeing the 
better and doing the worse across the whole of his corpus: video meliora, proboque, deteriora 
sequor, the philosopher quotes from Ovid’s Metamorphoses (E IV P17s / CWS I.554 / G II.221). 
I argue, instead, that Spinoza’s obsession with this problem points to the concept of the 
unconscious of desire that his philosophical system requires and explicates: it is not that one is 
able to freely will against what one understands to be better, in a morally compromised choice of 
how one exercises one’s power of volition; rather, it is that positive elements in the unconscious 
of thought frequently determine one’s desire in spite of conscious understanding. Lin’s account 
makes it seem as though if opposing courses of action did not appear closer to or farther in time 
from a given subject, akratic desire would never even arise as a possibility. But Spinoza’s 
discovery of the unconscious of desire is much more profound—and consequently more 
troubling—than this would suggest: akratic desire is nearly ubiquitous, because individual 
desires are unconsciously determined in a way that is only accessible to consciousness under 
very specific conditions, and such access does not imply the power to consciously restructure 
                                                          
13 Martin Lin, “Spinoza’s Account of Akrasia,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 7:3 (2006): 
395-414. 
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those desires. The whole conceptual frame of this Spinozist analysis of the problem of akratic 
desire is obviously very different from the Platonic one. 
But what kind of unconscious at work in Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought? And how 
does it relate to consciousness, its conceptual twin? Consciousness is, as Gilles Deleuze argues, 
an integration, “a matter of threshold”:14 a synthesis in the present of complex disunities and 
impure mixtures, selections based on unclear principles and whose matter is obscure. It is 
ambivalently given at best; its genesis is, for us, a matter of inferential reconstruction and 
retrospective positing, never something immediately accessible. I am not simply deluded when I 
admit that I knew something was wrong and wanted it anyway. There is no real contradiction in 
my conscious, volitional opposition to the forms of my actual determination. Rather, this tension 
underscores the unconscious character of the processes of my determination. My determination 
takes place below and behind my consciousness of it. We posit the unconscious axiomatically, as 
a concept that makes it possible to ask after the intelligibility of human behavior given the 
obvious insufficiency of well-intentioned self-conscious expression. Conscious expression and 
reflection are subject to habitual forms that are historically given and unconsciously adopted—
and so too, unavoidably, will be any attempt at critical reflection on this problem. This is what 
Althusser means when he says that philosophy, and even that of scientists, is itself a mode of 
ideology.15 At the same time, the unconscious of thought is always involved in a particular 
                                                          
14 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 101. 
 
15 See Louis Althusser, “Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,” in 
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, ed. Gregory Elliott, trans. Ben 
Brewster, James H. Kavanagh, Thomas E. Lewis, Grahame Lock, and Warren Montag (New 
York: Verso, 2015). This is why the very first thesis he presents in that lecture course is 
‘dogmatic’ and obviously circular: “Thesis 1. Philosophical propositions are Theses” (Althusser, 
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consciousness, as something that cannot but be expressed, even if this expression is obscure, 
incomplete, involuntary, or imperceptible.  
The fact that a set of unconscious determinations finds oblique expression in 
consciousness does not mean that the unconscious is isomorphic to these expressions; we should 
not imagine that the unconscious is structured ‘like’ the habituated forms in which we are 
determined to express it as consciousness. It would be a kind of transcendental illusion to assume 
that the unconscious, as that which grounds consciousness, somehow resembles what it 
grounds.16 But on the other hand, if we need a concept of the unconscious to navigate the 
apparent contradiction of an involuntary consciousness, surely this unconsciousness cannot be 
absolutely indifferent to conscious expression. Or, we might say that the problem of relating the 
unconscious of thought to consciousness leads to a Rousseauian dilemma: whenever we think we 
have identified the conditions for the possibility of the genesis of consciousness in the 
unconscious of thought itself, we will have succeeded only in pushing the structures of 
consciousness into the unconscious and subseuqently ‘discovering’ them there. 
If there is an ahistorical aspect to the unconscious, it is the simple fact of its existence, the 
naturans to conscious naturata.17 The potential risk in this formulation is that it seems to align 
                                                          
“Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists”, 74). The circularity here is, to 
borrow a phrase from the language of computer programming, not a bug but a feature. 
 
16 This is one of the great lessons taught by Deleuze. “[T]his bestowal of sense, on the basis of 
the immanent quasi-cause and the static genesis which ensues for the other dimensions of the 
proposition, may occur only within a transcendental field which would correspond to the 
conditions posed by Sartre in his decisive article of 1937: an impersonal transcendental field, not 
having the form of a synthetic personal consciousness or subjective identity—with the subject, 
on the contrary, being always constituted. The foundation can never resemble what it founds” 
(Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, trans. Constantin V. 
Boundas [New York: Columbia University Press, 1990], 98-9). 
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all productivity, generativity, and creativity with the unconscious, and consequently relegates 
consciousness at once to both reproduction and sterility (a fundamentally misogynistic 
conceptual couplet). Instead, we should say that consciousness and the unconscious both play 
roles in the social processes of production and reproduction, but that subjective consciousness is 
incapable of grasping or comprehending these processes as the concrete totality they 
synthetically constitute. Conscious expression is always expressive of a process that also 
involves unconscious determinations. This process as a whole is necessarily social and historical, 
but it is not entirely expressed at the level of consciousness.  
The unconscious is a concept of the involuntary, an idea axiomatically necessary as a 
corollary to the principle of sufficient reason in the domain of human action and behavior. It is 
resolutely opposed to all idealist fictions of purely self-determining subjectivity and voluntarist 
decisionism. This is why Schelling, in his System of Transcendental Idealism, names the 
unconscious as the ineradicable element of necessity that stands opposed to the free act of the 
will as its objective condition and obstacle.18 But it is from Leibniz, Spinoza, and Hume that I 
                                                          
17 See E I P29s / CWS I.434 / G II.71. 
 
18 “Freedom is to be necessity, and necessity freedom. But now in contrast to freedom, necessity 
is nothing else but the unconscious [das Bewußtlose]. That which exists in me without 
consciousness is involuntary [unwillkürlich]; that which exists with consciousness is in me 
through my willing. [… The] conscious, or that freely determining activity which we deduced 
earlier on, is to be confronted with an unconscious, whereby out of the most uninhibited 
expression of freedom there arises unawares something wholly involuntary, and perhaps even 
contrary to the agent’s will, which he himself could never have realized through his willing. […] 
Such intervention of a hidden necessity into human freedom is presupposed, not only, say, in 
tragedy, whose sole existence rests on that presumption, but even in normal doing and acting” 
(F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath [Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 2001], 204; Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling [Stuttgart and 
Augsburg: J.G. Cotta’scher Verlag, 1856-61], Volume III, 594). 
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would like to excavate elements for a theory of the unconscious of thought as materially and 
even historically conditioned on the one hand, and as determining the conditions for and limits of 
conscious thought on the other. There is no escape from the circle of necessity, except by 
espousing an irrationalism, the possibility of whose intelligibility vanishes along with that of any 
human action. For the image of voluntarist decisionism asks us to accept ‘for no reason’ as the 
final cause of concrete human actions.19 And while Spinoza and Hume are explicit in their 
rejection of such a model of self-determination in favor of the external, involuntary, and 
unconscious determination of subjects, even Leibniz’s theory of inclination, his attempt to save 
the metaphysical freedom of the subject, cannot help but become a doctrine of subjective 
necessity, as I will argue in Chapter 1. For my purposes, the issue is not whether it is possible to 
salvage these doctrines without the metaphysics of a God or substance that, while once providing 
their ground, have become distasteful or suspect to modern readers; instead it is a matter of 
positing the necessity of subjective determination as an axiom without which human action is 
unintelligible in principle. For we do indeed often see the better and do the worse; the question is 




                                                          
19 A contemporary version of such irrationalism can be found in Meillassoux’s After Finitude, 
where the ‘principle of unreason’ is given as that there “is no reason for anything to be or to 
remain the way it is; everything must, without reason, be able not to be and/or be able to be other 
than it is” (Quentin Meilllassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier [New York: Bloomsbury, 2010], 60). This is presented as a consequence of 
Meillassoux’s grappling with what he calls ‘Hume’s Problem’. How anything meaningfully, that 
is, nontrivially intelligible about actual states of affairs, bodies, facts, relations, or concepts could 
still be said once this principle is accepted remains entirely unclear to me. 
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3. Involuntary Freedom 
There do follow a number of consequences that might strike some as pessimistic. If ‘Spinozism’ 
was for a long time used as a term of abuse denoting fatalism, then I will be accused not only of 
having accepted this fatalism but of having turned Hume and Leibniz into fatalists as well. For 
example, if Leibniz is right to define freedom as the proportion of active to passive thought, or 
conscious to unconscious perception, as we will see in the first chapter, then it turns out that 
freedom is infinitesimally small: a vanishing quantum of conscious activity perpetually 
submitted to the laws of indistinctness and obscurity. Hume and Spinoza, on the other hand, 
flatly deny that there is such a thing as human freedom, if by ‘freedom’ we mean ‘spontaneous 
self-determination’. Our putative experience of this kind of freedom, for Spinoza, is in fact just a 
function of the epistemic gap between the real determining power of the unconscious of thought 
and our typically weak conscious grasp of the nature of things. Hume, for his part, denies that 
such putative experience is even possible.  
The standard line of criticism against various forms of involuntarism has always been 
that the denial of spontaneous human self-determination entails a nihilistic stoicism at best, 
leading to the necessary collapse of anything like a genuine ethics. And to be sure, many typical 
articulations of moral philosophy do indeed require the spontaneous freedom of the subject, so it 
is easy to see why the denial of the latter looks to many like the renunciation of the former. Thus 
Kant’s basic reaction to Spinoza’s ‘righteousness’ in the Critique of Judgment is one of stunned 
incomprehension: the relentless indifference of nature to morals, the unnecessary evils suffered 
by the virtuous, Kant thinks, should by rights have broken Spinoza. Kant concludes that in spite 
of Spinoza’s denial of physical teleology, the heretic’s apparent reverence for the moral law 
means that he must have been implicitly committed to a moral teleology and a moral author of 
20 
the world.20 The alternative, for Kant, if not outright unintelligible, is certainly nihilistic.21 A 
similar point could be made about how Kant finds Hume’s own reputedly irreproachable moral 
conduct basically unintelligible in light of what he takes to be the untenable essence of Hume’s 
metacritical skepticism.22 
However, I do not think that the denial of spontaneous self-determination is nihilistic, nor 
do I think that it entails pessimism. Quite the contrary: as a Spinozist, I am committed to the joy 
that the power of thought necessarily involves insofar as it is active. But thought is active even 
when it is unconscious. The polemical target, then, of this work is any conception of thought in 
which only conscious thought is allowed activity; any formulation in which thought is conceived 
as active and positive insofar as it is conscious, and passive and negative insofar as it is 
unconscious. Such a conception is, to be blunt, false, and from it follow precisely the sad 
passions that Spinoza ceaselessly denounces as debilitating. There is nothing sadder than 
thinking oneself to be spontaneously self-determining while really being determined by external 
causes. Even real joys are mutilated in that light: they become pale confusions, determining one 
to continue along the path of passivity and sadness. But this dissertation is not a polemic: it is a 
joyful exploration of the unconscious of thought in its positivity and difference. Coming to 
understand these unconscious structures is a necessary step along the way toward grasping for 
                                                          
20 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 
§87; 336-7. 
 
21 See Omri Boehm, Kant’s Critique of Spinoza (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), for 
a detailed reading of Kant’s critical system as an attempt to deal with (Jacobian) Spinozism as 
the metaphysical collapse into nihilism. This excellent work, which however I would argue 
misunderstands Spinoza in some important ways, deserves a more detailed engagement than is 
possible in the present dissertation. 
 
22 See CPR A745/B773-A769/B797. 
21 
ourselves the nature of our own determination, and this does indeed deserve the name of 
freedom. Consider Leibniz’s peculiar metaphysics of differentials: these vanishingly small 
quanta, which may appear as nothing beside the infinite actualities to which they are intrinsically 
related, are in fact not nothing; and the same must be said for freedom, an ephemeral degree of 
activity in an ocean of passive determination, infinitesimally small but still not nothing. Perhaps 
this is a disheartening picture when compared to the radiant myth of spontaneous self-
determination, that masculine and imperialist imaginary of sovereign subjective independence; 
but it would surely be sadder to continue to long for the promises of this destructive mythos 
when the alternative is open to us to leave it behind and explore the vibrant possibilities of a 
freedom without spontaneity and independence—that is, freedom without voluntarism. Or as 
Spinoza put it, too many philosophers have “learned how to praise in many ways a human nature 
which doesn’t exist anywhere, and how to bewail the way men really are. They conceive men not 
as they are, but as they want them to be” (TP I.1 / CWS II.503 / G III.273).  
Why was it possible for this concept of the unconscious of thought to be so rigorously 
formulated in early modernity? Here I can only venture some hypotheses. For one thing, it is in 
early modernity that the concept of consciousness came to be directly thematized, and the 
unconscious is its necessary corollary. This is to say that there is some truth to the claim that 
modernity is essentially defined in reference to subjectivity, and subjectivity necessarily involves 
some concept of the unconscious.23 Spinozist, Leibnizian, and Humean subjects have astonishing 
                                                          
23 By this I in no way mean to claim that subjectivity is the essentially determinative concept of 
modernity; it will be sufficient if the reader grants me that consciousness or subjectivity 
constitutes one of its key conceptual aspects. After all, as David Lachterman wrote in his 
remarkable genealogy of modernity, The Ethics of Geometry, “reflection upon the possible unity 
of ‘modernity’ as well as frustration with its elusiveness seem somehow part and parcel of the 
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depths: these thinkers teach us that subjectivity involves necessarily unconscious thought to an 
extraordinary degree. To identify the whole of thought with conscious expression (as for instance 
Locke does, as I will briefly show at the beginning of Chapter 1) is to misunderstand all the 
concrete logics of subjective determination. In that case, why were Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume 
able to reach the postulate of an unconscious of thought that is positive and determinate, while 
some of their contemporaries did not? This question is much more difficult to answer. I might 
suggest that this partially results from their pragmatic or realist orientation: their desire for the 
active constitution of transformative ethical practice led them to recognize clearly that 
consciousness alone could not possibly account for the nature of human activity, which so 
frequently runs counter to what is consciously grasped as good. If we posit that subjectivity is 
defined and determined exclusively in terms of consciousness, then we will remain structurally 
incapable of answering the question of why we often see the better and do the worse, and our 
transformative aspirations will be condemned to impotent confusion from the start.  
That is why this project, which in its details will focus almost exclusively on ostensibly 
esoteric questions of metaphysics and epistemology, must be understood as being essentially 
political in its guiding orientation. That is, the theory of the unconscious of thought as articulated 
in early modern philosophy has much to teach us about the mechanics of ideologies. As I write 
this, it must be confessed, things are going rather badly: late capitalist climate change is 
eradicating the very ecology and biosphere that constitute the material conditions for the 
possibility of terrestrial life; racist nationalism is resurging across the global north; toxic 
masculinity and white supremacism refuse to die; thirty years of neoliberal technocracy have 
                                                          
phenomenon of modernity itself” (David Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of 
Modernity [New York: Routledge, 1989], 1). 
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opened onto a broken dialectic of frustrated progressive class struggle and reactionary backlash. 
In this context, it is extremely important for us to understand the nature and logic of subjective 
determination: none of the ideological justifications for these historical tendencies has a 
genuinely rational basis, but they all seem to function perfectly well. Spinoza and Hume, again, 
recognized that the determining power of ideas has nothing to do with their rational validity. 
They proceed by distinguishing the question of the power of ideas from that of their veracity, and 
the philosophical consequences of this critical disarticulation are monumental.  
There may have been historical reasons why they were inclined to effect this 
disarticulation. Perhaps Spinoza’s experience of the murder of the brothers De Witt, an extreme 
moment of violent political reaction in seventeenth century Holland, ultimi barbarorum, pushed 
him in this direction.24 And it is certainly possible that Hume was similarly frustrated with the 
ideological incoherence of the Jacobite rebellions and eighteenth-century Tory propagandists, in 
light of their stubborn resilience and continued political effectiveness.25 This is of course only 
speculative, and risks leaving behind the philosophical for the historiographic or biographical. 
But it is at least true that, in the tumultuous political landscape of early modernity, the conditions 
existed for a discerning thinker to realize that the truth-content of an ideological formation has 
little to do with its effectiveness or actuality. 
                                                          
24 See Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza (New York: Routledge, 2008), 26-7; and Gilles Deleuze, 
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 
12-13. 
 
25 See F.J. McLynn, “Jacobitism and David Hume: The Ideological Backlash Foiled,” Hume 
Studies 9:2 (1983): 171-199. 
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Instead, its effectiveness has everything to do with affect. Spinoza has rightly enjoyed 
something of a renaissance in recent years as so-called affect theory has risen in prominence,26 
but Hume and Leibniz could also contribute substantially to that discussion in ways that are not 
so often recognized. A moment’s reflection shows that Hume’s famous subordination of reason 
to the passions can serve as a maxim for the project of ideology critique: it is at the level of their 
capacity to effectively engender passions and affects that ideologies must be engaged, since the 
question of their veracity or rational ground is actually trivial from this perspective. As I will 
explore in detail in Chapter 4, Hume is entirely correct when he identifies belief as absolutely 
central, as indispensibly necessary for the most basic operations of conscious thought, and at the 
same time denies that it has anything to do with the logic of demonstrative certainty or veracity, 
thus raising the problem of distinguishing belief from mere fiction.27 And Leibniz, as we will 
see, invokes precisely the unconscious elements of perception whenever he critiques the 
inadequate concept of freedom as indifference, arguing that decisions made under conditions of 
apparent indifference are subtended by real imperceptible differentia, unconsciously making 
more desirable the choice that ultimately wins out. Once again, Spinoza’s formulation clearly 
lays out the coordinates of the problem: “No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of 
                                                          
26 For example, consider the preponderance of references to Spinoza as a crucial precursor in: 
Anna Gibbs, “After Affect: Sympathy, Synchrony, and Mimetic Communication,” Gregory J. 
Siegworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” and Megan Watkins, “Desiring 
Recognition, Accumulating Affect,” in The Affect Theory Reader, eds. Melissa Gregg and 
Gregory J. Siegworth (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy 
of Affect,” Cultural Critique 31 (1995): 83-109; and Brian Massumi, Politics of Affect (Malden: 
Polity Press, 2015). 
 
27 See EHU V.10-12 / 47-9. 
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good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (E III P14 / 
CWS I.553 / G II.219).  
How do we account for the determining power of a given affect? Why does one ideal 
configuration affect us more strongly than another, if its veracity cannot account for this force? 
My claim is that any minimally adequate account of an idea’s determining power must 
necessarily involve the unconscious of thought. The dicethrow of this project is thus as follows. I 
wager on investigating the unconscious dimensions of perception, desire, and habit or belief, in 
order to try to find resources by which we might learn to perceive differently, to unmake our 
desires, to actively disbelieve, to try to form better habits of thought. Along the way, this 
investigation might allow us to get a sense for what is necessary and sufficient for an ideal 
formation to be affectively powerful enough to produce real effects at the level of subjective 
determination. What is required is to develop the capacity of active thought to intervene in the 
processes of subjective genesis, which precede and subtend consciousness. Hence the spirit of 
this project is aligned with that of Theodor Adorno when he wrote that philosophy must “use the 
strength of the constituted subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity.”28  
 
4. Empiricism and Materialist Epistemology 
Critical philosophy begins with the question of where and how one must begin, which is why it 
is an inherently reflexive and self-reflexive theoretical practice. Empiricism answers this 
question in a way that appears, at first glance, to be an empty tautology: we can only begin with 
what is given. At the formal level of its pure concept, Hegel is surely right about ‘the given’: it is 
                                                          
28 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Routledge, 2004), xx. 
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a name for empty identity, and the immediate vacuousness of ‘here’ and ‘now’ is enough to push 
the movement of thought onward.29 But what is empirically given is never simply identical. 
Hence there is an immediate distinction to be made between the conceptual identity of any ‘this’, 
which in fact expresses the indifference of the universal to the non-identity of empirical 
experiences, and the real difference between every ‘this’, which escapes the universal 
determinations of the concept of the given.30 To begin with the given is not, therefore, to begin 
with immediate identity or conceptual indifference; it is rather to begin with irreducible 
multiplicity and real difference. As Deleuze writes, justifying his formulation of empiricism and 
pluralism as an inclusive disjunction, while so-called rationalism commences with the postulate 
of an abstraction and seeks the conditions for its empirical instantiation, empiricism “starts with 
a completely different evaluation: analysing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-
existent concepts can be extracted from them. States of things are neither unities nor totalities, 
but multiplicities.”31 
The rationalist objection to this approach, which is radicalized in the Hegelian effort to 
exclude from philosophy all objective and subjective presuppositions, is that too much or too 
little is always delivered to philosophical reflection in its attempt to start with the given. Either 
‘the given’ includes too much, because the apparent immediacy of the given is subtended by and 
expressive of a vast network of socio-historical and metaphysical or logical mediations; or too 
                                                          
29 G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), §§90-110. 
 
30 See Bruce Baugh, “Transcendental Empiricism: Deleuze’s Response to Hegel,” Man and 
World 25:2 (1992): 133-148. 
 
31 Gilles Deleuze and Clare Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Hammerjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), vii. 
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little, because thought finds itself unable to move beyond the merely hypothetical mode, that is, 
to raise itself to the properly philosophical level of necessity and universality. This is why 
empiricism is constantly threatened by two forms of idealist relapse: on the one hand, a pure 
analytics in which one derives the mediations through which immediacy has its possibility and 
meaning, an anamnetics or geometrics of sense (phenomenology), and on the other, a fetishism 
of the immediate according to which the passage beyond apparent contingency to scientific 
systematicity is barred in advance as a matter of speculative agnostics (positivism). Here one can 
sense the proximity of Adorno and Althusser, whose otherwise very different approaches to 
Marxist philosophy are united in their polemical critiques of these two tendencies in thought, 
understood as intimately connected modes of ideological regress in epistemology—two poles at 
which, as Paul Feyerabend says, the empiricist deflation of metaphysical commitments “is on the 
best way to becoming a dogmatic metaphysical system.”32  
At either of these extremes, empiricism becomes an uncritical means for carrying out a 
program of legitimating the existent. It becomes epistemological conservatism. Idealist 
epistemology is marked by its effort to produce criteria for legitimation, or logics of justification, 
for the sanction of already existing practices of knowledge and objects of belief. It is a rights 
discourse at the level of thought: idealist epistemology asks whether we have the right to the 
knowledge we already have.33 Kant explicitly articulates the logic of this tendency: 
When teachers of law talk about rights and claims, they distinguish in a legal action the 
question regarding what is legal (quid iuris) from the question concerning fact (quid 
                                                          
32 Paul Feyerabend, “How to be a good empiricist,” in Knowledge, Science, and Relativism: 
Philosophical Papers Vol. III (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 81. 
 
33 An effort, incidentally, of dubious merit: “science can stand on its own feet and does not need 
any help from rationalists, secular humanists, Marxists…” (Paul Feyerabend, Against Method 
[New York: Verso, 2010], xviii). 
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facti), and they demand the proof of both. The first proof, which is to establish the right, 
or for that matter the legal entitlement, they call the deduction. [...] I distinguish 
transcendental deduction from empirical deduction, which indicates in what way a 
concept has been acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, 
and which therefore concerns not the concept’s legitimacy but only the fact whereby we 
came to possess it. (CPR A84/B116) 
 
Idealist epistemology understands itself as posing the question quid iuris, that is, what are the 
grounds for the legitimacy of applying concepts as we do? What right do we have to the 
knowledge we already possess? But this presupposes that thinking is already actual, that true 
knowledge exists, and that its process is ultimately a matter of course—a presupposition Deleuze 
calls the good sense of common sense, or the dogmatic image of thought.34 If the Kantian 
suggestion of an oppositional philosophical typology of rationalism and empiricism is 
inadequate, evidence for its inadequacy is found in the fact that Hume and Spinoza agree on 
precisely this point: the skeptical empiricist and the rationalist metaphysician both treat thinking 
as something that must be accomplished, a surprising navigation of numerous complications, an 
almost unbelievable achievement as rare as it is difficult.35 It is not surprising that thought 
sometimes falls into error; what is surprising is that it is occasionally possible for thinking to 
occur at all, that it sometimes happens that an unassignable threshold is crossed and a real 
movement of thought erupts from within an objective milieu of thoughtlessness.36 Such surprise 
                                                          
34 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, ch. 3. 
 
35 See E V P42s / CWS I.617 / G II.308. 
 
36 Spinoza’s role here is perhaps less obvious than Hume’s, since the former has been 
influentially interpreted as an arch exemplar of dogmatic (uncritical) rationalism by the German 
Idealists. But Deleuze rightly identifies this objective surprise as one of the motivating concerns 
of Spinozism: “The whole problem is therefore: How do we manage to have, to form adequate 
ideas, since our natural condition determines us to have only inadequate ideas?” (Deleuze, 
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 75-6).  
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is the orienting passion and affective disposition of transcendental empiricism; its practical 
correlate in materialist epistemology is the active construction of new modes of knowledge, 
which involves a critical interrogation of the objective logics of apparent immediacy and the 
currently existing milieus of non-thought or the unthought, that is, the positive, determining 
power of thought that is unconscious—or, in a word, ideology critique.37 
The fact that empiricism begins with the given means that it sets out from nonidentity, 
and the question it needs to answer is: how is it occasionally possible that determinate relations 
are postulated on the basis of the differentially given? In this context, Hume’s principles of 
association constitute a typology of external relations posited between nonidentical terms. As we 
will see in Chapter 4, the epistemic consequences here are far-reaching: claims about matters of 
fact will only be possible as synthetic, that is, as habits and not as reason. But this is the case 
because contiguity, resemblance, and causality relate terms that are always strictly nonidentical. 
Empiricism asks after the logic according to which, for instance, an objective resemblance 
between nonidentical givens is subjectively registered, which is also to ask after the determinate 
conditions under which what is given constitutes an occasional cause for the postulate of a 
differential resemblance. That the given can constitute an occasional cause for such a postulate is 
not the same as its constituting a sufficient reason. If associated relata were identical, then we 
                                                          
37 Althusser writes: “perceptions and images [Anschauung und Vorstellung] were treated by 
Marx as abstractions, and I attributed to this abstraction the state of the concrete or of experience 
as you find it in Spinoza’s first level of knowledge—that is, in my language, the status of the 
ideological” (Althusser, “Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy?” in Philosophy and the 
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, ed. Gregory Elliott, trans. Ben Brewster, James H. 
Kavanagh, Thomas E. Lewis, Grahame Lock, and Warren Montag [New York: Verso, 2012], 
226). Althusser suggests that the theory of the epistemological break, and the distinction between 
ideology and science, is, even before Canguilhem and Bachelard, already elaborated in 
Spinoza—and even in the early Spinoza of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Understanding. 
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could not say that they bear a resemblance, are contiguous, or stand in a causal relation; we 
would have to say that they were simply identical. In fact, in association we posit a relation 
between nonidentical terms whose concepts do not involve each other, that is, we posit external 
relations. Empiricism therefore begins with given differences and remains with their nonidentity: 
there is no question of deriving some objective identity on the basis of what is differentially 
given as nonidentical. Hume teaches us, for instance, that what is repeated in sense is never a 
pure identical instance (A and A) but always nonidentical cases involving impure mixtures (AB 
and AC).38 The principles of association are principles of selection: syntheses that are apparently 
posited immediately and spontaneously, but whose apparent spontaneity is a function of 
objective processes of social habituation, which, I argue, are unconscious. 
There is thus another sense to the question of ‘where we begin’, in which what is at stake 
is a matter of subjective demarcation or genesis: where does the world end, and where do we 
begin as subjects? Here transcendental empiricism becomes properly speculative, since it posits 
an immanent identity between, on the one hand, the process of social habituation that gives rise 
to the apparent immediacy of ideal associations, and, on the other, the process of subjective 
genesis. The subject or the mind is nothing other than its spontaneous ideal associations, whose 
logic and apparent immediacy are the result of social processes of unconscious habituation. 
Where the question raised is that of the possibility of the postulate of objective identity on the 
basis of the differentially given, the anamnetic doctrine of innate ideas eminently fails to suffice 
as an answer, as Leibniz argued; besides which, the indifferent identity of ideas supposedly 
innate to human minds would thereby be incapable of accounting for the real differences 
                                                          
38 See Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (New York: Continuum, 
2006), 14-6. 
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involved in subjective individuation.39 For the same reason, the Lockean tabula rasa involves 
only what is indifferently universal, never what is irreducibly singular about individual subjects. 
Empiricism remains at the level of the differentially given, the nonidentity of the repeated, in 
order to pose rigorously the problem of subjective constitution, or of the actual genesis of 
subjects. Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz constantly argue for the analytically unresolvable 
character of subjective knowledge, our inability to separate out clearly that which in a 
representation or imagination is ‘ours’ and that which is ‘from without’, or as I will put it, they 
argue that consciousness obscurely involves a complex unconscious of thought. Transcendental 
empiricism affirms the analytic ambiguity or topological indistinction between the subjective and 
objective, or the interior and exterior. In this sense, where we begin is not and can never be 
clearly given. As Maimon wrote, “‘given’ means only this: a representation that arises in us in an 
unknown [unbekanst] way.”40 In their uncompromising fidelity to this founding insight, Leibniz, 
Spinoza, and Hume, although obviously pre-Kantian, cannot be called pre-critical. 
 
5. Outline of the Project 
This project will unfold across four chapters. In each chapter I engage primarily with one of the 
main figures of the investigation, and with a particular focus on one aspect of the unconscious of 
thought: Leibniz on the unconscious of perception (Chapter 1), Spinoza on the unconscious of 
ideas and desire (Chapters 3 and 4), and Hume on the unconscious of habit (Chapter 4). At first 
glance, this organization might be read as quasi-dialectical in a Hegelian mode, as in: perception 
                                                          
39 See NE I.I.1-5 / 74-7. 
 
40 Solomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-
Hall, Alistair Welchman, and Martin Reglitz (New York: Continuum, 2010), 108. 
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turns out to presuppose desire, which turns out to presuppose habit, so that the project may be 
read as beginning with what appears as maximally immediate, and then dialectically unfolding 
the progressively more complex concepts that subtend the merely apparent immediacy of that 
starting-point. However, that reading would be slightly misleading, since this is not the only 
direction in which this ‘unfolding’ might be played out. This is because perception, desire, ideas, 
and habits form a complex knot of intrinsically interconnected modalities of thought that can 
only heuristically be separated for the purposes of presentational simplicity; in the end it is 
impossible properly to understand any of them without reference to all the others. It would also 
have been possible, for example, to show that the formation of habits is only possible on the 
basis of desire, which presupposes perception and ideas.  
In other words, the structure of my exposition here should by no means lead one to think 
that, for instance, only Hume of the three major figures discussed has anything to teach us about 
the unconscious of habit, or that only Leibniz recognizes the unconscious of perception. Still less 
should one think that Spinozist desire does not involve habits or associations, or that Leibnizian 
perception does not involve desire. I consider this division to be heuristically helpful, at least, 
and partially justified by the differences in emphasis found in these different thinkers: Leibniz 
clearly does tell us more about the unconscious of perception than does Hume or Spinoza, for 
example. But this does not mean that any of these figures are exclusively focused on the aspect I 
have ‘assigned’ them, so to speak, that the arrangement of the chapters below testifies to an order 
of logical or conceptual priority, or even that this way of arranging their contributions in light of 
the thematic of the unconscious of thought is the only possible one. 
In Chapter 1, “The Obscure Dust of the World: The Unconscious of Perception in 
Leibniz”, I develop and present a reading of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics that highlights the 
33 
central role played by his concept of petites perceptions. This concept provides us with a first 
foray into the unconscious of thought in the constitution of conscious thought. I reconstruct his 
arguments for the existence of these perceptions and concerning their nature insofar as they are 
unconscious, and unpack the consequences that this notion entails for his concept of freedom. I 
will show that, in spite of Leibniz’s avowed desire to save the concept of freedom as 
spontaneous, volitional self-determination, consistency and rigor demands that this desire be 
frustrated in light of the theory of petites perceptions. But I also argue that while Leibniz’s desire 
to save the concept must be abandoned, the same is not true for the concept of freedom itself; 
rather, the petites perceptions force it to undergo a serious revaluation. Reformulated in terms of 
the degree of activity of a given subject, the concept of freedom, I show, is structurally 
isomorphic to that of the petites perceptions, insofar as they both express an infinitesimally small 
power of thought that, nevertheless, is not nothing. I therefore argue that Leibniz’s recognition of 
the reality of unconscious perception transforms freedom from being a state of affairs whose 
conditions are already met into a genuinely infinite task for thought: to become active. 
The next two chapters together form an argument according to which Spinoza shows us 
the irreducible and ineradicable significance of the unconscious of thought for desire. In Chapter 
2, “Inevitable and Persistent Inadequacies: The Unconscious of Ideas in Spinoza”, I begin by 
giving an account of Spinoza’s reformulation of the Cartesian epistemic framework of clarity 
and distinctness into his own framework of adequate and inadequate knowledge. This 
framework, I show, is distinguished by its emphasis on actuality and genesis, or sufficient reason 
as opposed to non-contradiction: adequate knowledge clearly and distinctly involves its own 
cause, whereas inadequate knowledge only obscurely involves its own cause. I then reconstruct a 
substantial argumentative thread of the second part of the Ethics, which as I show is primarily 
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concerned with demonstrating the great extent to which we are strictly incapable of forming 
adequate knowledge about ourselves or others, which is also to say the extent to which we are 
strictly incapable of being fully conscious of the ideas that constitute our own minds. In other 
words, Spinoza argues that we are, not just accidentally, but structurally and necessarily, 
determined to have inadequate knowledge in the vast majority of cases. I then return to the 
question of this epistemic reframing and argue that Spinoza undertakes it in the service of the 
problematic of increasing one’s power rather than establishing certainty for itself. Finally, I 
consider Spinoza’s arguments for the unavoidable persistence of inadequate ideas, and their 
continued determining power as modes of thought, even in the context of the formation of more 
adequate ones. In this way I connect the structure of Spinoza’s epistemic framework to the 
problematic of freedom and activity laid out in the preceding chapter, while pointing forward to 
the next chapter’s explicit engagement with Spinoza’s theory of desire. 
Chapter 3, “Inadequate and Involuntary Desire: The Unconscious of Desire in Spinoza”, 
combines the insights from the preceding with a major claim from the end of the second part of 
the Ethics, according to which understanding and volition are not really distinct but instead are 
identical. I reconstruct in detail Spinoza’s argument for this identity claim and illustrate the 
extent to which it separates him from his contemporaries. I proceed to argue that the conjunction 
of this identity claim with the previous chapter’s arguments for the necessarily unconscious 
character of significant aspects of subjective understanding have the immediate consequence that 
desire is irreducibly determined by unconscious ideas, and show how Spinoza’s theory of affect 
provides a robust account of how this determination takes place through the imagination. To 
show this I will argue for a precise conception of the relation between Spinozist volition and 
desire. Finally, I argue that this account of unconscious determination by means of affect makes 
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it necessary to ask after the structure of the habits of thought that we develop in experience and 
which provide one aspect of the answer to the question of why some ideal formations are more 
powerful for us than others. Moreover, I suggest that the mechanisms of imaginary mediation 
that engender the affects, on Spinoza’s account, are precisely the principles of association that 
Hume places at the heart of his metacritique of epistemology, which opens onto the final chapter. 
Chapter 4, “Passages of the Mind: The Unconscious of Habit in Hume”, explores the 
philosopher’s arguments for the ineradicable and problematic status of belief, primarily in the 
Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. I argue that, 
according to Hume, thoughts about matters of fact are unavoidably synthetic, which means that 
they constitute objects of belief rather than knowledge strictly speaking. All such thought, which 
Hume characterizes as the mind’s passage beyond what can be given in experience, invariably 
involves the relation of causation. I therefore reconstruct his critiques of knowledge of causation 
in detail, which sharpens the problem of belief with regard to matters of fact. Hume argues that 
belief is not itself an idea, but is rather a passion of the mind, a sentiment, or an affective 
constellation that is affixed to certain ideal formations rather than others. Hume’s answer to the 
question of the basis for this differential affixion is custom or habit, and I argue that these habits 
of thought must be conceived as unconscious on Hume’s account. Not only is the process of 
habituation unconscious, but the mind’s passage along the habituated pathways of ideal 
association are unconscious for the most part as well. In a brief final section I show that this 
remains ineluctably true even when the mind attempts to correct its own habits of thinking. 
In the conclusion I return to and recapitulate the major themes of these readings through 
the concepts of obscurity and involvement. I argue that obscurity and involvement play a central 
role in the manner in which the unconscious of thought is thematized by each of these 
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philosophers. Reading these figures together paints a striking picture of the obscurity of the 
unconscious of thought out of which consciousness is occasionally capable of emerging. A 
conscious mind is a socially and materially conditioned set of unconscious habits of thought, 
which by virtue of these habits is determined to experience certain ideal formations as more or 
less affectively powerful, thereby shaping its desires. Conscious perception involves an infinity 
of unconscious perceptions; conscious desire involves inadequate ideas that only obscurely 
express their causes; conscious thinking involves unconscious and involuntary habits of ideal 
associations. What the discovery of the unconscious of thought in early modern philosophy rules 
out absolutely is the voluntarist image of subjective self-determination; what it makes possible is 
the development of practices of becoming active in thinking, though this activity never amounts 
to a transcendence of the unconscious of thought, which remains the ground and limiting 
condition of conscious reflection. It makes possible, in other words, a finally practicable ethics of 
thought, which posits axiomatically that subjects are not defined by their consciousness but 
rather by their specific determination in and through unconscious milieus of thought. And 
because this unconscious of thought is positive and objective rather than being a negation of 




The Obscure Dust of the World 
The Unconscious of Perception in Leibniz 
 
‘Unconscious perception’ seems to be a contradiction in terms. What is perceiving, if not, one 
way or another, a conscious mode of experience? Is it not part of the definition of ‘perception’ 
that it is somehow conscious? If something happens in our body, which does not affect our mind 
in any conscious way, does it make any sense to say that we ‘perceive’ it? This standard 
intuition, according to which perception necessarily implies consciousness, is given 
philosophical expression by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690):  
Perception, as it is the first faculty of the mind, exercised about our ideas; so it is the first 
and simplest idea we have from reflection [i.e., not from sensation], and is by some called 
thinking in general. […] What perception is, everyone will know better by reflecting on 
what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc., or thinks, than by any discourse of 
mine. […] This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach 
not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken 
notice of within, there is no perception. (LEHU II.IX.1-3 / 142) 
 
But Leibniz teaches precisely that there are unconscious perceptions. Not only are there 
perceptions of which we are not conscious, since they are imperceptibly minute, according to 
Leibniz, but conscious perceptions themselves involve, are indeed constituted by, these 
imperceptible or unconscious perceptions. By distinguishing between the concepts of perception 
and apperception, Leibniz breaks decisively with the notion that perception is inherently tied to 
consciousness or of being ‘present to the mind’, and this forces a profound reformulation of the 
problem of freedom, for unconscious perceptions as well as conscious ones play a role in the 
determination of a subject’s desire and agency. Indeed, as we will see, the role played by 
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unconscious perceptions in this regard must be, without exaggeration, infinitely greater than that 
played by conscious perceptions. 
In this chapter, I will take up Leibniz’s mature metaphysical writings in order to isolate 
the resources for thinking the unconscious of thought that his philosophy articulates. His primary 
contribution to this conceptual endeavor is the theory of petites perceptions, paradoxically 
imperceptible perceptions, or unconscious affections of the mind. These perceptions constitute 
an unconscious of thought that extends to infinity. The chapter begins by outlining the 
significance of this conceptual development, first by highlighting the limitations that are inherent 
to theories of the mind that do not make space for such an unconscious. In particular, they are 
incapable of explaining habituation, and run aground on the problem of akrasia: these theories 
cannot, on his analysis, give a satisfactory account of how it is possible to see the better and do 
the worse. Subsequently I will reconstruct Leibniz’s arguments for these unconscious 
perceptions, of which I identify three distinct versions that reveal three different aspects of these 
perceptions. Finally I show the significance of these perceptions, and the unconscious of thought 
they constitute, for Leibniz’s theory of freedom. My argument is that the unconscious of thought, 
which Leibniz’s own philosophical system demands and elaborates, in fact undermines the very 
foundations of the conception of freedom that he attempts to defend. As I will try to show, the 
unconscious of thought that Leibniz discovers in the petites perceptions pushes his conception of 
the mind closer to Spinoza’s than he would like to admit. Although I think Spinoza’s position is 
ultimately more defensible in this regard, it is Leibniz whose reflections on perception, 
expression, and the mind lead to the discovery of unconscious perceptions as a distinct 
theoretical object. And Leibniz himself consistently emphasizes the power that these 
unconscious modes of thought exercise in the determination of a singular mind. 
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1. Conscious Thought and its Limits 
Descartes argued, in the Principles of Philosophy (1644), that thought coincides with awareness. 
“By the term ‘thought’, I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us 
[quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt], in so far as we have awareness of it [quatenus eorum in 
nobis conscientia est]” (PP I.9 / CSM I.195 / AT VIIIA.7) For Descartes, the emphasis on 
awareness is crucial, since it makes possible the argumentative movement of the cogito. 
Awareness or consciousness links thought to actuality—I (actually) am—even if the object of 
thought does not itself actually exist in the way that it is imagined or understood. Aware as I am 
that I might be wrong about what I think, I must still exist as a thinking thing. Descartes 
distinguishes between two faculties or modes of thinking, perception and volition, of which 
further distinctions may be made: “Sensory perception, imagination, and pure understanding are 
simply various modes of perception; desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt are various 
modes of willing” (PP I.31 / CSM I.204 / AT VIIIA.17).  
The fact that the will is capable of going beyond what is given in perception, or that “the 
scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect” (PP I.35 / CSM I.204 / AT VIIIA.18), 
indicates for Descartes an epistemic danger that risks becoming a moral one: one can affirm or 
deny, can pass judgments on, things that are not sufficiently clear and distinct, and this is the 
only possible source of error. Hence Descartes counsels that we intentionally restrict the scope of 
our volition, refusing to will with regard to anything that is not clearly and distinctly perceived.1 
Descartes defines a clear idea as one “present and accessible to the attentive mind,” and calls an 
                                                          
1 As we will see in Chapter 3, Spinoza argues that such ‘intentional restriction’ is in fact 
impossible, and relies on a misunderstanding of the relationship between ideas and volition. 
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idea distinct “if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it 
contains within itself only what is clear” (PP I.45 / CSM I.207-8 / AT VIIIA.22).  
The lack of clarity and distinctness in a perception, according to Descartes, is only a 
privation, expressing nothing positive. It would not seem to make sense, in Cartesian terms, to 
speak of an idea’s efficacy or power, outside of its capacity to determine the mind to affirm in 
accordance with what it clearly and distinctly involves. Rather, the lack of clarity and 
distinctness of an idea, by virtue of its privative character, leaves the will free to determine itself, 
but without a solid principle for doing so. It seems that ideas, for Descartes, are determining 
precisely to the extent that they are clearly and distinctly present to the mind; absent 
consciousness, ideas are merely negative indices, expressing an under-determination of 
perception and understanding, rather than positive factors in subjective determination.  
Still, Descartes hints at a determining power of ideas that are not clear and distinct, for 
which he cannot fully account,2 when he suggests that the greatest impediment to forming clear 
                                                          
2 The full account would ostensibly have to be found in The Passions of the Soul (1649), 
Descartes’ last published work, and one he was prompted to write by Princess Elisabeth of 
Bohemia; in her extended correspondence with Descartes, she made clear her principled 
dissatisfaction with his attempts at giving an account of the relationship between res extensa and 
res cogitans (See Deborah Tollefsen, “Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind-Body 
Interaction,” Hypatia 14:3 [1999]: 59-77).  However, the text of the Passions does not seem to 
provide what we are looking for. For example, Descartes writes that there is nothing to our minds 
except thoughts, and that these “are of two principal kinds, some being actions of the soul and 
others its passions. Those I call its actions are all our volitions, for we experience them as 
proceeding directly from our soul and as seeming to depend on it alone. On the other hand, the 
various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us may be called its passions, in a general 
sense, for it is often not our soul which makes them such as they are, and the soul always 
receives them from the things that are represented by them” (PS I.17 / CSM I.335 / AT IX.342). 
Descartes’ insistence on distinguishing between volition and perception involves his claim that 
volition is by definition always active, whereas my interest lies in exploring the ways in which 
knowledge determines the will, and in particular in cases where that knowledge is inadequate or 
the mind is passive, since one’s volition in that case will be passive as well. 
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and distinct understanding is the habitual inertia of ‘preconceived opinions’. According to 
Descartes, we primarily acquire these preconceived opinions during childhood, when “the mind 
was so closely tied to the body that it had no leisure for any thoughts except those by means of 
which it had sensory awareness of what was happening to the body” (PP I.71 / CSM I.218 / AT 
VIIIA.35). Even when the mind later attains a relative degree of autonomy, and by means of 
clear and distinct understanding denies the veracity of such preconceived opinions, “it is not easy 
for the mind to erase these false judgments from its memory; and as long as they stick there, they 
can cause a variety of errors” (PP I.72 / CSM I.219-20 / AT VIIIA.36-7). Descartes contends that 
the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions actually present to the mind is beyond doubt, but 
when we are considering ideas of things not presently being perceived, he tells us, the temptation 
to regress to preconceived opinions is quite strong: “our judgments on these things are habitually 
based not on present perception but on preconceived opinion” (PP I.73 / CSM I.220 / AT 
VIIIA.37).3 While unclear and indistinct ideas, insofar as they express only a privation, seem to 
contain nothing positive in themselves that could directly account for their potential influence on 
the mind, Descartes at least acknowledges this influence of learned, habituated associations. 
                                                          
This latter position is what Spinoza argues for by collapsing the distinction between 
volition and knowledge, as we will see in Chapter 3. It is not by chance that Spinoza refers 
preicsely to The Passions of the Soul in the Preface to Part Five of the Ethics, where he objects 
that, according to Descartes, “since the determination of the will depends only on our power, we 
shall acquire an absolute dominion over our Passions, if we determine our will by firm and 
certain judgments according to which we will direct the actions of our life” (E V Pref. / CWS 
I.596 / G II.280). Of course, Spinoza thinks that such ‘absolute dominion’ is a fantasy, and that 
the determination of the will does not depend ‘only on our power’. 
 
3 The original Latin reads: “et ideo assueti simus de illis, non ex praesenti perceptione, sed ex 
praeconceptia opinione iudicare.” Assuetudo is custom or habit, association by repetition.  
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Locke, on the other hand, leaves no room for any such concession. In his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding he vociferously identified thinking with conscious perception 
alone. Consider his remarks on memory: 
For to remember, is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness, that it 
was known or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, 
and not remembered: this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that, 
which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was 
never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is 
either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, 
that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. (LEHU I.IV.20 / 101-2) 
 
Locke’s claim about memory here is a stronger variant of the argument against innate ideas that 
he had already articulated concerning ideas immediately present to the mind. For Locke, a 
thought just is the consciousness of a perception or its reflection. There is nothing that could be 
consistently called thinking that lies outside of consciousness, and to say otherwise would 
amount to an absurdity or a contradiction. He writes: “’tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a 
body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or 
perceiving, that it does so” (LEHU II.I.19 / 118). In this way, Locke restricts all inquiry and 
investigation to that of which one is conscious, relegating any possible questions pertaining to 
unconscious thought to the domain of purely illegitimate speculation: “Consciousness is the 
perception of what passes in a man’s own mind. Can another man perceive, that I am conscious 
of anything, when I perceive it not myself? No man’s knowledge here, can go beyond his 
experience” (Ibid.). Ideas, for Locke, are conscious, that is, a subject is directly aware of them, or 
they are literally nothing at all. In producing a cartography of ideas, Descartes marks the unclear 
and indistinct with an obscure danger; for Locke, the map is coextensive with consciousness, and 
there is simply nothing beyond its borders.  
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For his part, Leibniz could not disagree more. Commenting on Locke’s identification of 
all thinking with conscious perception in his New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), 
Leibniz writes that “he cannot hold strictly to this; otherwise his position would be too 
paradoxical, since, again, we are not always aware of our acquired dispositions [habitude] or of 
the contents of our memory, and they do not even come to our aid whenever we need them” (NE 
Preface / 52). The reference to habit here is revealing; habits are unconscious, or the unconscious 
is habituated, and Leibniz claims that this is only possible because perception is precisely not 
identical with consciousness: there are perceptions of which we are not aware. This in turn 
undermines Locke’s doctrine of personal identity, which invokes as a principle the unity of 
consciousness over time.4 Leibnizian subjectivity will require a different principle, but by the 
same token will have much greater depths: unconscious habits and dispositions obscurely 
expressing past determinations, subtending the integrated surface of conscious awareness. 
Beneath this conscious level, “at every moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions, 
unaccompanied by awareness or reflection; that is, of alterations in the soul itself, of which we 
are unaware because these impressions are either too minute and numerous, or else too 
unvarying, so that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own” (NE Preface / 53). It is easy 
to understand how habituation can take place on the basis of conscious perceptions. But these 
habits themselves have a twofold unconscious aspect: on the one hand, we tend not to be aware 
of them; and on the other, they are frequently formed on the basis of perceptions of which we are 
not conscious. These petites perceptions form the theoretical basis of an unconscious affection 
and habituation. 
 
                                                          
4 See LLEHU II.XXVII.10 / 302-3; II.XXVII.17 / 307-8. 
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2. Imperceptible Perceptions 
The New Essays is a relatively late work of Leibniz’s, and in it, along with the Principles of 
Nature and Grace (1714), he works out the theory of petite perceptions in greatest detail. But the 
insight underlying this theory is already present in the earliest articulations of his mature 
metaphysics; between the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and the final works, I would argue, 
the differences are mostly terminological. Already in the Discourse, he introduces the key 
thought for the first time: what if perception and consciousness are not coextensive? What if it is 
possible to perceive without being aware of it?5 Deleuze has remarked that the concept of 
expression is what enabled both Leibniz and Spinoza, in their own ways, to surpass the 
boundaries intrinsic to the Cartesian project.6 And indeed it is Leibniz’s fundamentally 
expressivist conception of the relationship between minds and the world that decisively 
transcends the limitations of the paradigm that tends to identify perception with consciousness. 
We will see, moreover, that this conception involves, perhaps surprisingly, given the generally 
idealist tenor of Leibniz’s typical reception,7 a materialist emphasis on bodily relations of 
proximity as that which grounds the principle of expressive clarity and distinctness. 
                                                          
5 Mark Kulstad has pointed out that Leibniz already argued that “minds are not conscious of all 
their actions” on another basis, namely that the reflexivity of reflection would in that case make 
action impossible, as early as in 1669 (see Mark Kulstad, “Leibniz on Consciousness and 
Reflection,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 21:S1 [1983]: 39-65). 
 
6 See Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: 
Zone Books, 1990), especially its Conclusion. 
 
7 I do not mean to claim that Leibniz is not in fact an idealist. As Jolley writes: “It can hardly be 
doubted that in his later writings Leibniz is an idealist, claiming that the only substances are 
souls” (Nicholas Jolley, Causality and Mind: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy [New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013], 185). But I do contend that there are some surprisingly robust 
materialist aspects of his monadological metaphysics. 
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The Discourse is comprised of 37 numbered sections; each begins with a declarative 
metaphysical assertion, which is elaborated upon and defended in the paragraphs that follow it. 
Section 9’s thesis reads: “That each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own 
way, and that in its concept are included all of the experiences belonging to it together with all 
of their circumstances and the entire sequence of exterior events” (DM 9 / L 308). The ‘singular 
substances’ in question are what will, in his later formulations, come to be called ‘monads’: the 
minds or souls of individual beings. The curious dialectic at work here is as follows: there is only 
the world, but this world is made up exclusively of the monads that express it. On the one hand, 
the world does not exist outside of its expressions in and by individual substances or minds; on 
the other hand, that world is nothing other than the complete set of such individual substances or 
minds. Together, these claims reveal a peculiar metaphysics of ideas in individual minds: your 
mind and mine express, in different ways, the world as a whole. And yet, as Leibniz says here, it 
is not the case that minds partially express the world, or express some determinate part of it; 
rather, each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way. 
If each monad expresses the whole world, and if individual substances or monads just are 
their manner of expressing one and the same world, in what could the difference between 
individual monads consist? We can start to answer this question by noticing how perception is a 
particular kind of expression, and especially insofar as Leibniz distinguishes between perception 
and apperception. According to Leibniz, each monad, or simple substance, is a point of view or 
perspective on the world as a whole. But the world itself is only made up of other monads. In this 
whole, perception is the manner in which the world is expressed by or folded into a particular 
subject. As he writes in the Monadology (1714), the “passing state which enfolds and represents 
a multitude in unity or in the simple substance is merely what is called perception. This must be 
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distinguished from apperception or from consciousness” (M 14 / L 664). Perception, for Leibniz, 
is a matter of resolving unity and multiplicity: it is how the singular monad expresses the totality 
of all the world at once—or, conversely, how the infinity of the world is expressed in the mind’s 
perception of it. A mind is the integration into a unity of the infinite multiplicity of the world, but 
there are an infinity of ways in which this unification can take place, each giving rise to a totally 
distinctive, singular unity.8 The key is this: if it is true that each monad or mind expresses the 
entire world all at once, it is false that they all do so clearly. Each mind “expresses, however 
confusedly, everything that takes place in the universe, past, present, or future” (DM 9 / L 308). 
Thus, the individuating difference between any two monads is the particular distribution of clear 
and confused or obscure perceptions they have of the same world. If you and I have or are 
different minds, this is not because we perceive or express different worlds; rather, it is because 
your mind and mine express the same world as a whole, but as a whole with differing 
distributions of clarity and obscurity of expression. 
It is in the new scope, the new depths, that Leibniz accords to the category of confused or 
obscure perceptions that we can grasp the radicality of his deployment of the concept of 
expression here. As he writes in the Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), there is a distinction 
to be made between apperception, or those modalities of expressing regions of the world in a 
mind that are clear and distinct, and perception, which includes these but also encompasses the 
whole set of obscure expressions, including those of which one is entirely unaware. And here is 
where we return to the question of unconscious perception, which I argue forms the basis of 
                                                          
8 This is why, immediately after giving the thesis of Section 9 above, he asserts that “it is not true 
that two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in number” (DM 9 / L 
308)—to differ in number would already be to differ substantially, since what really 
distinguishes substances is that they are different modalities of expressing the multiplicity of the 
world as a unity. 
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processes of unconscious habituation. Since my mind is nothing other than its perceptions of the 
world, what do we make of those cases, Leibniz asks, where I do not seem to perceive anything 
distinctly at all? In this context he invokes a few favored examples: he frequently refers to the 
experiences of deep, dreamless sleep, of blackouts and fainting, or of extreme dizziness (M 20-
24 / L 645; PNG 4, 13 / L 637, 640). We can formulate this first argument for the existence of 
unconscious perceptions in the following way: nothing can exist without being in some way; but 
having some perception just is the way of being for a monad, since its differentiation or 
individuation is its perspective on the world; so, unless we want to say that one ceases to exist 
while not consciously perceiving, as in dreamless sleep, it must have been true that perception 
was taking place at some level. And since, by hypothesis, one had no conscious experience 
during such a sleep or a blackout, at that level the perceptions were unconscious: they were too 
minute or indistinct to be noticed consciously. We only make this inference to their existence 
subsequently, retroactively, after waking up or becoming conscious again: “Since as soon as you 
recover from the faint you apperceive your perceptions, it clearly follows that you were having 
perceptions immediately before, even though you did not apperceive them” (M 23 / L 645). 
In a second variation on this theme, Leibniz raises the example of background noise, like 
the ambient sound of wind in the trees or the drone of a low hum: at some point in a 
conversation, one interlocutor might point this out to the other. When that happens, the other will 
have to acknowledge that, in retrospect, they had been perceiving the sound all along, although 
they had not noticed it at the time (NE Preface / 54). It is crucial to recognize the extremely 
broad consequences of this argument, since its application is only apparently limited to sensible 
phenomena such as ambient noise. In fact, it applies, first, to the entire range of possible sensible 
phenomena: sounds, colors, tactile and proprioceptive affections, even taste: in each case, it is 
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possible to imagine that one feels nothing, tastes nothing, and so on. But there is no pure absence 
of affection; rather, a particular affection, or set of affections, is common and familiar enough to 
become a kind of sensible background or sensate ambience, escaping notice while partially 
determining by contrast the nature of the other affections that stand out from it as foreground or 
figure. An empty mouth nevertheless tastes.9 And the argument also applies, second, in the ideal 
and not just the sensible register: certain thoughts, ideas, desires, imaginations—in short, certain 
modifications of what Descartes would call res cogitans—participate in constituting an ideal 
milieu, an ambient background hum comprised of certain particular ideal determinations that 
escape notice while partially determining the nature of thoughts that stand out in consciousness. 
No thought appears in isolation in a mind; but its environing ideas, the ambient milieu of ideas 
that surround and subtend it, may not be apparent to conscious reflection.10 
So far, we have established that there are minute perceptions while we are unconscious, 
as in dreamless sleep, and even while we are conscious, as in the case of background or ambient 
noise. In these first two kinds of examples, unconscious or minute perceptions are posited 
retroactively: at that time, we say, I must have been perceiving them. But in our conscious 
experience petites perceptions play a third, still more profound role, and here Leibniz’s argument 
for the existence of unconscious perception becomes properly transcendental. To see this, 
consider what is perhaps Leibniz’s most famous example: that of the crashing wave. The sound 
of a crashing wave is a determinate perception that we consciously experience, which is made up 
entirely of minute perceptions that we do not: “Every soul knows infinity, knows everything, but 
                                                          
9 See Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 20-22, in which ‘the tree greens’. 
 
10 This tendency of the milieu of environing ideas to vanish is one sense of the problem of 
ideology. 
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confusedly. Just as when I walk beside the sea and I hear the great noise that it makes I hear, 
though without distinguishing them, the individual sound of every wave out of which that total 
sound is made up, so in the same way our confused perceptions are the total outcome of the 
impressions which the whole universe makes on us” (PNG 13 / L 640). The world is actually 
infinite, and so too is the multiplicity of our modes of being affected by it. And thus, our 
perceptions, both distinct and confused, are comprised of an actual infinity of minute 
perceptions. As Deleuze puts it, for Leibniz, “clarity comes from obscurity and is endlessly 
plunging back into it […] The petites perceptions constitute the obscure dust of the world, the 
dark depths every monad contains.”11 
If this is indeed a properly transcendental argument, it is because, in moving from the 
first two kinds of arguments for the existence of unconscious perceptions to the third, we are no 
longer dealing with temporally prior perceptions that subsequent reflection instructs us must 
have existed—as is the case for the perceptions by which I must have been affected during deep 
sleep, or for a previously unnoticed audible hum or ideal background—but instead with logically 
or metaphysically prior perceptions that function as transcendental elements of composition for 
any possible empirical instance of apperception. In other words, the argument shows that no 
conscious perception exists that does not involve a multiplicity of unconscious perceptions. In 
the Principles, Leibniz writes: “each of the soul’s distinct perceptions involves an infinity of 
confused perceptions which encapsulate the entire universe” (PNG 3 / L 640). It is when these 
obscure, infinitesimally small, imperceptible elements enter into relations of composition with 
one another that they can cross a threshold of intensity, engendering a distinct and determinate 
perception, affection of the mind, or expression of the world. We do not hear distinctly the 
                                                          
11 Deleuze, The Fold, 102 (translation modified). 
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collision of each of a hundred thousand drops of water—let alone the incomprehensible 
multiplicity of molecular interactions that comprise each droplet itself—but these must affect us, 
since they combine to form the sound of a crashing wave that we ultimately hear. For a unity 
formed of a multiplicity of nothings would itself be nothing; therefore, we are forced to conclude 
that these minute perceptions must exist—beneath or below our consciousness, indeterminate 
and indistinct in themselves, but not nothing.  
Leibniz suggests that the positivity of these petites perceptions is itself sufficient to 
dismantle the idea of freedom as indifference: “it is these minute perceptions which determine 
our behavior in many situations without our thinking of them, and which deceive the 
unsophisticated with an appearance of indifference of equilibrium—as if it made no difference to 
us, for instance, whether we turned left or right” (NE Preface / 56). At the level of consciousness, 
there may be an apparent indifference between choices; but, Leibniz argues here, the fact that 
one rather than another is willed testifies to a real difference at the level of our unconscious 
perception of them. Leibniz’s doctrine of freedom as subjective inclination, then, is nevertheless 
a doctrine of subjective determination; and the theory of petites perceptions explains that this 
determination can be effective while remaining entirely unconscious.12 
                                                          
12 This connection, which is to my mind absolutely decisive, between the theory of petites 
perceptions and the critique of freedom as indifference, seems to have escaped most—if, indeed, 
not all—commentators. There is of course no proving a negative, but allow me to adduce several 
telling examples. Borst’s critical review of claims in the scholarly literature to the effect that 
Leibniz is (some kind of) a compatibilist or ‘soft determinist’ does not raise the concept of 
petites perceptions or even his general theory of perception at all (Clive Borst, “Leibniz and the 
Compatibilist Account of Free Will,” Studia Leibnitiana 21:2 [1992]: 49-58). Jolley’s more 
recent overview of Leibniz’s philosophy does not point out this connection in any way, which is 
particularly striking given that its chapter on Leibniz’s concepts of mind, knowledge, and ideas, 
which concludes with a section on the argument for unconscious perception, is immediately 
followed by a chapter on his account of freedom (Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz [New York: 
Routledge, 2005], chs. 4-5). Redding helpfully situates Leibniz as elaborating, against Hobbes’ 
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Now, an important question arises here, and its answer will bring to light what may be a 
surprisingly materialist strain of Leibniz’s thought. What is the principle according to which such 
minute perceptions, which themselves are not consciously perceptible, constitute determinate and 
conscious perceptions? We can reformulate this question in terms of the problem of genesis, or 
individuation: why do just these minute perceptions combine into this distinct perception—rather 
than another set combining into a different apperception? Leibniz’s insistence that each mind 
expresses ‘the whole universe’ means that there exists an actual infinity of ways in which we are 
affected by things that seem to have no chance of becoming consciously determinate for us. To 
borrow the hyperbolic, but justified, example provided by Antonie Arnauld, we would seemingly 
have to say that each of our minds somehow expresses, in some wildly obscure and 
                                                          
nominalist conception, the concept of freedom that would be central in the subsequent 
development German Idealism, but the petites perceptions are nowhere to be found (Paul 
Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche [New York: Routledge, 2009], chs. 1-2.). 
Sometimes we find a tantalizing near-miss: after recapitulating the arguments for the 
existence of petites perceptions, Arthur writes that Leibniz “has rightly been credited with being 
the first to recognize the significance of the unconscious,” and then even cites the same quotation 
as above regarding the ‘apparent indifference of equilibrium’, promising to return to the topic; 
but when he does return to it, it is in the context of the problem of the identity of indiscernibles 
in Leibniz’s metaphysical account of space and time, and their relationship to the problem of 
subjective freedom is left entirely unexamined. (Richard T.W. Arthur, Leibniz [Malden: Polity 
Press, 2014], 117-19; chs. 7 and 8.) 
In all these cases—and they are in no way exceptional—a strange disconnect is manifest, 
in which Leibniz’s theory of subjective freedom, on the one hand, and on the other his theory of 
perception, including the notion of petites perceptions as distinct from apperception, are treated 
as being entirely separate from one another. I dare say this would be hermeneutically odd even if 
it were not for Leibniz explicitly saying, as quoted above, that the concept of minute perceptions 
accounts for the ‘apparent indifference of equilibrium’, with a choice being the immediately 
provided example.  
In the secondary literature I have surveyed, only Seidler draws this connection out in any 
detail (Michael J. Seidler, “Freedom and Moral Therapy in Leibniz,” Studia Leibnitiana 17:1 
[1985]: 15-35), and Deleuze clearly recognizes its importance in several places, most notably in 
Chapter 7 of The Fold. 
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indeterminate way, the region of the universe occupied by the dust on the far side of each of the 
four Galilean moons. Let us grant that I do in fact perceive this dust, albeit totally without being 
aware of it. Why do these perceptions, these modes by which my mind is really but 
unconsciously affected, not seem to cross the threshold of intensity requisite to constitute 
distinct, conscious perceptions? Part of the answer, according to Leibniz, has to do with relations 
of bodily proximity. In his letter to Arnauld on October 9, 1687, Leibniz writes:  
I have said that the soul, which naturally expresses the entire universe in a certain sense 
and according to the relationship which other bodies have to its own, and which as a 
consequence expresses more immediately the properties of the parts of its body, must 
therefore, by virtue of the laws of relationship which are essential to it, particularly 
express certain unusual motions of the parts of the body. (L 339) 
 
Leibniz anticipates that his interlocutor will object that this suggests that “the soul has more 
thought and more knowledge of the motion of the lymph in the lymphatic ducts than it has of the 
satellites of Saturn” (Ibid.), which would be problematic if not impossible to explain, if the sole 
criteria for expressive apperception were bodily proximity.  
Arnauld had written that if this thought-experiment presents a genuine difficulty, perhaps 
the problem could be located in the notion of expression that Leibniz mobilizes. Leibniz thus 
tries to explain the concept: 
Expression is common to all the forms and is a genus of which natural perception, animal 
feeling, and intellectual knowledge are species. [… In] the reasonable soul this 
representation is accompanied by consciousness, and then it is called thought. Now this 
expression takes place everywhere, because every substance sympathizes with all the 
others and receives a proportional change corresponding to the slightest change which 
occurs in the whole world, although this change will be more or less noticeable as other 
bodies or their actions have more or less relationship with ours. (Ibid.) 
 
The argument Leibniz offers for this latter claim essentially repeats Descartes’ argument against 
the possibility of vacuum in extended substance—or, which amounts to the same thing, his 
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argument for extended plenum—in the Principia: to say that there is nothing between two 
corporeal substances is in fact to say that they are in immediate contact with one another (PP 
II.16-18 / CSM I.229-30 / AT IXB.49-50). Thus any motion anywhere in the universe causes an 
actual infinity of reverberating effects, ultimately affecting every other material body in the 
entire universe: “the slightest movement exerts its effect upon nearby bodies, and so from body 
to body to infinity, but in diminishing proportion. So our body must be affected in some way by 
the changes of all the rest” (L 339). We should understand the principle of ‘diminishing 
proportion’ here on the model of a magnitude’s diminution to an infinitesimally small quantity, 
as in Leibniz’s articulation of the calculus: so, too, the petites perceptions, these imperceptibly 
small quantities, are never simply nothing.13 
While this helps respond to the minor issue about my lack of consciousness regarding 
Galilean dust, the major issue, however, still remains unresolved. The principle of bodily 
proximity can indeed account for why events taking place at a remove from our own body will 
only have infinitesimally small effects at the level of our consciousness. But this principle is 
inadequate for resolving the problem of conscious individuation: that is, why I have this 
conscious perception rather than another cannot be simply due to bodily proximity, or, again, we 
would necessarily be conscious of lymphatic motions. My argument is that while Leibniz’s 
petites perceptions are indeed a necessary component of a sufficiently robust conception of the 
problem of conscious individuation, his relatively underdeveloped notion of habituation and the 
association of ideas means we must turn at this point to Spinoza and Hume for answers, which I 
will do in later chapters.  
                                                          
13 See L 545-6. 
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These notions may be relatively underdeveloped in Leibniz, but they are not entirely 
absent: “The strong imagination which strikes and moves [souls] comes either from the 
magnitude or from the number of the perceptions which preceded it. For often one single strong 
impression produces at once the effect of a long-formed habit or of many frequently repeated 
ordinary perceptions” (M 27 / L 645). And, in fact, in focusing on the concept of habit we 
rediscover the image of background and figure that the example of the ambient noise expressed: 
here, the background is constituted by habituated perception, and this habit plays a significant 
role in determining which perceptions are able to reach the level of consciousness, and in what 
form. Finally, Leibniz argues in the New Essays that nothing in principle makes it impossible for 
us to become conscious of the infinitesimally small perceptions subtending our apperception, 
although in practice other perceptions will constitute barriers to this awareness: “We could in 
fact become thoroughly aware of them and reflect on them, if we were not distracted by their 
multiplicity, which scatters the mind, and if bigger ones did not obliterate them, or rather, put 
them in the shade” (NE II.IX.1 / 134). But if those perceptions of which we are already aware 
can obscure [obscurcissent] other possible conscious perceptions, what is the principle according 
to which these ‘bigger’ perceptions occupy the mind in the first place? As we have seen, Leibniz, 
for all his ostensible idealism, concedes that part of the answer has to do with relations of bodily 
proximity; I will return to this in section 4. But for now let us turn to his conception of freedom, 
since these imperceptible perceptions play a crucial role in his critique of indifference and thus 





3. Inclination and Determination 
Leibniz is widely regarded to be a compatibilist on the question of freedom.14 Compatibilism is 
the doctrine according to which there exist both causal determinism and free will. In the essay 
“On Freedom” (1679), Leibniz poses the question quite clearly: “One of the oldest doubts of 
mankind concerns the question of how freedom and contingency are compatible with the chain 
of causes and with providence” (L 263). The compatibilist affirms that the conjunction is 
possible and actual; the incompatibilist has the alternatives of either denying causal determinism, 
the freedom of the will, or both. Leibniz, arguably due more than anything else to his theological 
commitments,15 takes the compatibilist route. Of course, everything hinges on the precise 
interpretation given to both of the terms in this conjunction: what sort of determinism and what 
sort of free will are involved in this conception? 
Leibniz famously distinguishes between contingent and necessary truths; in “On 
Freedom” he rehearses this distinction, and states, rather summarily, that “there can and must be 
truths which cannot be reduced by any analysis to identities or to the principle of contradiction 
but which involve an infinite series of reasons which only God can see through. This is the 
nature of everything which is called free and contingent and especially of everything which 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Borst, “Leibniz and the Compatibilist Account of Free Will”; Jolley, Leibniz, 130-
142. For a dissenting view, in which Leibniz’s “Necessary and Contingent Truths” is read such 
that Leibniz is an incompatibilist committed to a curious sort of libertarianism, see Ori Beck, 
“Leibniz: A Freedom Libertarian,” Studia Leibnitiana 47:1 (2015): 67-85; Similarly, Paull 
argues that the incompatibilist position that seems to be espoused in “Necessary and Contingent 
Truths” should not be classified as a mere aberration: “the theory of miraculous freedom 
presented in the NCT is not an unreasonable (or, really, an uncharacteristic) one for the mature 
Leibniz to have held” (R. Cranston Paull, “Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom,” Noûs 26:2 
[1992]: 218-235, 232). 
 
15 See R.W. Meyer, Leibniz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution, trans. J.P Stern 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 216, n. 428. 
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involves space and time” (L 266). Here he suggests that part of the solution to the compatibilist 
dilemma involves recognizing that the contingency of contingent truths leaves room for freedom. 
If matters of fact were indeed absolutely necessary, freedom (construed in almost any terms) 
would consequently be impossible on pain of violating the principle of noncontradiction; but 
since they are only contingently necessary, Leibniz says, freedom in this domain is, at least, not 
impossible. Thus, the causal determinism of matters of fact or states of affairs, for Leibniz, 
remains intact, but on condition that it is only contingently or hypothetically necessary. This is 
well enough, but the text says surprisingly little, indeed, almost nothing, about the nature or 
concept of freedom that this contingency supposedly leaves room for. 
In the Theodicy (1710), Leibniz’s specific conception of freedom is worked out in much 
greater detail. There he argues that freedom has three conditions that, as Jolley puts it, are 
“individually necessary and jointly sufficient for free agency”:16 intelligence, spontaneity, and 
contingency. Leibniz writes: 
[Freedom], according to the definition required in the schools of theology, consists in 
intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in 
spontaneity, whereby we determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of 
logical or metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, and the 
rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is self-determining and that 
according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding, which inclines it without 
compelling it: and all the conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. (TH 
288) 
 
Contingency here just means the absence of strong or absolute necessity: “freedom must exclude 
an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity” (TH 302). The key is that the contrary to 
anything called contingent involves no contradiction. This contingency, he is careful to note, is 
not the same thing as indifference, which he claims to be the third condition demanded for 
                                                          
16 Jolley, Leibniz, 129-30. 
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freedom by ‘the Schoolmen’: “I do not admit an indifference of equipoise, and I do not think that 
one ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent. Such a choice would be, as it were, mere 
chance, without determining reason, whether apparent or hidden. But such a chance, such an 
absolute and actual fortuity, is a chimera which never occurs in nature” (TH 303). And we have 
seen that it is the concept of petites perceptions that Leibniz uses to deny the actuality of 
indifference: in each case, there are differentials of perception that actually incline the soul 
toward one of several apparent options, even though these differentials may not themselves be 
consciously registered. Far from implying such indifference, the contingency he has in mind 
“does not prevent one from having stronger inclinations toward the course one chooses” (TH 
302). Leibniz even (somewhat perversely) invokes the Epicurean clinamen here: he denies that 
the deviation of the atom genuinely occurs for no reason—which would violate the principle of 
sufficient reason, and is arguably the most consequential metaphysical tenet of the doctrine of 
the clinamen itself—but suggests the image as a model for grasping the real non-indifference of 
the soul’s inclination (TH 303).17 Finally, he underscores the determining power of unconscious 
perceptions: “although I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me choose 
                                                          
17 On the relation between Epicurean-Lucretian atomism, particularly the concept of the 
clinamen and its infinitesimal mathematics, and Leibniz’s metaphysics, see Serres: “Lucretius’ 
De rerum natura, carefully reread in the presence of the Syracusan, and Leibniz’ De rerum 
originatione radicali, which did not need two conjoined authors, are in many respects 
isomorphic texts. In terms of the question of their genesis, birth or origins, in terms of 
equilibrium in general and the declining deviation, in terms of the law of the extreme slope, in 
terms of the model of drops of rain, and so on, as long as you like” (Michel Serres, The Birth of 
Physics, ed. David Webb, trans. Jack Hawkes [Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000], 158); and 
Michel Serres, Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques (Paris: PUF, 1968), for 
example 293 and 324. 
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between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be some impression, however 
imperceptible, that determines us.”18 
I argue that the implications of the theory of petites perceptions invoked here are 
irreparably damaging for the other two conditions for Leibnizian freedom, namely, intelligence 
and spontaneity. What I want to suggest is that if we take Leibniz seriously when he invokes 
imperceptible impressions in this way, the image of subjective inclination that we end up with 
brings him much closer to Spinozist involuntarism than he would want to admit. In other words, 
Leibnizian inclination becomes a doctrine of necessity or determination, regardless of whether 
matters of fact are actually contingent. But, on the other hand, the concept of petites perceptions 
itself has no robust correlate in Spinoza’s conceptual vocabulary, or in Hume’s, and is thus 
useful to retain from Leibniz’s work as a crucial element in working through the unconscious of 
thought. Let us consider in turn the other two conditions for Leibnizian freedom and how the 
implications of the theory of petites perceptions undermine them.  
 
1. Spontaneity. Leibniz’s articulation of the principle of sufficient reason is extremely 
strong. In the Theodicy, he lays out the two great principles of his argumentation. The first is the 
principle of non-contradiction; “the other principle is that of the determinant reason: it states that 
nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is, 
something to give an a priori reason why it is existent rather than non-existent, and in this wise 
rather than in any other” (TH 44).19 He specifies that this principle holds absolutely, admitting of 
                                                          
18 Leibniz, TH 305. 
 
19 As Couturat explains, the ‘principle of determinant reason’ is just an early name for what 
Leibniz will later call ‘the principle of sufficient reason’ and sometimes simply ‘the principle of 
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no exception whatsoever, and in particular that it applies to human volition. “There is always a 
prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and for the maintenance of freedom for 
the will it suffices that this reason should incline without necessitating” (TH 45). It is this last 
claim that causes problems: since there is always a sufficient reason for the inclination of the 
will, the question is whether and how inclination can fail to be necessitation. Leibniz argues that 
we will to act, but not to will, since the latter would itself require a higher-order volition and this 
would imbricate us in an infinite regress. But a particular will to act, he claims, is free in the 
sense of being spontaneous in addition to being contingent as part of a particular existing world 
whose necessity is merely hypothetical. 
This postulate of spontaneity plays a crucial role in Leibniz’s effort to distance his 
philosophy from that of Spinoza. For Spinoza, as we will see in Chapter 3, the will is fully 
determined in the sense of being strictly necessary: “The will cannot be called a free cause, but 
only a necessary one” (E I P32 / CWS I.435 / G II.72). For Leibniz, this claim is utterly 
incompatible with a moral vision of the world in which justice is even remotely possible (See 
DM 2 / L 304). Leibniz’s attempt to deny this necessitarianism by means of the concept of 
spontaneity is, however, a troubled affair. Arnauld, for his part, considered the effort to be a 
failure.20 One aspect of this problem has an Augustianian flavor: how is it possible to reconcile a 
subject’s spontaneous freedom with God’s foreknowledge and preordainment of everything that 
                                                          
reason’ (Louis Couturat, “Sur la métaphysique de Leibniz (avec un opuscule inédit),” Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale 10:1 [1902]: 1-25, 7-10). 
 
20 See R.C. Sleigh, Jr., Leibniz & Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), ch. 4. 
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will happen in a particular world?21 First, as might have been expected, Leibniz reiterates that 
even though it will always have been necessary that Caesar crosses the Rubicon, this necessity is 
contingent or hypothetical rather than absolute; alternative states of affairs remain absolutely 
possible in themselves. But second, his more detailed argument for substantial spontaneity 
involves reiterating the doctrine of pre-established harmony. 
As Leibniz himself frequently notes, his doctrine of pre-established harmony was 
developed in response to the perceived inadequacies of alternative accounts of causation, and in 
particular the issue of mind-body causation. He claims that the scholastics “believed that there 
was a reciprocal physical influence between body and soul” (TH 59), whereas the moderns, at 
least since Descartes, recognize the lack of a common measure between res extensa and res 
cogitans, thus making their interaction metaphysically impossible by definition. But the 
occasionalist solution to this problem, which Leibniz sometimes refers to as the ‘Cartesian’ one, 
is also unnacceptable, he argues, since it, “besides introducing perpetual miracles to establish 
communication between these two substances, does not obviate the derangement of the natural 
laws obtaining in each of these same substances, which, in the general opinion, their mutual 
influence would cause” (TH 61).22 Leaving aside the accusation of Deus ex machina, Leibniz’s 
critique here is that this ad hoc solution has the unfortunate consequence of rendering nature 
                                                          
21 Borst relates an argument by Parkinson to the effect that, for Leibniz, God’s foreknowledge is 
posterior to preordainment: it is only after having chosen to bring a particular possible world into 
existence that God knows everything that will happen (Borst, “Leibniz and the Compatibilist 
Account of Free Will,” 53). 
 
22 See also NS 13-14 / L 457-8. On Leibniz’s accusation that occasionalism amounts to the 
‘introduction of perpetual miracles’, see Donald Rutherford, “Natures, Laws, and Miracles: The 
Roots of Leibniz’s Critique of Occasionalism,” in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: 
Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State Univeristy Press, 1993).  
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disorderly to the point of chaos; if the nature of things is such that minds and bodies should not 
be able to communicate, then they should not be able to communicate. 
Indeed, the doctrine of pre-established harmony asserts that minds and bodies do not 
interact, and this as an implication of the more radical claim that each substance is in fact 
causally independent of all others. He articulates the doctrine in the New System of the 
Communication of Substances (1695) as follows: 
God has originally created the soul, and every other real unity, in such a way that 
everything in it must arise from its own nature by a perfect spontaneity with regard to 
itself, yet by a perfect conformity to things without. And thus, since our internal 
sensations, that is, those which are in the soul itself and not in the brain or in the subtle 
parts of the body, are merely phenomena which follow upon external events or better, are 
really appearances or like well-ordered dreams, it follows that these perceptions internal 
to the soul itself come to it through its own original constitution, that is to say, through its 
representative nature, which is capable of expressing entities outside of itself in 
agreement with its organs—this nature having been given it from its creation and 
constituting its original character. (NS 14 / L 457-8) 
 
It is clear that, for Leibniz, spontaneity means precisely that what happens to a mind, soul, or 
monad is caused only by itself and never by anything else. The principle of sufficient reason 
entails that every mental state has a reason for being so and not otherwise; the principle of 
spontaneity entails that this reason must not be located outside that mind itself. As Murray puts 
it: “When free action was in view, Leibniz characterized spontaneity as the absence of any 
external, determining, proximate, ‘phenomenal’ cause.”23 And it is notable that, in connection 
with satisfying this demand for the condition of spontaneity by means of the system of pre-
established harmony, Leibniz consistently describes individual minds as ‘spiritual automatons’.24 
                                                          
23 Michael J. Murray, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human 
Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:1 (1995): 75-108, 80. 
 
24 As in, e.g., NS 15 / L 458.  
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But of course, although automata may be ‘spontaneous’ in the sense that they are automotive, 
they also exemplify precisely the strictly mechanistic determinism that Leibniz is trying to 
avoid.25 The difference that is supposed to make all the difference here is the third condition: the 
claim that souls are spontaneous automata that are intelligent, to which we will return 
momentarily. As Leibniz writes: “it must be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has 
within it the principle of all its actions, and even all its passions, and that the same is true in all 
the simple substances scattered throughout Nature, although there be freedom only in those that 
are intelligent” (TH 65).  
How is this doctrine of spontaneity affected by the theory of petites perceptions? We saw 
that Leibniz flatly denies the actuality of indifference: two apparently identical options are in fact 
subtended and constituted by imperceptible differentials of perception that determine the will to 
incline towards one rather than the other. In order for the condition of spontaneity to be 
maintained, Leibniz must hold that these imperceptible differentials, or unconscious perceptions, 
arise from the mind itself in a kind of autoaffection. But then the perceptions would not be of 
anything other than the mind itself, since it would violate the principle of spontaneity if the mind 
were affected by impressions of external things. Rather, as in the articulation of the doctrine of 
pre-established harmony above, he would have to say that the mind affects itself with 
imperceptible impressions or unconscious perceptions that are in conformity with, but in no way 
caused by, the nature of the external things represented by the mind. In other words, he is able to 
say that “we are determined only in appearance and that in metaphysical strictness we are in a 
state of perfect independence as concerns the influence of all the other created beings” (NS 16 / 
                                                          
25 For a comprehensive and detailed account of the concept of spiritual automaton, see 
Christopher P. Noble, The Soul as Spiritual Automaton in Leibniz’s Synthetic Natural 
Philosophy, Dissertation (Villanova University, 2016), ProQuest No. 10099855. 
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L 458), but only at the risk of rendering his theory of perception incoherent as a theory of 
perception. For what is an imperceptible perception of, if the relation to the external things 
represented or expressed in the mind is strictly non-causal? Leibniz would have the mind to be 
entirely the source of its own actions qua independent substance, but that spontaneity seems to be 
in direct contradiction with the claim that “there will always be some impression, however 
imperceptible, that determines us” (TH 305). 
It should be noted that Leibniz himself recognizes this issue, but thinks that the doctrine 
of pre-established harmony simply solves the problem.  
The impressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, and it was 
commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of the sources of our actions were 
outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound to speak thus, adapting oneself to the popular 
mode of expression, as one may, in a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But 
when it is a question of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our spontaneity 
suffers no exception and that external things have no physical influence on us, I mean in 
the strictly philosophical sense. (TH 290) 
 
In other words, Leibniz argues that it is merely apparent that external things have any influence 
on minds, and that in reality our minds are fully and exclusively auto-affective; it is just a 
manner of speaking to say that we are determined by external things.26 But this should be seen as 
explaining away the difficulty, rather than genuinely resolving it, as I have argued. If it is true 
that, for Leibniz, strictly speaking, external things have no influence on minds, it is significant 
that he cannot seem to avoid helping himself to more conventional, admittedly unphilosophical 
modes of expression whenever it is a matter of the determination of the will. As Seidler puts it, 
“this equation of monadic, metaphysical spontaneity with actual independence of action in the 
                                                          
26 “Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit … Also because it’s nice 
to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it’s only a manner of 
speaking” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005], 3). 
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experienced, phenomenal world can only be accomplished with linguistic sleights of hand such 
as Leibniz himself often censured.”27 
 
2. Intelligence. Leibniz considers an action free when it is based on actual understanding: 
“The will is never prompted to action save by the representation of the good, which prevails over 
opposite representations” (TH 45). As we saw, Leibniz defines the condition of intelligence as 
one’s having “a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation” (TH 288). He goes on in the 
Theodicy to distinguish between knowledge that is distinct and knowledge that is confused, and 
writes: “Distinct knowledge, or intelligence, occurs in the actual use of reason” (TH 289).28 But 
as Leibniz himself is keen to note, this condition is only rarely satisfied: “the senses supply us 
with confused thoughts. And we may say that we are immune from bondage in so far as we act 
with a distinct knowledge, but that we are the slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are 
confused” (TH 289). It seems straightforward enough to suggest that we are free insofar as we 
act based on distinct understanding, but unfree when our actions are based on obscure 
perception. But when we start to ask when the former condition is adequately satisfied for an 
                                                          
27 Seidler, “Freedom and Moral Therapy in Leibniz,” 19. 
 
28 This is surprisingly simplistic for Leibniz. Elsewhere he puts forward substantially more 
robust taxonomies of knowledge than this basic and unqualified division into ‘distinct’ and 
‘confused’. For example, in §24 of the Discourse on Metaphysics he distinguishes between the 
following kinds of knowledge: confused, clear, distinct, adequate, intuitive, and suppositive; then 
he distinguishes between definitions that are nominal, only real, real and causal, and perfect or 
essential. Similarly, in “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas” (1684), he writes: 
“Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either confused or distinct; distinct 
knowledge is either inadequate or adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive. The most 
perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive” (L 291). 
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individual Leibnizian subject, it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine that it ever actually 
takes place. 
The magnitude of the problem here is hard to overstate. As we have seen, Leibniz is 
committed to the idea that individual perceptions are actually infinite. Given that perception is 
defined as “the passing state which enfolds and represents a multitude in unity or the simple 
substance” (M 14 / L 644), we ought to ask whether the multitude thereby represented is finite or 
infinite, and Leibniz must claim that it is infinite, for at least three reasons. First, because the 
“mutual connection or accommodation of all created things to each other and of each to all the 
rest causes each simple substance to have relations which express all the others and consequently 
to be a perpetual living mirror of the universe” (M 56 / L 648). That is, it is the actual infinity of 
created substances that constitutes the multitude expressed in unity in perception. Second, as we 
explored in the previous section, even in cases of clear and distinct apperception, each such 
impression is made up of and involves an infinity of obscure differentials of perception, as in the 
sound of the sea. Leibniz writes: “a soul can read within itself only what it represents distinctly; 
it cannot all at once develop all that is enfolded within it, for this reaches to infinity” (M 61 / L 
649). Third and finally, Leibniz is clear that the infinity at stake here is not simply horizontal, as 
it were, insofar as there are an actual infinity of distinct substances side-by-side; it is also, so to 
speak, vertical, insofar as each thing possesses an actual infinity within itself:  
[The] machines of nature, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts, into 
infinity… each part of matter not only is infinitely divisible, as the ancients recognized, 
but also is actually subdivided without end, each part into parts, each of which has its 
own distinct movement… It is clear from this that there is a world of creatures, living 
beings, animals, entelechies, souls, in the smallest particle of matter… Each part of 
matter can be thought of as a garden full of plants or as a pond full of fish. But each 
branch of the plant, each member of the animal, each drop of its humors, is also such a 
garden or such a pond. (M 64-7 / L 649-50) 
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Keeping in mind these three ways in which perception is actually infinite, we should now recall 
one of Leibniz’s constantly repeated arguments, namely that only God is capable of an infinite 
analysis, whereas for finite minds such as ours this task is strictly impossible.29 In the New 
Essays he writes: “All we can do with infinities is to know them confusedly and at least to know 
distinctly that they are there” (NE Preface / 57). But the kind of understanding required for free 
volitional action must involve more than knowing that an option exists; one must know what it 
is, in order to intelligently determine it to be good, even if only relatively good in relation to the 
other available options. And these three ways in which perception is actually infinite, and of 
actually infinite things, would seem to make it impossible for finite minds to know them any way 
other than confusedly. 
This issue is bound up with what is required in order to satisfy the first condition for the 
possibility of freedom, namely contingency. As we saw, Leibniz argues that truths about states of 
affairs in the created world are only hypothetically or contingently necessary, since their 
contraries do not involve contradictions; this contingent necessity is based on the fact that God 
willed the creation of the world in which they are true. Now those truths that are absolutely 
necessary can be derived by finite minds, because they are based on the principle of 
noncontradiction, whereas those that are contingently necessary require an infinite analysis, 
                                                          
29 For example, in “On Freedom”: “there is no truth of fact or of individual things which does not 
depend upon an infinite series of reasons, though God alone can see everything that is in this 
series. This is the cause, too, why only God knows the contingent truths a priori and sees their 
infallibility otherwise than by experience” (L 264); “In contingent truths, however, though the 
predicate inheres in the subject, we can never demonstrate this, nor can the proposition ever be 
reduced to an equation or an identity, but the analysis proceeds to infinity, only God being able 
to see, not the end of the analysis indeed, since there is no end, but the nexus of terms or the 
inclusion of the predicate in the subject, since he sees everything which is in the series” (L 265). 
See Jolley, Leibniz, 140-2. 
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because they are based on the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore, in order for the condition 
of contingency to be met, deriving the kinds of truths that obtain about contingently necessary 
things would require the kind of infinite analysis that only God can carry out.30 
Now although we cannot execute such infinite analyses, Leibniz does say that there are 
two ways in which we can know contingent truths. “The one is experience; the other reason. We 
know by experience when we perceive a thing distinctly enough by our senses; by reason, 
however, when we use the general principle that nothing happens without a reason, or that the 
predicate always inheres in the subject by virtue of some reason” (L 265). We have seen, 
however, that in the Theodicy, where Leibniz explains what he means by the condition of 
intelligence, sensation is disqualified because it provides us with confused perceptions. 
Therefore, he must mean for the condition to be satisfied by the latter alternative, namely, by 
virtue of our invoking the principle of sufficient reason, in spite of our inability to carry out the 
requisite infinite analyses. Once again, it must be said that Leibniz recognized the problem here, 
although, as before, what he writes seems to be more of the order of explaining it away than 
resolving it: 
A very clear recognition of the best determines the will; but it does not necessitate it, 
properly speaking… all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, or to 
perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call adequate ideas. And 
although in the blessed these passions always tend towards the true good, by virtue of the 
laws of Nature and the system of things pre-established in relation to them, yet this does 
not always happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good… As 
for us, in addition to the judgment of the understanding, of which we have an express 
knowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses, and these 
beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which we are not always aware. 
These movements often thwart the judgment of the practical understanding. (TH 310) 
 
                                                          
30 See DM 13 / L 310-11.  
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Indeed, an actual infinity of imperceptible perceptions always subtends even the most maximally 
distinct perception that we may have; these must necessarily participate in determining the will, 
whether or not we are aware of it, and nothing prevents this determination from running entirely 
counter to the understanding. In short, given how he characterizes intelligence as a condition for 
rational freedom, Leibniz seems to understate the case when he claims that we are “mere 
empirics in three-fourths of our actions” (M 28 / L 645).31 
Finally, there is one last strategy that Leibniz employs here in the effort to ward off the 
threat of Spinozism. For Spinoza, as we will explore in greater detail in Chapter 3, the will and 
the understanding are identical: “In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, 
except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” (E II P49 / CWS I.484 / G II.130). 
This identity is one of Spinoza’s most radical gnoseological claims. By contrast, for Descartes, 
the will and the intellect are not coextensive, and the possibility of moral failure or sin arises 
from the fact that one can will with regard to things that one does not understand.32 But for 
                                                          
31 Leibniz repeats this elsewhere: “Men too, insofar as they are empiricists, that is to say, in 
three-fourths of their actions, act only like beasts” (PNG 5 / L 638). 
 
32 “So what then is the source of my mistakes? It must be simply this: the scope of the will is 
wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use 
to matters which I do not understand. Since the will is indifferent in such cases, it easily turns 
aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin” (MFP IV / CSM 
II.40-41 / AT VII.58]). Arnauld, in the fourth set of objections, argued that Descartes “is dealing 
above all with the mistakes we commit in distinguishing between the true and the false, and not 
those that occur in our pursuit of good and evil” (Arnaud, MOR IV / CSM II.151 / AT VII.215]). 
He warns that this doctrine could be misleading, and might be theologically objectionable if 
taken out of context. Descartes responds: “this is something that the entire context of my book 
makes clear” (MOR IV / CSM II.172 / AT VII.248); nevertheless, he suggests that he has taken 
Arnauld’s concern seriously by adding an ‘advance warning’ on this score: “I do not deal at all 
with sin, i.e. the error which is committed in pursuing good and evil, but only with the error that 
occurs in distinguishing truth from falsehood” (MFP Synopsis / CSM II.11 / AT VII.15). How 
best to reconcile this warning with the actual text of the fourth meditation is not particularly 
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Spinoza, there is no such possibility: one affirms what one understands, and vice versa. Leibniz 
seems to agree with the former, that one affirms what one understands, but not the latter, that one 
understands what one wills, thereby insisting that the will and the understanding are therefore 
importantly nonidentical: “a clear and distinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the 
affirmation of the truth: thus the understanding is necessitated in that direction. But whatever 
perception one may have of the good, the effort to act in accordance with the judgment, which in 
my opinion forms the essence of the will, is distinct from it” (TH 311). One is justified in asking, 
then, what would be the principle by which the will would be determined to a course of action, if 
not in accordance with the judgment of the understanding. And the petites perceptions would 
seem, yet again, to supply a satisfying answer insofar as they participate in the determination of 
the will. But in this way, Leibniz once again comes closer to Spinoza than he would like: for 
according to both philosophers, it cannot be by virtue of a lack of understanding that the will is 
determined, but only by virtue of the positivity of some affection. Leibniz’s imperceptible 
impressions or unconscious perceptions here play the same role as Spinoza’s inadequate ideas, 
which I will explore in Chapter 2, insofar as both give rise to passionate affects that determine 
one to act in a particular and determinate way. Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor. If 
Leibniz were to object that this amounts to seriously undermining the freedom of the will by 
deflating the determining power of rational understanding, Spinoza would have to agree. 
 
                                                          
clear. Ariew contends that, in any case, Descartes’ position on sin as laid out in the meditation 
itself was not obviously in conflict with the official Jesuit doctrines of the day, according to 
which sin had to be considered only a privation and nothing positive in itself (Roger Ariew, 
“Descartes and Scholasticism: the intellectual background to Descartes’ thought,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham [New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005], 65-6). 
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4. The Metaphysics of Interaction and the Problem of Bodies 
The whole difficulty here, for Leibniz, lies in his need to reconcile two seemingly incompatible 
claims: that there is freedom, and that everything has a sufficient reason. As we have seen, his 
strategy for doing so involves several distinct steps: first, he claims that any state of affairs or 
matter of fact is contingent in itself, since freedom is strictly speaking incompatible with any 
absolute determination. This he argues for by noting that the contraries of such matters of fact 
cannot involve any contradiction, so that true claims about them can still be considered 
contingent. Second, he argues that while there do exist determinations of the will, these “incline 
without necessitating” (TH 45), since it is precisely such necessitation that a genuine theory of 
subjective freedom rules out (and vice versa). He makes two kinds of arguments in favor of 
inclination without necessitation: on the one hand, he suggests that the intelligence of monads is 
such that it makes a monad’s deliberate actions freely willed in accordance with inclination. 
However, I have pointed to some objections to the viability of this account. In particular, I 
argued that it seems either that a monad’s deliberate actions are never sufficiently intelligent to 
constitute free volition, owing to the structure of finite minds and the infinite analysis required 
for the cognition of the real goodness of contingent things; or else that these actions are simply 
free by definition, which would amount to evacuating the concept of freedom of all the moral 
weight Leibniz would like it to bear (not to mention that it would contradict his repeated claims 
that we are ‘mere empirics’ three-quarters of the time). On the other hand, Leibniz also 
continually emphasizes that the metaphysical vision of nature he forwards is one in which 
individual substances, that is, minds or monads, never really interact; instead they unfold totally 
separately from one another such that their actions, even if they have sufficient reasons for being 
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so and not otherwise (and they always do33), remain free in the sense of being entirely 
spontaneous. This is the doctrine of pre-established harmony. 
What is at stake in this doctrine, which Leibniz clearly considered so central to his 
metaphysics and as one of his most significant and novel philosophical contributions? In 
particular, we should consider some features in which it is remarkably similar to, and yet distinct 
from, Spinoza’s central metaphysical thesis in relation to the same problem. As many have 
noted,34 the various theories of causation that developed in the seventeenth century have their 
basic root in the widespread recognition of the problem presented by the Cartesian model of 
substantial interaction, which the question of mind-body causation made explicit and acute, 
namely, since minds are not extended substances, how is it possible for them to cause physical 
movements, as seems to be the case when I will my arms to move in typing this sentence? Or, 
vice versa, how is it possible for my mind to be affected in some way as a consequence of some 
state of bodily affairs, as seems to be the case when I have difficulty focusing when I have not 
eaten recently enough? To this sort of question, two kinds of answers can evidently be given: 
either one can affirm that minds do in fact cause bodily movements and vice versa, which would 
require that one give an account of how this is metaphysically possible, or one can simply deny 
that such causal relations exist—that is, one can argue that, metaphysically speaking, minds are 
                                                          
33 Again (see note 14, above) I should point out that this is actually a matter of debate; Paull and 
Beck both argue that the position Leibniz forwards in “Necessary and Contingent Truths” is one 
in which human actions are free in the sense that they do not have sufficient reasons. Paull, quite 
precisely, calls this the ‘theory of miraculous freedom’. 
 
34 See Steven Nadler et al., Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, 
Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); Kenneth Clatterburgh, The Causation Debate in 
Modern Philosophy 1637-1739 (New York: Routledge, 1999); Walter Ott, Causation and Laws 
of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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not and cannot be the causes of anything physical, and that bodies are not and cannot be the 
causes of anything mental. If one takes this latter route, the issue is to give an account of the 
merely apparent interaction of minds and bodies. It is significant that almost none of the 
metaphysical theories of causation developed in the wake of Descartes take the first horn of this 
dilemma: Malebranchian occasionalism, Leibnizian pre-established harmony, and Spinozist 
parallelism all involve the denial of such causal relations, although in importantly different 
ways.35 
Leaving aside occasionalism here,36 closer consideration of parallelism and pre-
established harmony reveals more affinities than one might expect. For one thing, Leibniz and 
                                                          
35 To be sure, Hobbes could accurately be described as a thinker whose metaphysical position 
allows for bodies to be the cause of mental states; in his materialism, minds just are bodily 
interactions. But Hobbes’ position here is so radically different from that of the others that it 
would deserve its own treatment. To round out the post-Cartesian picture a bit: Arnauld, on the 
question of mind-body causation at least, is clearly an occasionalist—indeed, as Nadler notes, he 
is “the only Cartesian to recognize [the mind-body problem] and to use occasionalism to resolve 
it” (Steven Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians [New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011], 89); Berkeley’s eliminativism with regard to bodies entails that he too 
denies such causal relations, because for him there are no real bodies to affect or be affected by 
minds (see Jolley, Causality and Mind, 186-90, 244-51); Locke argues that bodily interactions 
cannot give rise to mental states, as in his argument for our knowledge of the existence of God: 
“it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking 
intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter” (LEHU IV.X.9 / 550-1). 
Finally, Hume (in a Malebranchian-occasionalist register) mutates the problem, yielding a 
critique of causal knowledge in general, which I will explore in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
36 As a provisional justification for leaving occasionalism aside, let me briefly reconstruct 
Leibniz’s charge of deus ex machina. The problem is that on the occasionalist account, the 
apparent interactions of things cannot be understood on the basis of the natures of the things that 
seem to interact. Leibniz argues that God’s intervention to make things interact, even if it is in a 
maximally general way, is arbitrary from the perspective of the natures of the occasional causes 
themselves; these interactions thus constitute miracles “in the philosophical sense of that which 
exceeds the powers of created beings. It is not enough to say that God has made a general law, 
for besides the decree there is also necessary a natural means of carrying it out, that is, all that 
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Spinoza both hold that causal relations between substances are impossible. In Leibniz, as we 
have seen, this impossibility leads to his argument for the doctrine of pre-established harmony 
and the spontaneity of monads. But Spinoza is also committed to the same impossibility. The 
intuition forming the basis of the mind-body problem is formalized in the third proposition of the 
First Part of the Ethics: “If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot 
be the cause of the other” (E I P3 / CWS I.410 / G II.47). The demonstration appeals to two 
axioms from Part One: Axiom 4, that the “knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the 
knowledge of its cause” (E I A4 / CWS I.410 / G II.46); and Axiom 5, that “things that have 
nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another” (E I A5 / 
CWS I.410 / G II.46). With these axioms in hand, the problem can be rigorously articulated: if 
two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other, for knowledge of 
effects involves that of their causes, and the supposed lack of commonality precludes this.37 Of 
course, whether this demonstration is satisfying depends on whether one agrees to accept 
Spinoza’s definitions and axioms, and Leibniz certainly did not accept all of them; indeed, he is 
particularly frustrated by Spinoza’s definition of substance as quod in se est et per se concipitur 
                                                          
happens must also be explained through the nature which God gives to things. The laws of nature 
are not so arbitrary and so indifferent as many people imagine” (L 494). It is the arbitrariness of 
nature here that he considers impermissible; nature, for Leibniz, must itself be rationally 
intelligible, and it should be possible to give an account of why a bodily state would give rise to 
a mental one, other than the non-explanatory ‘God willed it so’. Still, more should be said on the 
subject of occasionalism as a metaphysics of causation—I will bring it up again briefly in 
Chapter 4—and I leave it aside primarily due to constraints of space and time. On this subject, 
see Rutherford, “Natures, Laws, and Miracles”. 
 
37 On the curiously gnoseological character of this Spinozist argument, according to which things 
with nothing in common cannot cause one another because this would imply that knowledge of 
one would involve knowledge of the other, see Martial Gueroult, Spinoza I: Dieu (Paris: Aubier 
Montaigne, 1968), 115-6. 
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(L 196). But it is noteworthy that, in his notes on the opening of the Ethics, Leibniz remarks that 
he believes “that the third, fourth, and fifth axioms can be proved” (L 197), and raises no 
objections to this third proposition.38 
Having demonstrated this proposition, Spinoza proceeds to argue that there cannot be 
more than one substance of a given attribute (E I P5 / CWS I.411 / G II.48), and that, since this is 
the case, there is no intersubstantial causation: “One substance cannot be produced by another 
substance” (E I P6 / CWS I.411 / G II.48). It might be thought that this refers solely to the 
creation but not the modification of a substance, i.e., that while one substance cannot produce 
another, it might still be possible for one to modify or affect another. However, Spinoza’s 
argument clearly denies this possibility by the same reasoning: in order for one substance to 
produce even a modification in another, the two substances in question would have to possess a 
common attribute, and this possibility was already ruled out by P5. Therefore, any substance can 
only be auto-affective; there is no consistent way to hold that one substance can produce, 
determine, affect, or modify another. To this extent, Spinoza and Leibniz are in perfect 
agreement regarding the metaphysics of substantial causation. 
However, their disagreement becomes apparent when we ask how many substances exist 
in their respective metaphysical cosmologies. Spinoza famously argues that there is only one 
substance, which necessarily exists and possesses an infinity of attributes (E I P11 / CWS I.417 / 
G II.52). For Leibniz, the answer is somewhat more complicated. On the one hand, the world is 
made up of an actual infinity of distinct substances, an infinity of minds or monads, each of 
                                                          
38 It is equally noteworthy that Leibniz thinks these can be proved, since this would seem to 
suggest that their proper status is not axiomatic but propositional or theorematic. Leibniz does 
not here provide any indication as to how it might be possible to prove the truth of these claims, 
and I leave aside as falling outside the scope of the present inquiry the question of how Leibniz 
might have proceeded in this regard. 
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which is itself finite, and, on the other hand, there is God, the infinite substance that creates the 
world.39 This seems to create a problem for Leibniz, insofar as, outside this single exception of 
divine creation, he is committed to the metaphysical impossibility of intersubstantial causation, 
and it would seem improper to fall back here on a deus ex machina—since, after all, he objected 
to the occasionalists in precisely these terms (NS 13 / L 457). Yet when it comes to resolving this 
difficulty, Leibniz seems to do just this: “I have shown a posteriori, through the pre-established 
harmony, that all monads were created by God and depend on him; yet we cannot understand in 
detail how this was done” (NE IV.X.19 / 443). Spinoza’s monism involves no such difficulty, 
and there is no exception in his system to the prohibition on intersubstantial causation—
although, of course, his pantheism involves other sacrifices, most notably moral ones, that 
Leibniz is unwilling to make. 
Here then are two major differences: first, the infinite number of finite substances in 
Leibniz’s pre-established harmony, against the infinity of the single substance, Deus sive Natura, 
in Spinoza’s metaphysics; and second, the exception to the impossibility of intersubstantial 
causation in the divine creation of the world in Leibniz, which has no correlate in Spinoza. But 
there is yet another, perhaps more profound, metaphysical difference between the two systems, 
which has to do with the status of bodies. It is generally accepted that if Leibniz is an idealist, 
this is most obvious in terms of his rejection of corporeal or bodily substantiality. In his notes on 
the Ethics, Leibniz parenthetically and cautiously remarks concerning Proposition 14: “it does 
not yet seem certain to me that bodies are substances; with minds the case is different” (L 201). 
                                                          
39 “The sufficient reason, therefore, which needs no further reason, must be outside of this series 
of contingent things and is found in a substance which is the cause of this series or which is a 
necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself; otherwise we should not yet 
have a sufficient reason with which to stop. This final reason for things is called God” (PNG 8 / 
L 639; first emphasis mine). 
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Elsewhere he is more direct in asserting that the only true substances are minds or monads. In the 
Principles of Nature and Grace, he writes that each monad “is surrounded by a mass composed 
of an infinity of other monads which constitute the body belonging to this central monad” (PNG 
3 / L 637); in the Monadology, he argues that the simplicity of substances entails that “it is 
impossible [for them] to have either extension, or figure, or divisibility” (M 3 / L 643). In the 
Discourse on Metaphysics, he directly argues against corporeal substantiality at length: 
…the entire nature of the body does not consist merely in extension, that is to say, in size, 
figure, and motion, [but] there must necessarily be recognized in it something related to 
souls, which is commonly called a substantial form […] It can even be demonstrated that 
the concepts of size, figure, and motion are not so distinct as has been imagined and that 
they include something imaginary and relative to our perceptions, as do also (though to a 
greater extent) color, heat, and other similar qualities which one may doubt truly are 
found in the nature of things outside ourselves. This is why qualities of this kind cannot 
constitute any substance. And if there is no other principle identity of body than those we 
have just mentioned, no body can ever subsist longer than a moment. (DM 12 / L 309-
10). 
 
Now clearly, bodies do often subsist for longer than a moment. But what does this tell us? Here, 
Leibniz argues that their subsistence in fact constitutes an argument for the active, unifying 
power of really existing substantial forms, that is, minds or monads. 
However, if it is clear enough that only minds qualify as substances, this still leaves open 
the question of the precise status of bodies in Leibniz’s metaphysics. There is some disagreement 
on this question. On the one hand, Leibniz frequently writes as though bodies are merely 
phenomena, even if he insists that the pre-established harmony entails that they are well-founded 
ones (phenomena bene fundata).40 This has given rise to the so-called ‘phenomenalist’ 
interpretation, which holds that, as Jolley glosses it, “according to Leibniz, physical objects are 
                                                          
40 See LPS II.276, 306; III.636; IV.467. 
77 
reducible to sets of perceptions.”41 However, as he also argues, even if Leibniz is an idealist, this 
does not necessarily commit him to phenomenalism, and there are good textual reasons (some of 
which we have just encountered) to entertain the possibility of another status for Leibnizian 
bodies: namely, that they somehow arise out of aggregates of monads.42 Jolley writes: “Leibniz 
often prefers to speak of body, not as an aggregate of monads, but as a being by aggregation 
which results from monads.”43 Jolley convincingly argues that Leibniz is not an eliminativist 
with regard to bodies, as for example Berkeley is, but some kind of reductivist with regard to 
them. The phenomenalist has Leibniz reducing bodies to aggregates of monads; Jolley’s 
intervention consists in suggesting that bodies are phenomena ‘resulting from’ such aggregates, 
but without conceding thereby that monads constitute parts of the bodily phenomena in 
question.44 This would seem to make bodies a kind of emergent phenomena with regard to 
                                                          
41 Jolley, Causality and Mind, 184. Some variants of the phenomenalist interpretation are 
defended in the following: Montgomery Furth, “Monadology,” in Leibniz: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. Harry G. Frankfurt (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976); 
Louis Loeb, From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern 
Philosophy (New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), ch. 7; and Daniel Garber, Leibniz: 
Body, Substance, Monad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 7. 
 
42 Woolhouse also seems to contest the phenomenalist interpretation: “though not substances or 
entia per se, masses of material are not like rainbows, mere phenomena or appearances. They 
have reality, and they derive it from being aggregates of material substances” (R.S. Woolhouse, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The concept of substance in seventeenth-century metaphysics [New 
York: Routledge, 1993], 94-5). But this latter formulation seems to beg the question, if it doesn’t 
directly misconstrue the issue. Leibniz is clear that bodies cannot be simple substances, since 
they admit of infinite divisibility, and so it is beside the point to suggest that composite bodies 
are substantial insofar as they are ‘aggregates of material substances’. In his arguments for 
monads and substantial forms, Leibniz constantly returns to the theme that bodies cannot 
themselves constitute unities. 
 
43 Jolley, Causality and Mind, 188. 
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monads—which is an appealing alternative, since bodies clearly evince properties that monads 
do not have (divisibility ad infinitum, for example).45 But whether bodies in his system turn out 
to be mere aggregates or constitute some kind of emergent phenomena, Leibniz unambiguously 
asserts, throughout his mature metaphysical works, including in the extended correspondences 
with Arnauld and Des Bosses, that only minds are substantial. Yet, as we have seen, Leibniz 
makes surprisingly materialist overtures in his account of perception: that region of the world 
that we clearly and distinctly perceive or express is in some way a function of our relations of 
bodily proximity. And this account is troubled by the consistently insubstantial character of 
bodies, whatever their ultimate metaphysical status. 
For Spinoza, by contrast, there is no difficulty or confusion on the issue: bodies are just 
as substantial as minds; God, the absolutely infinite substance, is both thinking and extended. 
The scholium to Proposition 15 of Part One includes a detailed defense of the possibility of 
divine corporeality, which in fact proceeds by arguing that corporeal substance is not really, but 
only imaginarily or ideally, divisible. His aim is to argue that extension, insofar as it is really 
infinite and indivisible, is perfectly commensurate with the divine nature. Spinoza first notes that 
most often thinkers tend to equate corporeality with “quantity, with length, breadth, and depth, 
limited by some certain figure” (E I P15s / CWS I.421 / G II.57), which are characteristics of 
finitude incompatible with the absolute infinity of God—and he does not dispute this 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
 
45 For further reading on this subject, see Look and Rutherford’s introduction to G.W.F. Leibniz, 
The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, trans. and ed. Brandon C. Look and Donald Rutherford 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), xlix-lvi and lxvi-lxxi; and Sleigh, Leibniz & 
Arnauld, 101-115. 
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incompatibility or absurdity.46 But, he continues, these thinkers “entirely remove corporeal, or 
extended, substance itself from the divine nature. And they maintain that it has been created by 
God. But by what divine power could it be created?” (Ibid.). Spinoza, unlike Leibniz, does not 
allow any exception to the metaphysical impossibility of intersubstantial causation: Spinoza’s 
God, insofar as it is corporeal substance, produces infinitely many extended things in infinitely 
many extended modes (E I P16 / CWS I.424 / G II.60); there is no deus ex machina here, only 
the absolute consistency of immanent divine infinity. Indeed, in the scholium to P15 he 
continues: “I have demonstrated clearly enough—in my judgment, at least—that no substance 
can be produced by any other” (E I P15s / CWS I.421/ G II.57). 
If Spinoza rejects the possibility of intersubstantial causation more consistently than 
Leibniz, this is not to say that he denies interaction or causation between individuals. For 
Spinoza, all individuals are only modifications of the one infinite substance; and there is no 
contradiction whatsoever in the idea of a modification generating effects outside itself but within 
the same substance. In fact, Spinoza’s theory of conatus involves an essentially expansive 
understanding of modal interaction: each mode or finite thing, insofar as strives to persevere in 
its being, must necessarily attempt to transform all modes that it comes into contact with so that 
their nature follows from and conforms with its own (E III P4-9 / CWS I.498-9 / G II.145-7).47 
Freedom, for Spinoza, consists precisely in the degree to which a mode is effectively capable of 
actively producing effects that follow from its own nature as a finite mode, both in itself and in 
external modes. This is metaphysically possible because all modes, for Spinoza, are simply 
                                                          
46 “…all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurd, which I am not now disputing) …” (E I 
P15s / CWS I.422 / G II.58). In fact, he does not dispute them at all. 
 
47 See Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Les Éditions de 
Minuit, 1988), chs. 1-4. 
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modifications of one and the same infinite substance, Deus sive natura; intersubstantial causation 
is impossible, but Spinozist individuals are not distinct substances. Thus we are led to ask of 
Leibniz: what does it mean to talk about a substance’s ‘degree of activity’ or its acting freely, if 
it is metaphysically impossible for it to affect anything outside itself? According to the pre-
established harmony, my acting does not amount to nothing, since my actions will form part of 
the perceptions of other monads; but this action does not really affect any other monads, and the 
relation between my action and another’s perception is expressive instead of causal. This is why 
Leibniz says that the soul’s inner perceptions of the external world are in fact only “like well-
ordered dreams” (NS 14 / L 457). But is it really freedom to systematically dream about one’s 
activity, while in reality remaining entirely incapable of causally affecting anything outside 
oneself? 
One final point deserves to be made here. Like the pre-established harmony, Spinoza’s 
parallelism does indeed deny intersubstantial causation, and it even denies causal relations 
between mind and body. But whereas the pre-established harmony denies the latter by refusing 
bodies the status of being metaphysically real, Spinozism does so by insisting that mind and 
body are one and the same thing, understood in two different ways: a given mode of substance 
may be understood under the aspect of extension, as a body, or under the aspect of thought, as an 
idea. It is true that for Spinoza the relationship between bodies and minds is decisively not causal 
but expressive: bodies are expressed in and as ideas, and ideas imply and involve corporeal 
expressions. But for Spinoza, this is a function of a unified order underlying both thought and 
extension, the order of absolute necessity or divine consistency, rather than being a benevolent 
and freely-chosen divine decision to have us dream in an orderly way. “The order and connection 
of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E II P7 / CWS I.451 / G II.89). For 
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us, then, parallelism has three crucial aspects: bodies and minds are equally substantial, modes 
really do interact and affect one another within their substantial attribute, and the logic of one 
kind of modal interaction (e.g., in thought) is isomorphic to that of another (e.g., in extension). 
This means that our developing knowledge of bodies also deepens our knowledge of their 
correlative ideas, and vice versa. Spinozist parallelism, therefore, provides us the theoretical 
means to explore the unconscious of thought, since the logic of mental determination is also that 
of bodily determination; as Deleuze writes, a key part of Spinoza’s intervention consists in “a 
devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a discovery of the unconscious, of an 
unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the body.”48 But as we have seen, this 
unconscious of thought is also present in Leibniz, in the petites perceptions and the infinite 
obscure depths of each and every individual mind. 
 
5. Infinitesimal Agency 
I began this investigation into Leibniz’s metaphysics with the assumption that he contributes to 
our understanding of the unconscious of thought. As I have argued, Leibniz elaborates a robust 
theory of unconscious mental affection in the form of the petites perceptions. This affection is 
actually infinite, such that it is no exaggeration to say that, in relation to it, the conscious part of 
the mind is infinitesimally small. And since the degree of a mind’s freedom is precisely the 
degree of its activity, or the ratio of conscious to unconscious thought, each mind’s degree of 
freedom is also infinitesimally small. But Leibniz must also be credited with consistently arguing 
for the metaphysically consequential status of the infinitesimal: an infinitesimally small freedom 
is not nothing. Moreover, he argues that the nature of infinitesimals is not indifferent; in other 
                                                          
48 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 18-9. 
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words, even infinitesimally small elements are distinct from one another. Thus, as he says, 
although monads are “metaphysical points” (NS 11 / L 456), still it is “necessary for each monad 
to be different from every other” (M 9 / L 643). Everything in Leibniz is a matter of ratio, and 
ratios are always absolutely singular. 
The theory of unconscious affection or petites perceptions has no equivalent in Leibniz’s 
contemporaries. As I indicated, this is clear with regard to Descartes and Locke, for both of 
whom thought seems to be directly bound to consciousness. But even with regard to Hume and 
Spinoza, who, as I will argue in the coming chapters, also develop sophisticated accounts of the 
unconscious of thought, Leibniz’s concept of unconscious perception stands alone. In Hume and 
Spinoza, the ideal and affective associations by which the mind is led from one idea to the next 
are habituations that tend to be unconscious. With Hume we can say that the movement by which 
my mind believes in the persistent existence of external bodies is an unconscious mental 
mechanism; and with Spinoza we can say that the affective relationship I have with an external 
cause rests on unconscious associations, through the persistent power of inadequate ideas. But 
Leibniz shows us that even at the level of perception itself, consciousness is only the evanescent 
unity of an unconscious infinite multiplicity. Neither Hume nor Spinoza provide us the resources 
to think this infinity, or to grasp the metaphysically consequential status of the infinitely small in 
the unconscious of thought.  
With his differential calculus, Leibniz provides us a model for thinking the nature of the 
conscious mind: consciousness is the singular integration of an actual infinity of infinitesimally 
small perceptions. The integrated unity of a mind is the singular ratio of conscious and 
unconscious perceptions, of minute perceptions and the apperceptions that strike a mind as clear 
and distinct. The singularity of this integration—that is, of an individual mind—is precisely the 
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uniqueness of this ratio, which involves and expresses the relations of one’s body to the world as 
a whole. The Leibnizian individual is nothing other than the relations it maintains with others, 
but those relations are nothing other than the infinite totality of individuals in its actuality. In 
other words, the world is constituted of monads, but the monads are just their perspective on the 
world—the infinitesimally small portion of clear and distinct perceptions and the actually infinite 
multiplicity of unconscious perceptions that together constitute an individual mind.  
As I have tried to argue here, this means that Leibniz’s doctrine of subjective inclination 
must amount to a doctrine of subjective determination. Could it ever be otherwise, for a 
philosophy that insists on the actuality of infinity and the principle of sufficient reason? For it is 
precisely the actual infinity of infinitesimal mental affections, or differentials of perception, that 
Leibniz consistently refuses to deny. These paradoxically imperceptible perceptions, as we have 
seen, subtend his denial of indifference: the reality of differentials means that indifference is 
actually impossible, so that any concept of freedom as choosing among indifferent options must 
be rejected as incoherent. And they also subtend his affirmation of mental habituation: the 
integrated totality of imperceptible perceptions determines the mind’s very capacity for active 
thought. Taken together, this denial and this affirmation force his systematic reevaluation of the 
concept of freedom: freedom cannot consist in indifferent choice but in the habit of active 
thinking. The degree of a mind’s freedom, its proportion of clear to obscure expression, must 
always be one of infinitesimal vanishing, but this in no way implies that all degrees of freedom 
are identical. The mind’s activity can only increase as it discovers within itself clear and distinct 
perceptions; one’s relations with others can indeed be clearly and distinctly expressed. Leibniz 
teaches us that depths of the subject infinitely exceed its consciousness, and this infinite excess is 
what makes it always possible for the mind to become more active in thought. This is why 
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Inevitable and Persistent Inadequacies 
The Unconscious of Ideas in Spinoza 
 
“Desire,” Spinoza says, “is the very essence of the human” (E III DA 1 / CWS I.531 / G II.190). 
For Spinoza, there is no ‘essence of humanity’, as in the scholastic Aristotelian ‘rational animal’, 
the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον that Heidegger describes.1 Rather, in Spinoza’s metaphysics each individual 
mode of substance, and so each human being, has its own unique essence: its conatus or striving 
to persevere in its being (E III P7 / CWS I.499 / G II.147. This striving should not be understood 
statically, as though each being strives only to remain what it was, but dynamically, in the sense 
that each being strives to become what it is by actively seeking to increase its powers to affect 
and be affected, in thought as well as in extension.2 This is the metaphysical basis for Spinoza’s 
lauded non- (or anti-) anthropocentrism. But human beings are not entirely unremarkable for 
Spinoza; they are, for one thing, highly complicated as finite modes go, capable of affecting 
others and being affected by them in a great many ways (E II Postulates, P14-15 / CWS I.462-3 / 
G II.102-3). And the complex dynamic striving that constitutes the essence of each human being 
                                                          
1 Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Indianapolis: 
Indiana Univeristy Press, 1997), 19. On Spinoza’s relationship to the category of ‘species’, see 
Zourabichvili, “Individual Identity in Spinoza”. 
 
2 Macherey argues that this dynamism is one of the major differences between Spinozist and 
Hobbesan conatus; the latter, he claims, is precisely this ‘static’ formulation. See Pierre 
Macherey, Avec Spinoza: Études sur la doctrine et l’histoire du spinozisme (Paris: PUF, 1992). 
See also Matheron on the development of Spinoza’s theory of conatus: Alexandre Matheron, 
Politics, Ontology and Knowledge in Spinoza, eds. Filippo del Lucchesse, David Maruzzella, and 
Gil Morejón, trans. David Maruzzella and Gil Morejón (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
forthcoming), above all ch. 11, but also chs. 4 and 9. 
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is clearly both mental as well as corporeal: I strive to increase the power of my body to act, but 
also my mind’s power to think, in one and the same movement; conversely, as a human being, 
my incapacities are both corporeal, insofar as there are things that my body cannot do, and 
mental, insofar as there are things that I do not and cannot adequately understand. The fact that 
we must have such incapacities in general is inescapable: this is one of the demonstrated 
propositions of Part Four of the Ethics (E IV P4 / CWS I.548 / G II.212), but it is also axiomatic 
(E IV A1 / CWS I.547 / G II.210). Spinozist ethics is the practice of systematically replacing 
such incapacities in thought and extension with active powers, so that one actively produces the 
effects that follow from one’s nature, instead of passively undergoing changes determined by 
natures other than one’s own.  
To what extent is our striving or desire conscious? In the scholium to Ethics III P9, 
Spinoza seems to suggest that human desire is essentially conscious: “desire can be defined as 
appetite together with consciousness of the appetite” (E III P9s / CWS I.500 / G II.148). But this 
formulation is misleading, as I will show in greater detail in Chapter 3. As Spinoza later writes, 
in his explication of the definition of desire at the end of Part III, consciousness is not a 
necessary feature of human striving: “whether a human being is conscious of his appetite or not, 
the appetite remains one and the same” (E III DA1 exp. / CWS I.531 / G II.190). Indeed Spinoza 
argues that for the most part our determination and our desire is in fact unconscious; it is only 
under certain determinate conditions, and only to a limited extent, that we can be conscious of 
the striving that we are. For Spinoza, our mind is nothing other than the idea of our body, and his 
parallelism commits him to the claim that “nothing happens in the body which is not perceived 
by the Mind” (E II P12 / CWS I.456-7 / G II.95). But as I showed in the previous chapter, 
perceptions may be perfectly unconscious. And indeed, it would be a mistake to think that 
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Spinozist perceptions are necessarily conscious: that is, the mind necessarily perceives 
everything that happens in the body, but it does not follow that the mind is always consciously 
aware of these perceptions. And once we allow that the ideas that constitute a mind may not be 
consciously registered as such by that mind, or that the Spinozist mind has an unconscious 
component, it follows that the desire that constitutes each individual has a profoundly 
unconscious dimension as well. 
In this chapter and the next, I will argue for this unconscious of desire in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of thought in the following manner. In this chapter, I will explore Spinoza’s 
typology of adequate and inadequate ideas in Part II of the Ethics, arguing that it is a reframing 
of the Cartesian typology of ideas as being clear and distinct or obscure and confused. I will 
argue that Spinoza undertakes this reframing for the following two reasons. First, whereas 
unclear and indistinct ideas can be, so to speak, effectively quarantined on Descartes’ account, 
Spinoza’s inadequate ideas are necessary, in that there are things of which we are only able to 
form inadequate ideas. Second, and more importantly, they are persistent: inadequate ideas 
remain in the mind, and continue to produce effects, even when we have formed more adequate 
ones. After laying out Spinoza’s framework of adequate and inadequate ideas in broad outline, I 
will first show how inadequate ideas are inevitable, and then how and why they persist in the 
face of the development of adequate knowledge. One way to sum up the results of this 
investigation is as follows: even though we may come to possess adequate knowledge of certain 
things, our knowledge of the idea that we are must always, to a significant degree, remain 
inadequate; the conditions of consciousness imply the unavoidable involvement of unconscious 
ideas. 
88 
Then, in Chapter 3, I will consider ideas as components of desire. To this end I will first 
give an account of Spinoza’s argument, at the end of Part II of the Ethics, that intellect and 
volition are identical; then I will explore the relationship between volition and desire itself in 
Part III. All together, this will provide us with a robust account of Spinozist desire, the striving 
by which each human being seeks to increase its power to think and to act, and that each human 
being is, which has an inescapably unconscious aspect insofar as some of the ideas that constitute 
the mind, as understanding and volition, are necessarily inadequate. Ideas themselves, just like 
human beings, are modes of substance, and so are also essentially characterized by their striving 
to persevere in their own being: persistent inadequate ideas continue to produce effects in the 
mind, or continue to determine one’s desire, unconsciously and often in spite of the adequate 
ideas that one manages to form. For on Spinoza’s account, ideas determine one’s desire insofar 
as they constitute affects with a certain degree of power, not insofar as they are true or false (E 
IV P14 / CWS I.553 / G II.219). Even when one is genuinely active, the unconscious of desire, 
the potency of inadequate ideas constituting the mind, persistently and significantly continues to 
determine what one does. This necessity according to which one’s desire must remain 
unconscious in spite of the formation of adequate ideas is not, I argue, cause for epistemological 
defeatism, but is a condition for the possibility of a genuine ethics of knowledge. 
One of Spinoza’s most significant conceptual innovations is his distinction between 
adequate and inadequate ideas. In this chapter, I propose an interpretation of what is at stake in 
this distinction: I argue that it is motivated by a different set of philosophical concerns than that 
which motivated the category of clear and distinct ideas as Descartes formulated it. The latter, I 
claim, responds to the skeptical problem of uncertainty, whereas the distinction between 
adequate and inadequate knowledge is formulated in the context of Spinoza’s ethical imperative 
89 
to increase one’s power. Even true inadequate knowledge is ‘like a conclusion without 
premises’, and expresses the passivity and impotence of the mind that happens to stumble upon 
it, whereas even the most threadbare adequate idea involves the affirmation of the power to think 
of the mind that forms it. I then trace out a major argumentative thread of Part II of the Ethics, 
which illustrates the extent to which we are only capable of forming inadequate ideas. Based on 
Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas, insofar as our minds are finite modes of thought, we are only 
able to form inadequate ideas concerning the nature of external bodies or the parts of our own 
bodies, the nature of our own mind based on the ideas of our affections, and knowledge of the 
specific durations of singular things, including our own bodies and external things. Since 
inadequate ideas are not false, according to Spinoza, by virtue of anything positive in them, but 
rather due to their partiality or what they are lacking, this means that, at least with regard to these 
objects of knowledge, our mind is necessarily constituted by ideas that are only partially present 
to the mind. Consequently, I claim that the obverse, non-present aspects of these inadequate 
ideas can be considered their positively determined and determining unconscious aspect, from 
the perspective of the minds that they partially constitute. 
I then give an account of what it means, according to Spinoza, to form adequate 
knowledge: namely, the self-affirmation of the mind’s genuinely active power to think, and its 
correlative direct increase in power. Finally, however, I show that Spinoza argues that even 
assuming that one successfully forms adequate ideas, with all that this entails, inadequate ideas 
are not thereby destroyed but remain as constitutive elements of the mind. Indeed, inadequate 
ideas, insofar as they are really existing modes of thought, persistently and stubbornly continue 
to affirm what they only confusedly involve, and thus continue to determine the mind that they 
participate in constituting at an unconscious level. 
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Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought is remarkable insofar as it accounts both for the 
possibility of the formation of genuinely adequate ideas, and also for the deep, unavoidable 
persistence of inadequate ones. He shows us not just how adequate ideas are possible, but also 
how to go about seeking to form them practically. But the sober realism of the Ethics also warns 
us that the ideal of a mind constituted solely and exclusively of adequate ideas is absolutely 
unattainable for finite modes such as ourselves. To that extent, at the very least, there is an 
irreducibly unconscious dimension to every mind, every singular mode of thought that, while 
necessarily involving absolutely everything that happens in the body of which it is the idea, is 
only partially and inadequately conscious of that totality. 
 
1. From Clarity and Distinctness to Inadequacy 
Descartes distinguishes between ideas that are clear and distinct, and those that are not. It is by 
the clarity and distinctness of an idea that the doubting philosopher can find solace. Such an idea 
will not lead us astray; here there is certainty at last, an idea that provides the basis for practical 
wisdom. Once we restrict the domain of our judgments in accordance with the principle of clarity 
and distinctness, we have no cause for concern. Whatever else may turn out to be the case, at 
least we can rest assured that these judgments will not be incorrect. Clarity and distinctness come 
to be equated with certainty itself, the ideal characteristics that lead us out of the skeptical 
labyrinth. The trouble with unclear and indistinct ideas is not that they are necessarily wrong, but 
that we cannot really be sure about them either way. How could we say that an idea that we only 
perceive unclearly and indistinctly is correct or not? In order for us to pass that kind of judgment 
with any measure of certainty, we would require the impossible, that is, we would need to 
apprehend it clearly and distinctly. Better to remain agnostic on that terrain. 
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Spinoza seems to agree, at first. But something happens between the early writings and 
the Ethics, where the language of clarity and distinctness have largely fallen by the wayside. 
Clear and distinct understanding has not vanished entirely, but a new epistemological framework 
has taken the place of the doctrine of the clear and distinct. In the Ethics, it is a matter of marking 
the difference between adequate and inadequate ideas. In part, this is because the problem has 
changed: there is no skeptical labyrinth to escape for Spinoza, but rather an imperative to seek 
joy, to strive ontologically to increase one’s power in thought and extension. Adequacy will be 
the marker not of an idea that grounds the certainty of a judgment, but of one that ensures and is 
itself the passage to a greater perfection. And conversely, an inadequate idea expresses the 
impotence of the mind that thinks it, its incapacity or passivity. 
But of course, it is not just the problematic that has changed in the shift from of clarity 
and distinctness to that of adequacy. The very nature of the ideas themselves is transformed in 
this shift. The clear and distinct idea correctly describes its object, representationally capturing 
its essential features; the adequate idea grasps its object from the perspective of its production, 
genetically comprehending its causal necessity. But how do these typologies of ideas relate to 
their motivating problems—why should the accurately representational deliver us from 
skepticism, and why should the genetically comprehensive increase our power? In what follows 
we will consider the categories of clarity and distinctness and adequacy, exploring the 
epistemological claims and commitments of each and the stakes of the Spinozist shift from the 
former to the latter.  
Concluding the Second Meditation, Descartes writes: “I know plainly that I can achieve 
an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of anything else” (MFP II / CSM 
II.22-3 / AT VII.34). He has found the Archimedean point for which he was searching. The 
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cogito is beyond all doubt, and he seems to be poised to exit the intolerable whirlpool of 
skepticism. And yet he hesitates upon resuming the investigation: what is the principle according 
to which the cogito is indubitable, after all? “In this first item of knowledge there is simply a 
clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain 
of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such 
clarity and distinctness was false” (MFP III / CSM II.24 / AT VII.35). He immediately 
concludes: whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived must be true. But this is not particularly 
satisfying, even for Descartes. He admits that this conclusion is too quick as a means to resolve 
the radical suspension of belief he has been attempting. 
When he underscores this difficulty himself, recalling things that he had perceived 
through his senses, like the earth and the sky, Descartes drops the language of distinctness: 
“What was it about them that I perceived clearly? Just that the ideas, or thoughts, of such things 
appeared before my mind” (Ibid.). And the same striking omission reappears when he considers 
the uncertain foundations even of mathematical truths, on the hypothesis of a deceptive God: “it 
would be easy for him, if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters 
which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind’s eye” (MFP III / CSM II.25 / AT VII.36). What 
then does Descartes mean by ‘distinct’ as opposed to ‘clear’? In section 45 of the first part of the 
Principles of Philosophy, entitled ‘What is meant by a clear perception, and by a distinct 
perception’, he writes:  
I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind—just as 
when we say that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye’s gaze and 
stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility. I call a perception 
‘distinct’ if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions 
that it contains within itself only what is clear. (PP I.45 / CSM I.207-8 / AT VIIIA.21-2) 
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Clarity, on this account, is just the presence of some reality to a mind that perceives it. 
Distinctness, on the other hand, involves a principle of exclusion: an idea that is not just clear but 
is also distinct3 excludes what does not belong to it. For example, my perceiving a four-sided 
shape as a ‘polygon’ is clearly true but nevertheless obscure, since the category ‘polygon’ 
includes indistinctly all n-sided plane figures; if I had perceived it as a quadrilateral, the 
perception would have been more distinct. And again, the perception of a rhombus, as opposed 
to, say, a trapezoid, would be more distinct than the perception of a quadrilateral. Although 
Descartes said above that clarity can be grasped by way of analogy to a visual impression of 
‘sufficient degree of strength and accessibility’, distinctness seems to admit of degrees in a way 
that clarity itself does not. Nevertheless, a less distinct perception is still supposed to be true to 
the extent that it is distinct: it is not false to perceive a rhombus as a quadrilateral or, less 
distinctly still, as a polygon. But the question is, how can we be sure that an idea that we 
perceive both clearly and distinctly is true? 
The argument fractures at this point: on the one hand, Descartes will pursue the line that 
God cannot be a deceiver, which guarantees the veracity of the clear and distinct perception to 
which I cannot help but assent; on the other, he will argue that the very force of the clarity and 
distinctness of an idea is an indisputable guarantor of its immediate truth, irrespective of any 
hypothetically deceptive God. In spite of his protestations to the contrary, these two lines of 
argument do form a kind of vicious circle, as we will see: God’s not being a deceiver is both 
guaranteed by and the guarantor of the veracity of clear and distinct ideas. But from another 
                                                          
3 An idea that is distinct but unclear is impossible for Descartes (PP I.46 / CSM I.208 / AT 
VIIIA.22). 
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angle, rather than a vicious circle, what this Cartesian argument exhibits is the necessity of a 
dialectic of faith and reason. 
In the second line of this broken dialectic, the forcible truth of clear and distinct ideas 
leads to the conclusion that God is not a deceiver. Descartes appeals directly to the spontaneous 
persuasive character of clarity and distinctness: “whenever I turn my attention to those very 
things that I think I perceive with such great clarity, I am so completely persuaded by them that I 
spontaneously blurt out these words: ‘let him who can deceive me’” (MFP III / CSM II.25 / AT 
VII.36)—that is, even God would be unable to convince me that what is clearly and distinctly 
contradictory is nevertheless true. In Descartes’ Reply to the Second Set of Objections to the 
Meditations, he repeats this appeal: “as soon as we think we correctly perceive something, we 
are spontaneously convinced that it is true” (MOR II / CSM II.103 / AT VII.144). On this 
account, spontaneous conviction would itself constitute certainty in the immediacy of a 
perception. The question reduces to the existential matter of whether this kind of immediate 
conviction actually exists: “it may be doubted whether any such certainty, or firm and immutable 
conviction, is in fact to be had” (MOR II / CSM II.103 / AT VII.145). Descartes claims that we 
can rule out the possibility of this kind of conviction attending either a minimally obscure or 
confused perception, or clear perceptions when they are purely sensorial: some doubt remains 
there, even in the best of cases. “Accordingly, if there is any certainty to be had, the only 
remaining alternative is that it occurs in the clear perceptions of the intellect and nowhere else” 
(MOR II / CSM II.104 / AT VII.145). 
These kinds of perceptions, he tells us, are of two kinds. First, there are those that “are so 
transparently clear and at the same time so simple that we cannot ever think of them without 
believing them to be true” (Ibid.). In these cases, disbelief would involve a manifest or obvious 
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contradiction, as in the paradoxical claim that ‘I think that I am not thinking’ or that ‘parallel 
lines in Euclidean space intersect’. Hence, they cannot be doubted. But second, there are also 
things perceived by the intellect whose contrary does not involve a manifest contradiction, 
although this is ultimately due to the complexity of the chain of reasoning by which we reach 
them. These truths “are perceived very clearly by our intellect so long as we attend to the 
arguments on which our knowledge of them depends; and we are therefore incapable of doubting 
them during this time. But we may forget the arguments in question and later remember simply 
the conclusions which were deduced from them” (MOR II / CSM II.104 / AT VII.146). 
Ostensibly, then, if we were able to keep in view the entire line of argumentation by which we 
reach these conclusions, we would recognize that their denial would indeed involve a 
contradiction. Clarity and distinctness here seem to be the defining characteristic of those ideas 
whose truth is guaranteed by the principle of non-contradiction. At this point, the argument folds 
back toward resolving the theological anxiety of a deceptive God. Since it would be 
contradictory to posit evil as an attribute of the supreme being, we can clearly and distinctly 
perceive that God is not a deceiver. This is precisely the sort of claim that Descartes means with 
this second description. The claim that God is a deceiver is contradictory, but that God is not a 
deceiver is not immediately clear and distinct. It is inescapably clear and distinct when we 
rehearse the argument; it is just that we do not always have the entire chain of reasoning in view. 
So much for the first side of the fracture. 
But on the other hand, this argument also runs in reverse from the contrary perspective. 
This line of argumentation turns once again on the principle of non-contradiction: “Since God is 
the supreme being, he must also be supremely good and true, and it would therefore be a 
contradiction that anything should be created by him which positively tends toward falsehood” 
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(MOR II / CSM II.103 / AT VII.144). Descartes first derives the benevolence of God from the 
postulate of divine perfection, and on this basis concludes that the things that we take to be true 
insofar as they are clearly and distinctly perceived are indeed true. “Since it is impossible to 
imagine that he is a deceiver, whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive must be completely 
accepted as true and certain” (Ibid.). This argument clearly proceeds in the direction opposite to 
that which we analyzed above, and we are left, to borrow Kant’s terminology, in a kind of 
antinomy. Is clarity and distinctness the basis for our belief in the benevolence of God, or does 
the impossibility of a deceptive God ground our faith in the truth of clear and distinct perception? 
The always-incendiary Arnauld recognized this circularity and raised it directly in his set of 
objections to the Meditations: 
I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids reasoning in a circle when he 
says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because 
God exists.  
 
But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly and distinctly perceive this. 
Hence, before we can be sure that God exists, we ought to be able to be sure that 
whatever we perceive clearly and evidently is true. (Arnauld, MOR IV / CSM II.150 / AT 
VII.214) 
 
Descartes denies the charge of vicious circularity, citing the distinction he made earlier with 
regard to the two kinds of indubitable truths—as we saw, there are those whose contraries 
manifestly exhibit a contradiction, and those whose contraries do ultimately involve a 
contradiction, but not obviously or immediately, since we reach them as the conclusions of 
complex arguments. According to Descartes, the existence of a benevolent God is an example of 
the latter kind of ultimately indubitable truth. As he writes in response to Arnauld, “we are sure 
that God exists because we attend to the arguments which prove this; but subsequently it is 
enough for us to remember that we perceived something clearly in order for us to be certain that 
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it is true. This would not be sufficient if we did not know that God exists and is not a deceiver” 
(MOR IV / CSM II.171 / AT VII.245-6). Even so, it is not obvious how this is supposed to 
resolve the problem. We still rely, in this demonstration of the existence of God, on the truth of 
clear and distinct perceptions, which God’s existence as benevolent will sanction as 
argumentatively legitimate. The unstated premise in either case is that the principle of non-
contradiction is itself beyond doubt; that a thesis whose negation involves a contradiction must 
be true lies at the heart of Descartes’ arguments proceeding in either direction. 
It seems clear, however, that this is not a problem for the Cartesian project. On both sides 
of the circular argument we have been exploring, Descartes consistently exhibits the dialectic of 
the rationality of faith and of putting faith in reason, where both rely on and reinforce the other 
by virtue of the principle of non-contradiction as ground and consequence. What counts then are 
the limits to this kind of reasoning. What kind of truth does reasoning by the principle of non-
contradiction deliver, and what can it not accomplish if it is to remain within itself? Descartes 
himself acknowledges these limits: this kind of reasoning delivers indisputable truths about what 
is necessarily possible, but cannot indicate anything about the necessity of actual existence, as he 
explains in the First Set of Replies. “It must be noted that possible existence is contained in the 
concept or idea of everything that we clearly and distinctly understand; but in no case is 
necessary existence so contained, except in the case of the idea of God” (MOR I / CSM II.83 / 
AT VII.116). And this line between necessary existence and possible existence marks precisely 
the limit of reasoning by means of the principle of non-contradiction, and thus of the 
epistemological categories of clarity and distinctness. In other words, however much I may 
clearly and distinctly understand something, this understanding will never involve an account of 
the sufficient reason for its existence, or an explanation as to why it actually exists. Clear and 
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distinct understanding can thus constitute true knowledge at increasingly distinct levels of 
descriptive complexity, but never involves a genetic account of actual necessity.  
The problem is that Descartes nevertheless intends to demonstrate rationally the 
necessary existence of actual things, and not just their possibility, in the final two Meditations. 
But this is precisely what clarity and distinctness, and its exclusive reliance on the principle of 
non-contradiction, can by definition never provide. In Meditation 5, Descartes notes the 
difference in kind between reasoning about the distinction between essence and existence of 
God, on the one hand, and on the other hand, absolutely everything else. Regarding the latter, 
Descartes puts the abstract claims of mathematical science on the same level as propositions 
about physical reality: it is true in the same way that the greatest side of a triangle is opposite its 
greatest angle as that the concept of a mountain is inseparable from that of a valley. They are true 
in the same way because their contraries would involve contradictions. But these are therefore 
claims about the essence of these mental entities, not about their existence, and indeed “from the 
fact that I cannot think of a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that a mountain and 
valley exist anywhere, but simply that a mountain and a valley, whether they exist or not, are 
mutually inseparable” (MFP V / CSM II.45-6 / AT VII.66-7). However, he argues, while this 
separability of essence and existence in the case of absolutely all nondivine beings makes 
arguing for their existence difficult—indeed, on my account, impossible, given the limitations of 
the Cartesian epistemic framework—things are different in the case of God, whose essence and 
existence are not similarly separable. And the inseparability of essence and existence in the 
concept of God lies at the basis of the argument for the existence of God in this fifth meditation: 
“what is more self-evident than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose 
essence alone existence belongs, exists?” (MFP V / CSM II.47 / AT VII.69). 
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But that is not the issue; the issue is whether and how it is possible to demonstrate the 
existence, to use the Cartesian way of putting things, of anything to whose essence existence 
does not belong. This is the challenge Descartes faces in the sixth meditation. We have described 
Descartes’ twofold argument for the existence of God and the veracity of clear and distinct ideas 
as exhibiting a dialectical necessity; but here there will be no such dialectic. Descartes admits 
that the actual existence of corporeal beings is suggested by the nature of imaginary 
understanding, but that “this is only a probability; and despite careful and comprehensive 
investigation, I do not yet see how the distinct idea of corporeal nature which I find in my 
imagination can provide any basis for a necessary inference that some body exists” (MFP VI / 
CSM II.51 / AT VII.73). Similarly, sensory perception and the memories we have of all kinds of 
sensory experiences suggest that we have a body that is affected by others that really exist, but 
this remains probabilistic; and Descartes notes that the very skeptical arguments that he himself 
has raised cast insuperable doubt on the idea that such real existence can be deduced from 
something as unreliable as sight or even pain (MFP VI / CSM II.53 / AT VII.76-7). However, 
these sorts of experiences are precisely the kind that Descartes will invoke in making the 
inference to the existence of external corporeal reality, buttressed by the additional claim that 
God is not a deceiver. 
Sensory experiences, such as my finger’s pain when I touch a sharp object, suggest that 
my body and this sharp object really exist. But Descartes argues that this mental operation 
actually involves two faculties: a passive faculty of sensory perception, and an active faculty that 
produces the ideas of those objects corresponding to these sensory perceptions. 
But this [latter, active] faculty cannot be in me, since clearly it presupposes no 
intellectual act on my part, and the ideas in question are produced without my 
cooperation and often even against my will. So the only alternative is that it is in another 
substance distinct from me—a substance which contains either formally or eminently all 
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the reality which exists objectively in the ideas produced by this faculty (as I have just 
noted). This substance is either a body, that is, a corporeal nature, in which case it will 
contain formally everything which is to be found objectively in the ideas; or else it is 
God, or some creature more noble than a body, in which case it will contain eminently 
whatever is to be found in the ideas. But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that 
he does not transmit the ideas to me either directly from himself, or indirectly, via some 
creature which contains the objective reality of the ideas not formally but only eminently. 
(MFP VI / CSM II.55 / AT VII.79) 4 
 
It is this genetic problematic of sufficient reason, which is inherently tied to the question of the 
conditions for the actual increase of power, and which is quite different from Descartes’ 
problematic of skepticism, that Spinoza will take up in elaborating his own epistemological 
framework of adequacy and inadequacy. 
 
2. Inadequate Knowledge: Partial and Abstract Ideas 
Spinoza’s motto was ‘Caute’. The infamous Theologico-Political Treatise, which in 1670 was 
published anonymously and by a fictional publisher, was summarily condemned by a cacophony 
of religious and philosophical authorities as, to take but one formulation from the South Holland 
Synod of 1670, “the vilest and most sacrilegious book the world has ever seen.”5 And while his 
authorship of the first Treatise was something of an open secret, only one text was published in 
his lifetime that bore his name: the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, which appeared in 1663 
                                                          
4 Note that one of the possibilities that Descartes rules out here—namely, that these ideas are 
produced directly by God—is precisely the alternative that Malebranche will accept and develop 
in his doctrine of vision in God. See Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and On 
Religion, ed. Nicholas Jolley, trans. David Scott (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
Dialogue XIII; SAT III.2, and Elucidation Ten. 
 
5 W.N.A. Klever, “Spinoza’s Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. 
Don Garrett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39-41. See also Jonathan Israel, 
Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-85. 
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with an Appendix on Metaphysical Thoughts. But it would be misleading to periodize his work, 
as though the earlier writings evinced a Cartesianism with which he had definitively broken in 
the mature statement of his philosophical system, the posthumously published Ethics. In his 
Preface to the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Spinoza’s friend and collaborator Lodewijk 
Meyer warns the reader not to take the text as a statement of the author’s own philosophical 
commitments:  
Our Author quite frequently departs from Descartes, not only in the arrangement and 
explanation of the Axioms, but also in the demonstration of the Propositions themselves, 
and the rest of the Conclusions; he often uses a Proof very different from Descartes’.  
 
[…] our Author has only set out the opinions of Descartes and their demonstrations, 
insofar as these are found in his writings, or are such as ought to be deduced validly from 
the foundations he laid.6 For since he had promised to teach his pupil [i.e., Caesarius, a 
student at Leiden University] Descartes’ philosophy, he considered himself obliged not to 
depart a hair’s breadth from Descartes’ opinion, nor to dictate to him anything that either 
would not correspond to his doctrines or would be contrary to them. So let no one think 
that he is teaching here either his own opinions, or only those which he approves of. 
Though he judges that some of the doctrines are true, and admits that he has added some 
of his own, nevertheless there are many that he rejects as false, and concerning which he 
holds a quite different opinion.7 
 
It is significant that Meyer immediately gives as an example of a profound philosophical 
difference between the two thinkers the fact that, unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not consider the 
will and the intellect to be distinct. If the identity of Deus sive Natura is his theological heresy, 
the identity of the will and the understanding is, as we will see in the next chapter, Spinoza’s 
epistemic or gnoseological heresy.  
                                                          
6 Curley scoffs at this: “It would take a very generous interpretation of this last clause to justify 
everything that appears here” (CSM I.222, fn). 
 
7 Lodewijk Meyer (CSM I.228-9); emphasis added. 
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Spinoza’s thought always contained unique insights and novel conceptual formulations. 
Any account of his obvious debts to the various traditions of medieval Aristotelian scholastic 
philosophy and theology, nascent Cartesian and post-Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology, 
Jewish mysticism, and contemporary developments in optics and physics must nevertheless 
acknowledge his striking originality. For example, Yitzhak Melamed notes that Spinoza’s 
concept of ‘infinite modes’, which “has no equivalent among his predecessors or 
contemporaries”8 (and, we might add, very few equivalents among his successors) appears as 
early as the Short Treatise, which was surely written no later than 1662.9  
In the Ethics, I will show, the framework of adequate and inadequate ideas constitutes a 
novel Spinozist conceptual formulation, which in many respects replaces that of the clear and 
distinct. But the language of clarity and distinctness has not entirely vanished in this text. 
Spinoza writes that “if someone were to say that he had a clear and distinct, i.e., true, idea of 
substance, and nevertheless doubted whether such a substance existed, that would indeed be the 
same as if he were to say that he had a true idea, and nevertheless doubted whether it was false 
                                                          
8 Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 113.  
 
9 There are conflicting accounts regarding when Spinoza wrote the Short Treatise. Indirect 
evidence for dating it comes from the 1662 Letter to Oldenburg, in which Spinoza says that he 
had already “composed a whole short work” on the topic of the relationship between things and 
God as their first cause (Spinoza, Letter 6 / CSM I.188). But he may have also been referring to 
the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Nevertheless, Michael L. Morgan, editor of the 
Hackett Complete Works of Spinoza, takes this reference as compelling evidence for its having 
been written in 1662 (see Michael Morgan, in Spinoza, The Complete Works of Spinoza, 31). 
Curley also relates a hypothesis forwarded by Mignini, the editor of the critical edition of the 
Short Treatise, according to which it was actually written in 1660 in Latin, while noting that this 
interesting hypothesis is all but impossible to prove or refute (see Curley, CSM I.50-1). 
Whatever the case, the Short Treatise is indisputably an ‘early’ text.  
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(as is evident to anyone who is sufficiently attentive)” (E I P8s2 / CWS I.414 / G II.50). Here 
Spinoza seems to accept the Cartesian articulation of the clear and distinct idea: it necessarily 
delivers a true conception of what is possible, on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction. 
But in that same scholium, he also indicates the necessary limits of this epistemic framework. 
“The true definition of each thing,” that is, the clear and distinct idea of it, “neither involves nor 
expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined” (Ibid). It follows, he tells us, that 
“there must be, for each existing thing, a certain cause on account of which it exists” (E I P8s2 / 
CWS I.415 / G II.50). Presumably this cause could either be internal to or external to the 
definition. But for things whose definitions do not involve numerically distinct existence, the 
definitions do not and cannot include any ‘cause on account of which one exists’. For instance, 
the definition of human being—the clear and distinct idea of what it is to be a human being, 
according with the principle of non-contradiction—does not involve or express anything about 
the existence in fact of any particular human beings. Spinoza concludes that “whatever is of such 
a nature that there can be many individuals [of that nature] must, to exist, have an external cause 
to exist” (E I P8s2 / CWS I.415 / G II.51). The second scholium of Proposition 8 of the Ethics, 
while explicitly formulated as a defense of the infinity and indivisibility of the unique substance 
called God or nature, thus amounts to an immanent critique of the category of the clear and 
distinct idea. Clear and distinct knowledge is true, but its object is definitions that formally 
exclude any account of genesis or individuation. It can never amount to knowledge of a 
sufficient reason for existence. For the latter, a different set of epistemological categories must 
be elaborated. And from the perspective of this new set of categories, as we will see, further 
critiques of the limits of the clear and distinct will emerge. 
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But if Spinoza has just shown us that clear and distinct knowledge is limited insofar as it 
amounts only to a definition, it will no doubt seem objectionable that he introduces the category 
of adequacy as one of the definitions that begins Part II of the Ethics. This brings to mind the 
critiques of Spinoza’s geometric manner of exposition, perhaps best formulated by Hegel:  
To render his philosophy mathematically conclusive and consistent, Spinoza presented it 
according to a geometrical method, but one that is only appropriate for the finite sciences 
of the understanding. Hence he begins with definitions. These definitions involve 
universal determinations, and they are adopted directly or presupposed, they are not 
deduced, for Spinoza does not know how he arrives at them.10  
 
There does indeed appear to be a dialectical tension here between the content of an epistemic 
category that seeks to surpass definitional knowledge, and its formal appearance in the system as 
one definition among others. To show that this is not a genuine contradiction with devastating 
consequences for Spinoza’s epistemological system would require a too-lengthy digression on 
the nature and limits of more geometrico.11 It will suffice, for our purposes here, to leave this 
apparent paradox aside and consider on its own terms Spinoza’s elaboration and usage of the 
category of the adequate idea.12 
                                                          
10 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume III: Medieval and Modern 
Philosophy, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R.F. Brown and J.M. Stewart with H.S. Harris 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 155. 
 
11 On this score, Pierre Macherey’s text remains definitive: see Pierre Macherey, Hegel or 
Spinoza, trans. Susan Ruddick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), ch. 2. Julie 
Klein’s reading of the nature of definition in Spinoza’s systematic philosophy and the epistemic 
status of his concept of eternity is also illuminating in this regard. See Julie Klein, “‘By Eternity 
I Understand: Eternity According to Spinoza,” The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 
(2002): 295-324. Finally, see Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 61, 115-21, etc. 
 
12 I cannot help noting here in passing that when Hegel explicitly critiques the definitions of 
Spinoza’s system, he always focuses on the substance–attribute–mode triad, and never considers 
the definition of adequacy—perhaps because, I am tempted to suggest, this might reveal too 
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The definition itself is, on its own, rather opaque. It reads: “By adequate idea I 
understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all 
the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea” (E II D4 / CWS I.447 / G II.85). A first 
clue as to what this means is given in the explication that immediately follows, wherein Spinoza 
adds that he specified ‘intrinsic’ denominations in order “to exclude what is extrinsic, viz. the 
agreement of the idea with its object” (E II D4 exp. / CWS I.447 / G II.85). It is thus clear that 
adequacy is not a matter of representational ‘accuracy’; adequatio is at a remove from any 
correspondence theory of truth. Still, this is only a negative determination, indicating what 
adequacy does not mean. Two other passages help suggest some positive content. First, the 
crucial fourth axiom from Part I: “The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the 
knowledge of its cause” (E I A4 / CWS I.410 / G II.46). And second, the first definition of part 
three, not of adequate ideas, but of adequate causes: “I call that cause adequate whose effect can 
be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect 
                                                          
great a proximity between Spinozism and his own thought, whereas he is always eager to mark 
his distance from Spinoza (see Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume III, 155-9; 
see also G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. and ed. George di Giovanni [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010], 21.37, 21.101, 21.324). 
Similarly, the fact that Spinoza abandoned the Treatise on the Emendation of the 
Intellect, his attempted contribution to the literature of ‘discourses on method’, can be read as in 
part reflecting his discovery that, as Hegel would later argue, method cannot be determined in 
advance, but rather emerges in the course of an investigation and can only be articulated for itself 
at the investigation’s end. As Spinoza explains: “Method is nothing but a reflexive knowledge, or 
an idea of an idea; and because there is no idea of an idea, unless there is first an idea, there will 
be no Method unless there is first an idea. So that Method will be good which shows how the 
mind is to be directed according to the standard of a given true idea” (TdIE 38 / CWS I.19 / G 
II.15-6). Compare this to what Hegel writes in the Philosophy of Mind: “This movement [of 
absolute cognition], which philosophy is, finds itself already accomplished, when at the 
conclusion it grasps its own concept, i.e. only looks back on its knowledge” (G.W.F. Hegel, The 
Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Miller [New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007], §573). 
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cannot be understood through it alone” (E III D1 / CWS I.491 / G II.139). Taken together, these 
give us the sense that the adequate idea of a thing clearly and distinctly expresses, not what it is 
abstractly, but its concrete genesis or actual necessity: adequacy seems to be concerned with 
sufficient reason, the causal relations that constitute the object of knowledge. But the fact that 
these two passages are drawn from parts of the Ethics other than Part II itself means that we must 
be cautious in relying on them here. 
Moreover, within Part II, Spinoza is not particularly forthcoming about what he means by 
adequacy. Most of what happens in this part of the Ethics is a “way of despair”,13 to use Hegel’s 
turn of phrase: a catalogue of what turn out to be the necessarily inadequate forms of knowledge, 
to which the human mind seems condemned. Only with the introduction of the common notions, 
the second kind of knowledge which, according to Spinoza, “can only be conceived adequately” 
(E II P38 / CWS I.474 / G II.118), does the category of the adequate begin to be positively and 
concretely articulated. But since, as Spinoza also says, “he who knows how to distinguish 
between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of the true and of the false” (E II P42 
dem. / CWS I.479 / G II.123), it is from the vantage of adequate knowledge that these forms of 
inadequate knowledge are understood and their necessity is demonstrated. It will thus be helpful 
to review this catalogue, to take stock of what Spinoza means by ‘inadequate’ in each of these 
cases, and to consider the arguments he provides for this inadequacy. Here are the relevant 
propositions: 
The human Mind does not involve adequate knowledge of the parts composing the 
human body. (E II P24 / CWS I.468 / G II.110) 
 
The idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of an 
external body. (E II P25 / CWS I.469 / G II.111)  
                                                          
13 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §78. 
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The ideas of the affections of the human Body, insofar as they are related only to the 
human Mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused. (E II P28 / CWS I.469 / G II.112) 
 
The idea of the idea of any affection of the human Body does not involve adequate 
knowledge of the human Mind. (E II P29 / CWS I.470 / G II.113) 
 
We can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of our Body. (E II 
P30 / CWS I.471 / G II.114) 
 
We can have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of the singular things 
which are outside us. (E II P31 / CWS I.472 / G II.115) 
 
These naturally break into three groups. 
 
1. II P24 and P25. The demonstrations for Propositions 24 and 25 rely on a distinction that 
is first articulated in the corollary to Proposition 11, where we find the first appearance of what I 
will hereafter refer to as ‘the formula for inadequacy’: 
…when we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that 
God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the 
human Mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human Mind, has this or that 
idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the 
nature of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together 
with the human Mind, then we say that the human Mind perceives the thing only 
partially, or inadequately. (E II P11c / CWS I.456 / G II.94-5) 
 
At this point in the text, these formulations are no doubt puzzling and less than helpful, and in 
the scholium here Spinoza even asks his readers to stay their objections and questions for the 
time being. In P24 their sense begins to become concrete. The human mind is, he tells us there, 
the idea of the actually existing human body (E II P13 / CWS I.457 / G II.96). Now this body is 
made up of parts, and nothing can happen in this body that is not perceived by the mind (E II P12 
/ CWS I.456-7 / G II.95). But it does not follow that we have adequate knowledge of these 
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bodily parts. For one thing, Spinoza’s claim is not that our minds perceive everything in the 
body, but everything that happens in the body. This indicates that the mind perceives only those 
parts of the body that are presently undergoing some kind of affection or modification. Indeed, 
he writes: “The human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that it 
exists, except through ideas of affections by which the Body is affected” (E II P19 / CWS I.466 / 
G II.107). Since an individual is a mode, it is only manifest and knowable in and through its 
modifications, that is, its interactions with other modes. 
Spinoza argues that the individual parts that constitute the human body whose idea is the 
human mind are similarly only perceived and known insofar as they constitute that body—that 
is, “not insofar as they can be considered as Individuals, without relation to the human Body” (E 
II P24 dem. / CWS I.468 / G II.111). Adequate knowledge of these parts would thus have to be 
knowledge of them, to repeat the phrase, ‘insofar as they can be considered as individuals’. The 
‘insofar as they can be considered’ is significant here, given the really indivisible nature of 
Spinoza’s monistic substance. There are no real distinctions in Spinoza’s metaphysics, in 
thought or in extension.14 To return to the formulations from the corollary to P11: adequate 
knowledge of these parts considered as individuals does exist in the mind of God, but “insofar as 
he is affected with a great many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has only the idea of the 
human Body, i.e. (by P13), the idea that constitutes the nature of the human Mind” (E II P24 
dem. / CWS I.469 / G II.111; emphasis added). The idea of the human body surely involves 
these parts, but it does not explain them on its own, since they are not determined solely as parts 
of this body. Thus the knowledge the human mind has of them is inadequate. 
                                                          
14 See E I P13 / CWS I.420 / G II.55; and P15s / CWS I.422-4 / G II.58-60. On the sense and 
concept of distinction in Spinoza, see Deleuze, Expressionism, chapter 1. 
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The case is even simpler in P25. The human body is affected by another body; this entails 
a modification of the mind, or the perception of that modification of the body. Now the nature of 
an affection must not just involve the nature of some of the bodies affected in the interaction; it 
must involve all of them, on pain of violating the principle of sufficient reason, Spinoza’s 
explicit formulation of which is given in the third axiom of Part I: “From a given determinate 
cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is 
impossible for an effect to follow” (E I A3 / CWS I.410 / G II.46). And so, while it must be the 
case that something about the nature of the external body is expressed in the idea of the 
modification, it does not follow that this idea involves an adequate idea of the external body. 
Again in terms of the corollary to P11, or the formula for inadequacy: “adequate knowledge of 
the external body is not in God insofar as he has the idea of an affection of the human Body, or 
the idea of an affection of the human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external 
body” (E II P25 dem. / CWS I.469 / G II.111). God surely has adequate knowledge of the nature 
of this external body, but this nature is only inadequately expressed in the idea of the affection 
produced by its interaction with the human body. 
In both P24 and P25, inadequacy is a necessary consequence of the fact that the bodies 
involved are only obscurely or partially expressed in the mind. In other words, the human mind 
does not have an adequate idea of the parts of the body, or the nature of the external body in an 
encounter, because the nature of these bodies is not fully expressed in the composition they form 
with the human body in a determinate modification. They are not reducible to the roles they play 
in a given modification, although they obviously do play these roles in it. Therefore, the 
knowledge of them formed on the basis of these roles is surely not nothing, but can only be 
inadequate. 
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2. II P28 and P29. Propositions 28 and 29 deal, not with inadequate knowledge of bodies, 
but with inadequate knowledge of the human mind itself. The movement from P28 to P29 
underscores that the inadequacy in these cases is not a matter of the mind’s being insufficiently 
reflexive. In its explicit formulation, P28 is unique in this succession of propositions. In all the 
rest, Spinoza writes that the ideas in question ‘do not involve adequate knowledge’, whereas here 
he uses the language of clarity and distinctness: “The ideas of the affections of the human Body, 
insofar as they are related only to the human Mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused” (E II 
P28 / CWS I.470 / G II.113). This suggests that, if it is true that adequacy is not the same as 
clarity and distinctness, the domains of the inadequate and the confused might still be 
coextensive.  
The demonstration for this proposition, like those of the two we have just considered, 
turns on the difference between knowledge of a thing abstractly or ‘in itself’, and knowledge of a 
thing in its concrete relations. The idea of an affection of the human body, again, involves the 
natures of the human body and those of whatever other bodies enter into the modification. But 
we have just said that ideas of this sort do not involve adequate knowledge either of the parts of 
the body or of the external parts affecting it. Hence, Spinoza says, “these ideas of the affections, 
insofar as they are related only to the human Mind, are like conclusions without premises, i.e. (as 
is known through itself), they are confused ideas” (E II P28 dem. / CWS I.470 / G II.113). If 
inadequacy, as I have been suggesting, characterizes a kind of knowledge that does not involve 
knowledge of the object’s concrete causes or sufficient reason, the claim that confused ideas ‘are 
like conclusions without premises’ seems to confirm the hypothesis that the inadequate and the 
confused overlap. In the scholium to this proposition, Spinoza says that the same argument 
would suffice to demonstrate that “the idea which constitutes the nature of the human Mind is 
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not, considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; we can also demonstrate the same of the idea of 
the human Mind and the ideas of the ideas of the human Body’s affections [viz. that they are 
confused], insofar as they are related to the Mind alone” (E II P28s / CWS I.470 / G II.113). The 
confusion or inadequacy of an idea is here tied to abstraction, in the sense of abstracting the thing 
known from its real context and genesis, as the repetition of the term alone (sola, solam) makes 
evident. 
Proposition 29 introduces a higher order of reflexivity to this issue and shows that the 
problem of inadequacy nevertheless remains in play. “The idea of the idea of any affection of the 
human Body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human Mind” (E II P29 / CWS I.470 / 
G II.113). We know, again, that the idea of an affection of the human body does not involve 
adequate knowledge of that body; and, again, that the human mind just is the idea of the human 
body. From this it follows that “the idea of this idea [of an affection of the human body] does not 
express the nature of the mind adequately, or does not involve adequate knowledge of it” (E II 
P29 dem. / CWS I.471 / G II.114). This last formulation is revealing. For an idea to involve 
adequate knowledge of something is the same as expressing the nature of that thing adequately. 
Since the idea of an affection, at best, expresses the nature of the body only partially—that is, 
insofar as it is affected in a particular way—the conclusion that this idea only partially expresses 
the nature of the mind follows immediately. This suggests that adequate knowledge involves the 
nature of the thing in a fully expressive or non-partial way; but such knowledge cannot be 
attained by means of abstraction, as we have seen. 
 
3. II P30 and P31. Propositions 30 and 31 concern the knowledge that we can have of 
durations, whether of our own bodies (“de duratione nostri corporis”) or of external bodies that 
112 
Spinoza specifies as being singular (“de duratione rerum singularium, quae extra nos sunt”) (E 
II P30 and 31 / CWS I.471-2 / G II.114-5). Spinoza defined duration at the beginning of Part II: 
“Duration is an indefinite continuation of existing” (E II D5 / CWS I.447 / G II.85).  
The first thing to note here is Spinoza’s unalloyed confidence in formulating this 
definition; caute underlies every other definition in the Ethics, as can be seen by the way he 
qualifies them: “By body I understand a mode…”, “Per corpus intelligo modum…” (E II D1 / 
CWS I.447 / G II.84; emphasis added); “I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that 
which…”, “Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico…” (E II D2 / CWS I.447 / G II.84; 
emphasis added). These formulations are typical of Spinoza’s definitions throughout the Ethics.15 
But the definition of duration is in no way qualified—indeed, it is surprisingly direct and 
assertive: “Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio” (E II D5 / CWS I.447 / G II.84). 
Spinoza’s explication of the definition shows us why he is so confident: “I say indefinite because 
it cannot be determined at all through the very nature of the existing thing, nor even by the 
efficient cause, which necessarily posits the existence of the thing, and does not take it away” (E 
II D5 exp. / CWS I.447 / G II.85). This is consistent with the doctrine of conatus, according to 
which each thing just is its striving to persevere in its being; Spinoza will later argue that the 
“striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an 
indefinite time” (E III P8 / CWS I.499 / G II.146). And the only prior claim he refers to in his 
demonstration for this proposition is that things are only and always destroyed by external 
causes—which, in turn, he claims is simply self-evident (E III P4 and dem. / CWS I.498 / G 
II.145). Therefore, the claim that the striving of any thing is durationally indefinite is practically 
tautological; when a thing ceases to exist, it will not be by virtue of its own nature or through its 
                                                          
15 See Klein, “By Eternity I Understand.” 
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causes, but through its being destroyed by something external, and that very externality entails 
that the moment of destruction cannot be read off the essence alone of the thing that will be 
destroyed. 
The particular point in time at which a given thing will be destroyed is not, however, 
absolutely unforeseeable: God has adequate knowledge of when this will take place. Strictly 
speaking, the time of a thing’s destruction, or of the duration of its existence, is not contingent 
but is determined by “the common order of Nature and the constitution of things. But adequate 
knowledge of how things are constituted is in God, insofar as he has the ideas of all of them, and 
not insofar as God has only the idea of the human Body” (E II P30 dem. / CWS I.471 / G II.115). 
The formula for inadequacy reappears. To know adequately the duration of our own body would 
require that we know adequately: 1. the laws of modal generation and destruction, or ‘the 
constitution of things’; 2. the nature of our own body, which is a characteristic relation of the 
communication of motion and rest with a significant degree of complexity, so that we would 
thereby know what it would take for it to be destroyed; 3. the nature and current position of all 
external bodies, so that we would be able to discern which of them would, by its very nature and 
striving to persevere in its being, at one determinate point come into contact with our own body 
and destroy our characteristic corporeal relations of movement and rest. God has all of these 
ideas adequately.16 But our own mind, being just the idea of our body, has only confused and 
                                                          
16 Actual and complete knowledge of ‘the nature and position of all bodies’ is precisely what is 
ruled out in the epistemology of contemporary physics; in this regard, the claim that God actually 
knows this, that such knowledge actually exists or even that it is theoretically possible, stands in 
clear violation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. The case is less clear, however, concerning 
Bohr’s ‘complementarity thesis’ (see Arkady Plotnitsky, Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology 
after Bohr and Derrida [Durham: Duke University Press, 1994], ch. 7; and Karen Barad, 
Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning 
[Durham: Duke Univeristy Press, 2007], chs. 3, 7, and 8, and Appendices B and C). This is one 
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inadequate ideas of such things. “So the knowledge of the duration of our Body is quite 
inadequate in God, insofar as he is considered to constitute only the nature of the human Mind, 
that is (by P11C), this knowledge is quite inadequate in our Mind” (E II P30 dem. / CWS I.471 / 
G II.115). And the exact same argument goes for our knowledge of the durations of external 
things, which Spinoza tells us we can only know quite inadequately (E II P31 and dem. / CWS 
I.472 / G II.115). 
The corollary to this proposition informs us that it follows that “all particular things are 
contingent and corruptible” (E II P31 cor. / CWS I.472 / G II.115-6). Spinoza dialectically folds 
contingency and necessity into one another. The destruction of a thing is actually necessary, and 
indeed necessary at a certain determinate point, and the necessity of our inadequate knowledge of 
this necessity is “what we must understand by the contingency of things and the possibility of 
their corruption”; and he then writes, even more forcefully: “beyond that there is no 
contingency” (Ibid.).  
 
Bringing this all together, we see that Spinoza argues for the necessarily inadequate character of: 
1. knowledge of the natures of external bodies, or the parts of our own bodies; 2. knowledge of 
nature of our own mind, insofar as it is based on the ideas we have of our affections; and 3. 
knowledge of the durations of existences of our own bodies, or of external things. In each case, 
this is because we do not have clear ideas of the causes of the things involved; we have only at 
                                                          
key aspect of Spinozist metaphysics and epistemology in which it would be extremely valuable 
to consider the implications of metalogical problems of totality and reflexivity; in particular I am 
thinking of Grim’s claim that paradoxes of self-reference, when taken seriously, render the very 
notion of divine omniscence irrevocably incoherent (Patrick Grim, The Incomplete Universe: 
Totality, Knowledge, and Truth [Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991]). But these matters are of 
course outside the scope of the present inquiry. 
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best a partial understanding of the causes at work in these situations, and thus are condemned to 
imagining the nature of things and their contingency, rather than understanding them in their 
necessity. The fact that we only inadequately understand the natures of things is a consequence 
of our inadequately understanding the actual relations of causality involved in their production 
and maintenance. But none of this could be grasped from within the framework of clarity and 
distinctness, or by virtue of the principle of non-contradiction alone. Since they bear on relations 
of actual existence, these instances of knowing must involve something more than the mere 
definition of the thing. If this string of propositions constitutes, as I have suggested, something 
like a Hegelian pathway of despair, Spinoza’s typology of inadequate knowledges reveals that 
“there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false” (E II P33 / CWS 
I.472 / G II.116), and thus that “falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, 
or mutilated and confused, ideas involve” (E II P35 / CWS I.472 / G II.116). Even true 
inadequate knowledge is, at best, ‘a conclusion without premises.’ By contrast, adequate 
knowledge, as we will see in the next section, will have to do not with the definitions of things in 
the abstract, but with their concrete causes. And yet, as we will also see, the development of such 
adequate knowledge in no way eliminates the inadequate ideas that constitute our mind. 
 
3. Adequate Knowledge: Causes and Actuality 
How many kinds of knowledge are there in Spinoza’s thought? This question can be answered in 
several ways. Spinoza famously distinguishes, in the Ethics, between three kinds of knowledge: 
imaginary or inadequate knowledge, rational knowledge by and of common notions, and 
intuitive knowledge of the third kind, i.e. beatitude or the intellectual love of God. But one could 
also say that there are really only two kinds of knowledge, adequate and inadequate, since both 
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the second and third kinds of knowledge in Spinoza’s typology constitute systems of adequate 
ideas, the only difference being their respective object of knowledge, which in the second kind is 
relations or unities of composition and in the third kind is singular essences.  
Then again, in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza—who, according 
to a hypothesis advanced by Deleuze, had not yet discovered the theory of common notions17—
distinguishes between four different ‘modes of perception’ based on their origins: knowledge 
from signs, or hearsay; perception or knowledge from chance encounters; the inadequate 
perception of a cause indirectly based on the experience of something presumed to be an effect; 
and, finally, perception of a thing through its essence alone, that is, through knowledge of its 
proximate causes (TdIE 20 / CWS I.13-4 / G II.10-1). Later, in the Ethics, Spinoza repeats the 
gesture of distinguishing between forms of knowledge on the basis of their origins, and again he 
gives us four kinds, now rearranged and with the common notions in play. We “perceive many 
things and form universal notions” (E II P40s2 / CWS I.477 / G II.122) 1. from random 
experience; 2. from signs or by associative memory; 3. from common notions and adequate ideas 
of the properties of things (to which we will return in a moment); and 4. as the intuitive 
knowledge or beatitude that “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain 
attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [formal] essence of things” (E II P40s2 / 
CWS I.478 / G II.122). He calls the first two “knowledge of the first kind, opinion or 
imagination” (E II P40s2 / CWS I.477-8 / G II.122). The third, knowledge from common 
                                                          
17 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, ch. 5. 
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notions, he calls ‘reason’ or knowledge of the second kind; and the last he calls knowledge of the 
third kind.18  
Spinoza provides a mathematical example to illustrate the distinction between the three 
kinds of knowledge: when presented with three numbers and asked to produce the fourth that 
stands in the same relationship to the third that the second does to the first, one can either 
remember being told the procedure for determining it without really understanding why that 
procedure works (first kind), understand the rule for its production and determine it by that 
means (second kind), or intuitively grasp the singular determination of the fourth number (third 
kind).19 And in the very next proposition he announces: “Knowledge of the first kind is the only 
                                                          
18 Two brief notes on Spinoza’s Latin here. First, when he describes knowledge of the first kind 
here, ‘opinion or imagination’, the or is not a Spinozist sive, as in the inclusive disjunction ‘Deus 
sive natura’, but rather vel: “Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum cognitionem primi 
generis, opinionem vel imaginationem in posterum vocabo” (G II.180). This suggests that 
‘opinion’ and ‘imagination’ constitute genuine alternatives and are not two names for the same 
thing, the way God and Nature (and, as we will see, ‘will’ and ‘intellect’) are really identical.  
Second, it is noteworthy that the first two kinds of knowledge are cognitionem (primi 
generis and secondi generis) while only the third earns the title of scientia: “Praeter haec 
cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium, quod scientiam intuitivam 
vocabimus” (G II.182). 
 
19 The example Spinoza gives here in II P40s2 is, like many of his mathematical examples, 
somewhat frustrating and unhelpful on the face of it (like the circle’s chord sections in II P8s; or 
the inscribed circles exhibiting ‘infinite inequalities’ in Letter 12—on the latter, see Simon Duffy, 
“The Differential Point of View of the Infinitesimal Calculus in Spinoza, Leibniz, and Deleuze,” 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 37:3 [2006]: 286-307). Allow me to indicate a 
way through. 
Given three numbers (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3), the problem is to find the fourth (𝑥4) that stands in the 
same relation to the third that the second does to the first. Spinoza tells us that merchants will 
remember from being told in school—knowledge of the first kind—the brute-force procedure for 
finding the solution to this problem: 
𝑥2𝑥3
𝑥1
. But to know, even correctly, the mechanical solution 
does not, on its own, mean that one adequately understands the nature of the problem. However, 
if those same merchants were able to figure out this procedure themselves, or understand the force 
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cause of falsity, whereas knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarily true” (E II 
P41 / CWS I.478; G II.123). 
We know by now what marks inadequate knowledge: in the best possible case, where it 
happens to be correct, inadequate knowledge is like a conclusion without premises; a form of 
imagination rather than reason or genuine understanding, it is an abstraction or subtraction, a 
generalization, or a projection. An abstraction or subtraction: I only inadequately understand 
something when I imagine it out of the real context of its causal genesis and its concrete milieu 
                                                          
of Euclid’s demonstration, by “grasping the common property of proportionals,” we could then 
say they have knowledge of the second kind.  
Finally, Spinoza says, one might simply intuit the solution, inferring “at a glance” the 
fourth number from the ratio of the first to the second. Now, he says this sort of intuition happens 
easily in the simplest cases, and he instructs us to consider 1, 2, and 3 as our three givens, where 
the missing fourth term is 6. Now this might be initially perplexing if only because, if given 1, 2, 
and 3, the solution that one might intuit for the fourth might easily be—4! The mistake here is 
thinking that the three terms are part of a series, which they are not; what we have is two pairs of 
terms: one fully determinate pair of terms (1, 2) and the first term of a second pair (3, 𝑥). 
What one is supposed to intuit, then, is the proportional relation of (1, 2): a productive 
procedure of doubling (analogous, here, to the ‘attribute of God’ that one adequately understands), 
from which one ‘sees’ immediately the second term of the second pair, whatever its given first 
term happened to be (‘proceeding to the formal essence of the singular thing’). That is, knowledge 
of the third kind grasps the necessity according to which individual existents follow from God’s 
attributes, or divine rules of production: one intuits that the fourth term will be twice the third—in 
this case, 6. A kind of arithmetic prejudice, if I can speak of such a thing, might lead us to think 
that 1, 2, and 3 form a series whose fourth term will be 4; there may have been less cause for 
confusion if Spinoza had given us three numbers in which no immediately obvious arithmetic 
series presented itself, for instance 1, 2, and 7, where the fourth number would clearly be 14.  
For another example, taking up the very first proposition of Euclid’s Elements, one might 
note the difference between knowing that the radii of a given circle are all always equal in length 
(knowledge of the second kind) and knowing that a pair of determinate equilateral and equiangular 
triangles are engendered by the shared radius of two equal circles and the radii where those circles 
intersect (knowledge of the third kind). Here we see the genesis of the individual (an equilateral, 
equiangular triangle with a given side length) as contained within and following from the genetic 
rule of production when it is adequately understood (the necessary attributes of the circle). 
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of effectivity (since a thing’s actual striving and power, just is its essence). A generalization: I 
only inadequately understand something when I imagine it to have characteristics observed in 
what seems similar to it (for Spinoza, analogical reasoning is always inadequate).20 A projection: 
I only inadequately understand something when I imagine it to resemble or be structurally 
similar to myself (most obviously absurd in the anthropomorphic conception of God). I am 
trapped in and by the imagination, relying on analogies, resemblances, and hearsay. I mistake 
effects for causes, inverting the real order of nature and the production of things; indeed, I never 
get to real causes, staying at the level of apparent effects. In this regard, Spinoza agrees entirely 
with a key aspect of Humean empiricism, which we will explore in Chapter 4: causal relations 
never appear as such, and knowledge that remains at the level of what is given is inadequate. If it 
is true, as Spinoza posits axiomatically, that “knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, 
the knowledge of its cause” (E I A4 / CWS I.410 / G II.46), in inadequate knowledge these 
causes are involved only in a confused and obscure manner. It is the clarity and distinctness of a 
thing’s actual cause that is missing in an inadequate idea of it: “Falsity consists in the privation 
of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve” (E II P35 / CWS 
I.472 / G II.116). By contrast, adequate knowledge always involves causes clearly and distinctly. 
As I said, adequate knowledge is bifurcated into knowledge of the second kind by common 
notions, and knowledge of the third kind, the intuition of singular essences; in both cases we 
understand the thing as caused, as a necessary expression of determining causal relations. 
Common notions or knowledge of the second kind is generic, not abstract: “What is 
common to all things and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence 
of any singular thing” (E II P37 / CWS I.474 / G II.118). Every body, from the smallest (corpora 
                                                          
20 See Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 63-4. 
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simplicissima21) to the largest, the whole of physical reality (Facies Totius Universi22), is 
characterized by relations of movement and rest; this is universally true, and follows from the 
very nature of what it is to be a body23 without expressing anything determinate about any one 
body in particular. That bodies are characterized by relations of movement and rest is a common 
notion, valid at any and every descriptive level; thus “those things which are common to all, and 
which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately” (E II P38 / 
CWS I.474 / G II.118). In his demonstration of this proposition, Spinoza finally inverts the 
formula for inadequacy: we always have such ideas adequately because God always does—not 
just insofar as God constitutes these things ‘in themselves’, but “insofar as God constitutes the 
human Mind, or insofar as God has the ideas that are in the human Mind” (E II P38 dem. / CWS 
I.474 / G II.118-9. This follows precisely thanks to the ubiquity of that which is understood in 
and through common notions. Since they are common to all things, and exist equally in the part 
and in the whole, the idea one forms of them can never lack anything essential. Again, if in the 
formula for inadequacy in Spinoza’s refrain was that God had an adequate idea of something, but 
only insofar as God is absolutely infinite and not insofar as God constitutes the individual human 
mind, here his claim is that the nature of the things understood and consequently of the ideas that 
can be formed of them must be adequate no matter what, since God necessarily has these ideas 
                                                          
21 See E II L7s after P13 / CWS I.461 / G II.101. 
 
22 See Spinoza, Letter 64 / CWS II.439 / G IV.278. 
 
23 Spinoza never ceases denouncing the Cartesian idea that the nature of body is merely to be 
extended. See Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739, ch. 6; 
Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, 94-96; Alison Peterson, “Spinoza on Extension,” 
Philosophers’ Imprint 15:14 (2015): 1-23; Matheron, Politics, Ontology and Knowledge in 
Spinoza, ch. 3. 
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adequately insofar as God constitutes our minds, or for that matter any finite mode of thought. 
From this, Spinoza draws the corollary claim that “there are certain ideas, or notions, common to 
all human beings” (E II P38 cor. / CWS I.474 / G II.119), since all bodies have certain things in 
common and which can only be understood adequately. 
The next proposition indicates the way in which these generic relations of composition or 
common natures can be understood adequately on the basis of determinate and particular 
affections. Three conditions must be met for this to obtain, according to Spinoza: “If something 
is common to, and peculiar to, the human Body and certain external bodies by which the human 
Body is usually affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will 
also be adequate in the Mind” (E II P39 / CWS I.474 / G II.119). The three conditions are as 
follows: 1. the thing to be known must be ‘common and proper’24 to both the human body and 
some external body; 2. the common thing to be known is that through which the external body 
affects the human body; 3. the thing to be known must be equally in the part and in the whole. 
Now, in the demonstration, Spinoza asks us to read the third condition as refracted through the 
first two: whatever the thing to be known is, it must be equally in the part and in the whole of the 
human body; equally in the part and in the whole of the external body; and equally in the part 
and in the whole of the conjunction human body–external body (E III P39 dem. / CWS I.475 / G 
II.119). When an external body affects my body, can only be by virtue of something common to 
both of these bodies.25 As we know, all knowledge of any effect—whether this knowledge is 
                                                          
24 Curley’s translation of this phrase as ‘common and peculiar’ is itself a bit peculiar: Spinoza in 
fact writes “commune est et proprium” (G II.119). 
 
25 The necessity of a common element as a condition for causal interaction is a constant theme in 
the Ethics, most prominently forming a key element in the argument for substance monism in the 
early propositions of Part I (E I P3 / CWS I.410 / G II.47). 
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adequate or inadequate—necessarily “depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause” (E I 
A4 / CWS I.410 / G II.46). The previous proposition demonstrated that, due to the ubiquity of 
these common natures—being equally in the part and in the whole—we can only form adequate 
ideas of them; and given finally that they are the causes of the nature of the affection of our body 
by some external body, an affection of which we necessarily form an idea (even if this idea itself 
is inadequate), the conclusion is inescapable that any idea of these commonalities must 
necessarily be adequate. 
These, then, are the common notions. They are generic ideas, not abstractions or 
universals, whose truth is guaranteed by virtue of the fact that the idea of what is common is 
necessarily adequately involved—to employ an anachronistic term, we might say ‘losslessly’, in 
that nothing is missing from it—in any idea of an effect of which it is the cause. Common 
notions may be organized along on a spectrum, according to which they indicate a maximum or 
minimum of generality; at one end they describe what is common to all modes of a given 
attribute, and at the other what is common to just two modes of an attribute.26 At the latter 
extreme, the least general common notion of which I can form an adequate idea is of my body 
and one other body. We can say that the less general the common notion, the more ‘useful’ it is, 
since the domain of bodies whose relations it adequately expresses is more specifically delimited 
the less general it is. By contrast, a maximally general common notion is almost practically 
useless; to recapitulate the example given above, all bodies are modes of extension, involving 
relations of movement and rest, from the simplest body to the face of the whole universe; the 
universal applicability of a concept is at the same time its necessary fall into triviality. No matter 
the degree of a common notion’s genericity, however, Spinoza is adamant that any ideas that 
                                                          
26 See Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 114-5. 
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follow from them “are also adequate” (E II P40 / CWS I.475 / G II.120), and his argument for 
this claim directly ties the question of adequacy to the theme of causality and genesis:  
[W]hen we say that an idea in the human Mind follows from ideas that are adequate in it, 
we are saying nothing but that (by P11C) in the Divine intellect there is an idea of which 
God is the cause, not insofar as God is infinite, nor insofar as God is affected with the 
ideas of a great many singular things, but insofar God constitutes only the essence of the 
human Mind. (E II P40 dem. / CWS I.475 / G II.120) 
 
The common notions are adequate because they all relate the thing known to its cause, God or 
nature, conceived as the unity and necessity of relations of composition or rules of production of 
finite and determinate things. As Deleuze writes, “common notions give us knowledge of the 
positive order of Nature as an order of constitutive or characteristic relations by which bodies 
agree with, and are opposed to, one another.”27  
Spinoza’s claim that the ideas of singular things necessarily refer back to and involve an 
idea of God that can only be adequate is further developed in Propositions 45-47, which link the 
now-united themes of adequacy and causality with that of actuality or actual existence. “Each 
idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal 
and infinite essence of God” (E II P45 / CWS I.481 / G II.127). As he explains in the 
demonstration, the idea of a singular thing involves both its essence and its existence; but, as we 
have seen, when it comes to determinate singular things or individual beings, their essence (or 
their definition, or their clear and distinct idea in abstracto) cannot possibly involve existence. 
The sufficient reason for a thing’s existence is contained either within itself or in something else, 
and as we know, in the case of a finite thing, it is absolutely impossible that this reason could be 
in itself, or else it would be actually infinite, contradicting the hypothesis. This kind of essential 
                                                          
27 Deleuze, Expressionism, 291. 
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or definitional self-causation can only be attributed to Deus sive natura.28 Hence it follows that 
“because (by [II]P6) they have God for a cause insofar as God is considered under the attribute 
of which the things are modes, their ideas must involve the concept of their attribute (by IA4), 
i.e. (by ID6), must involve an eternal and infinite essence of God” (E II P45 dem. / CWS I.482 / 
G II.127). Insofar as the idea of a thing involves that thing’s existence, and insofar as that 
existence cannot by definition be found in the abstract idea of that thing’s nature alone, any idea 
of an actually existing thing must necessarily involve the idea of God or nature as its cause. 
Moreover, that idea of God or nature as the cause of existing things, which is necessarily 
involved in any idea of such existing things, “is adequate and perfect” (E II P46 / CWS I.482 / G 
II.127). Spinoza tells us that the argument for this claim has already been made in the previous 
proposition’s demonstration, which he calls ‘Universal’: that the idea of God as cause is involved 
in any idea of existing things holds whether the existing thing is conceived as a part or as a 
whole; it holds for everything actual, from the smallest conceivable parts of matter to the entire 
corporeal world as a whole (E II P46 dem. / CWS I.482 / G II.127). It is on the basis of this 
knowledge or idea of God as cause, which is common to and involved in all ideas in the same 
way that God is the cause of all things, that we will be able, according to Spinoza, to form 
adequate ideas of the third kind (E II P47s / CWS I.482 / G II.128).  
It is striking to every reader of the Ethics how little Spinoza says about knowledge of the 
third kind here in Part II, the ostensibly ‘epistemological’ text where one might have expected 
some elaboration on the concept. It will only be directly thematized in the final book, De 
Potentia Intellectus seu de Libertate Humana; even there what Spinoza says is tantalizingly brief 
and schematic, and I will not do more than mention it in passing. For now, let us return to the 
                                                          
28 See E I D1, A1-2, P5-8, and P11. 
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matter of the transformation of the problematic to which Spinoza’s newly elaborated epistemic 
framework responds: ethics, or the increase of power. 
 
4. Understanding and Power  
Every epistemological framework bears the implicit injunction to develop those ideas that it 
valorizes. For Descartes, as we saw, this means that one should strive to form clear and distinct 
ideas, and to will only in accordance with what one understands clearly and distinctly. This 
framework, I argued, is motivated by the problem of skepticism, and involves the figure of 
knowledge as an unalloyed good in itself: razing to the ground all that which is built on unstable 
epistemic foundations, the Cartesian can contribute to the project of philosophical modernity by 
advancing the universal sciences of mathematics and its application, as in physics. The problem 
is essentially Platonic: it is the problem of the pretender or of the indistinguishable; as we saw, 
the problem with unclear and indistinct ideas is that they do not exhibit any internal criteria of 
validity—consequently, with such ideas one will not necessarily be wrong, but must always be 
unsure. Its solution is the elaboration of the clear and the distinct, about which there can be no 
confusion and with which one is in no danger of being led astray. 
With Spinoza’s elaboration of adequate and inadequate ideas, the problem, the solution, 
and the injunction are very different. It is true that in having inadequate knowledge, one is as 
uncertain as the Cartesian whose knowledge is based on unclear and indistinct ideas; and 
Spinoza is categorical that this condition is both natural and necessary—it is that in which we 
find ourselves at first and for the most part. As Deleuze writes, this “initial knowledge 
corresponds first of all to the state of nature: I perceive objects through chance encounters, and 
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by the effect they have on me. Such an effect is but a ‘sign’, a varying ‘indication’.”29 One need 
only consider Spinoza’s characterization of the biblical Adam’s wildly confused interpretation of 
his encounter with God concerning the fruit of the tree of knowledge: imaginary projections, 
postulated analogies and teleologies, and the failure to grasp real causal necessity all proliferate 
wildly (TTP II.14 / CWS II.97 / G II.32). At the same time, Spinoza tells us, Adam no less than 
anyone else could have formed adequate knowledge of God: “since this natural divine law is 
understood simply by the consideration of human nature, it is certain that we can conceive it just 
as much in Adam as in any other human being” (TTP IV.18 / CWS II.129 / G III.61). We are at 
first and for the most part beholden to inadequate knowledge, not as a consequence of the Fall, 
but simply as a natural characteristic of finite processes of thought—or, I might say, as a 
consequence of the fact that consciousness emerges from out of and involves the obscure 
unconscious of thought. 
Still, this ubiquity of inadequate knowledge does not capture Spinoza’s problem, but only 
characterizes one aspect of it. Long before Nietzsche claimed to ‘split history in two’, Spinoza 
had already rejected the assumption that knowledge is a good in itself. For Spinoza, the 
injunction is to form adequate knowledge, but this is a conditional imperative, in the service of a 
more fundamental injunction to become active. As Clatterbaugh puts it, “for Spinoza, the 
metaphysical and epistemological problems of causation serve as a means to the moral end of 
happiness or freedom.”30 For the Spinozist, inadequate knowledge must indeed be overcome—
not because adequate knowledge is intrinsically valuable, but because one is always passive and 
reactive when in thrall to inadequate ideas. By contrast, adequate knowledge necessarily involves 
                                                          
29 Deleuze, Expressionism, 289. 
 
30 Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate, 130. 
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an activity, an increase in the extent to which the one who understands is active, and an increase 
in power. Therefore, we can say that Spinoza’s fundamental problem, even at the level of 
categories of thought, is not skepticism but impotence or passivity, to which the solution is to 
become active and increase one’s power by the development of adequate understanding. In other 
words, the categories of adequacy and inadequacy are secondary in relation to the doctrine of 
conatus, which lays out the terms of this problematic of power. And so it is in Part III, with the 
elaboration of the concepts of joy and sadness, activity and passivity, and adequate and partial 
causes, that the epistemic framework of Part II finds its sense and significance. 
The very first proposition of Part III makes this apparent. “Our Mind does certain things 
[acts] and undergoes other things, viz., insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain 
things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things” (E III P1 / 
CWS I.493 / G II.140). This distinction between activity and passivity, between acting and being 
acted upon, is given as a definition at the beginning of this Part: 
I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the 
adequate cause, i.e. (by D1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, 
which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it [our nature] alone. On the other 
hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows 
from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause. (E III D2 / CWS I.493 / G II.139) 
 
A pair of series is established, each of which, of their own accord, will become reflexively 
ramified. On the one hand, we have adequate knowledge, and are active; our idea of adequate 
knowledge itself contributes to our power; by this increase of power, we are led to form more 
adequate ideas, and so on. On the other hand, we have inadequate knowledge, and things happen 
to us; this undergoing (passio) decreases our power; by this decrease of power, we are blocked 
from forming adequate ideas, and so on. In other words, both passivity and activity tend to 
reinforce themselves, together forming an asymmetrical affective-epistemic circuit that could 
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accurately be described as a negative feedback loop in the case of passivity (negative feedback 
loops being characterized by inherent stasis or closed repetition), and a positive feedback loop in 
the case of activity (positive feedback loops being characterized by an inherent openness and an 
intrinsic tendency to expand).31 
Let us examine Spinoza’s argument for this first proposition. The first premise is that 
each human mind has some adequate and some inadequate ideas. As we have seen, Spinoza 
thinks that the most precise way to articulate this situation is as follows: in the case of my mind 
having an adequate idea, we say that God has this idea adequately insofar as God constitutes the 
essence of my mind alone; in the case of my mind having an inadequate idea, we say that God 
has this idea adequately, but insofar as God constitutes not the essence of my mind alone but the 
essence of my mind along with other things external to my mind. Spinoza then refers back to the 
final proposition of Part I, one of his formulations of the principle of sufficient reason: “Nothing 
exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (E I P36 / CWS I.439 / G II.77). This 
applies to the ideas under consideration here, those we actually have, whether they happen to be 
adequate or inadequate. Such ideas are determinate modes, and they necessarily produce effects. 
Next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (IP36), of which God is 
the adequate cause (see D1), not insofar as God is infinite, but insofar as God is 
considered to be affected by that given idea (see IIP9). But if God, insofar as God is 
affected by an idea that is adequate in someone’s Mind, is the cause of an effect, that 
same Mind is the effect’s adequate cause (by IIP11C). (E III P1 dem. / CWS I.493-4 / G 
II.140) 
                                                          
31 The language of ‘feedback loops’ comes from the discourse of cybernetics, whose 
foundational text is Norbert Weiner, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal 
and the Machine (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1961). On the concept of feedback loops, see 
Sadie Plant, Zeros + Ones: Digital Women and the New Technoculture (London: Fourth Estate, 
1998), 156-64, 199-209, 229-32, etc. The use of such cybernetic notions to describe Spinozist 
concepts goes back at least to the early 1960’s, in Sylvain Zac, L’idée de vie dans la philosophie 
de Spinoza (Paris: PUF, 1963). 
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Of course, God is the adequate cause of all things. But it is also correct, Spinoza has told us, to 
call a cause adequate when an effect can be clearly and distinctly understood just through it. That 
is, to say: ‘God, insofar as God constitutes the essence of my mind alone, is the adequate cause 
of some effect x’, is equivalent to saying: ‘My mind is the adequate cause of that effect x’. And 
so, an effect that necessarily follows—within me or outside me—from my having an adequate 
idea is properly called my action, rather than something that happens to me, since it follows from 
and can be explained by my nature alone. On the other hand, an effect that necessarily follows 
from an inadequate idea that I have cannot be explained through the nature of my mind alone, 
since my mind is only a partial cause of that idea. This idea, in God, is adequate, but “insofar as 
he has in himself the Minds of other things together with the mind of that man” (Ibid.). Whatever 
it is that follows as an effect from the fact that I have an inadequate idea, it will not be an action 
but a passion that I undergo or suffer, that I am subject to. And Spinoza makes plain what this 
means in the corollary: “the Mind is more liable to passions the more it has inadequate ideas, and 
conversely, is more active the more it has adequate ideas” (E III P1 cor. / CWS I.494 / G II.141). 
While this is a compelling argument that we act on the basis of adequate ideas, and that 
things happen to us when we have inadequate ideas, Spinoza wants to make the stronger claim 
that the mind’s actions and passions exclusively follow from having adequate ideas in the first 
case and inadequate ideas in the second. “The actions of the Mind arise from adequate ideas 
alone; the passions depend on inadequate ideas alone” (E III P3 / CWS I.497 / G II.144). His aim 
here is to rule out two possibilities: first, that the mind could become active, or act, without 
having adequate ideas; and second, that the mind could become passive, or undergo something, 
by virtue of having adequate ideas. In order to make this claim, Spinoza argues: “whatever 
follows from the nature of the Mind and has the Mind as its proximate cause, through which it 
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must be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate idea or an inadequate one” (E III 
P3 dem. / CWS I.498 / G II.145). In the former case, as we have seen, the necessary effect will 
be an action, and in the latter case it will be a passion. The mind’s acting expresses nothing other 
than the adequacy of the idea it has and from which an effect follows; its passively undergoing 
something expresses nothing other than the inadequacy of the idea it has and from which an 
effect follows. 
Once this is established, Spinoza lays out the theory of conatus in the next several 
propositions. For our purposes here, four of these are particularly important:  
Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being. (E III P6 / 
CWS I.498 / G II.146) 
 
The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual 
essence of the thing. (E III P7 / CWS I.499 / G II.146) 
 
Both insofar as the Mind has clear and distinct ideas, and insofar as it has confused ideas, 
it strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in this being and is conscious of this 
striving it has. (E III P9 / CWS I.499 / G II.147) 
 
The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Body’s power of 
acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our Mind’s power of thinking. (E III P11 
/ CWS I.500 / G II.148) 
 
Propositions 6 to 8 of Part III could be called the general theory of conatus, according to which 
striving to persevere constitutes the actual essence of all things. P9 affirms this of individual 
minds as a special case of the general theory, and irrespective of whether the mind in question 
has adequate or inadequate ideas. P11 reminds us that this theory in all cases must be understood 
in conjunction with the thesis of parallelism, articulated in II P7, according to which “the order 
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E II P7 / CWS I.451 / 
G II.89). Indeed, the demonstration for this proposition is a simple reference to II P7; rigorously 
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speaking, III P11 does not say anything new, and each reference to it in subsequent 
demonstrations could just as well have referred to II P7. Ostensibly, Spinoza makes this claim 
explicitly just in order to clearly mark his distance from Descartes, who writes in The Passions of 
the Soul that “what is a passion in the soul is usually an action in the body” (PS I.2 / CSM I.328 / 
AT XI.328). In the scholium to this last proposition, Spinoza draws from this conceptual matrix 
the celebrated definitions of joy and sadness: 
We see, then, that the Mind can undergo a great many changes, and pass now to a greater, 
now to a lesser perfection. These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of Joy and 
Sadness. By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which it 
passes to a greater perfection. And by Sadness, that passion by which it passes to a lesser 
perfection. (E III P11s / CWS I.500 / G II.148-9) 
 
Perfection, for Spinoza, is nothing other than power: the power to affect and to be affected, as 
well as the power to persevere in being. Joy is the affect—he is careful to note that he is 
describing joy insofar as it is a passion and not an action—that one undergoes when the mind 
and the body together pass to a greater perfection, or experience an increase in their power. The 
theory of conatus thus entails that we seek joy. 
Producing a full account of the complexities of Part III is not my aim here, so I will limit 
my comments in what remains to noting a few remarkable moments of Spinoza’s presentation as 
it relates to our current question, that of the relationship between the problematic of becoming 
active and the epistemic category of adequate knowledge. As such we will skip the propositions 
from 11 to 53, in which Spinoza elaborates a robust theory of ideal-affective association based 
on the identity of the will and the intellect and its relation to desire, which I will explore in the 
next chapter. 
In Proposition 53, Spinoza writes: “When the Mind considers itself and its power of 
acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of 
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acting” (E III P53 / CWS I.524 / G II.181). In the demonstration, Spinoza points out that to 
consider one’s own mind insofar as it is capable of acting or thinking is already to pass to a 
greater perfection, since the mind only thinks of itself in strictly positive terms when it considers 
its power to think. Conversely, “When the Mind imagines its own lack of power, it is saddened 
by it” (E III P55 / CWS I.525 / G II.182). Both of these propositions are accompanied by 
corollaries noting that when these positive and negative self-appraisals are echoed by the others, 
the joy and sadness that follow from them are correlatively more intense. But even in the case of 
the joy that follows from my reflecting on my mind’s singular power to think, corroborated by 
others, this kind of joy remains a passion. This is attested to by the fact that Spinoza, in P53, is 
careful to write that the joy involved arises from imagining one’s own mind and power to think: 
this is not yet adequate understanding, it is not an action. 
In addition, however, there are active joys and desires, which are the focus of the final 
two propositions of Part III. “Apart from the Joy and Desire that are passions, there are other 
affects of Joy and Desire that are related to us insofar as we act” (E III P58 / CWS I.529 / G 
II.187). In the demonstration he argues for the possibility first of active joys, and then of active 
desires. In the first case, the argument has three premises. First, the mind has some adequate 
ideas; we have seen this argued for in the case of common notions. Second, “the Mind 
necessarily considers itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by IIP40S2)” (E III P58 
dem. / CWS I.529 / G II.187). Now it is not clear to what, exactly, Spinoza is referring with this 
parenthetical citation; in that scholium (which we encountered earlier in this chapter), he 
distinguishes between four different kinds of perception based on their sources, and provides the 
mathematical example of the ordered pairs (E II P40s2 / CWS I.477-8 / G II.122). But his 
intention seems clear enough, so I will allow myself to reconstruct the reasoning. Axiomatically, 
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the idea of an effect necessarily involves the idea of its cause (E I A4 / CWS I.410 / G II.46). 
And as we have seen, in the case of adequate knowledge, the mind is the proximate cause of the 
effect of the adequate idea; thus when the mind conceives any idea adequately, it also necessarily 
conceives of itself adequately as the proximate cause of that idea. Third, Spinoza refers us back 
to the joy described in P53: “When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices 
[…] Therefore, it also rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, i.e. (by P1), insofar as it 
acts” (E III P58 / CWS I.529 / G II.187). The argument for active desire follows the same line, 
showing that the joy that one experiences in desiring is active precisely to the extent that our 
desiring is determined by our adequate understanding. The proposition that follows denies that 
this kind of active mental affect can in any case be a sadness, since it is predicated on the mind’s 
activity qua adequate understanding: “Hence no affects of Sadness can be related to the Mind 
insofar as it acts, but only affects of Joy and Desire” (E III P59 / CWS I.529 / G II.188). 
Thus we can distinguish between passive joys, in which the mind passes to a greater 
perfection or increases its power, but is not the adequate cause of this passage, instead being only 
a partial cause of it, since it only imagines and does not yet understand; and active joys, in which 
the mind, by forming adequate ideas and understanding itself to be the adequate cause of such 
adequate ideas, passes immediately to a greater perfection or increases its power. In either case, 
joy is preferable to sadness, as it involves an increase of power or a passage to a greater 
perfection; but active joy is always preferable to passive joy, since by understanding itself and its 
own power of acting adequately, the mind is able to determine an ethical rather than an 
epistemological Archimedean point. Because everything that follows from adequate ideas must 
itself be adequate, as we have seen, the discovery of active joy, in the contemplation of one’s 
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own power to form the adequate idea that one actually has, can ground a dynamic process of 
increasing that power indefinitely and without needing to rely on imaginary ideas.  
One last way to put this would be to recall a formulation we earlier explored in our 
analysis of inadequate knowledge of the mind. Spinoza wrote that “the idea of this idea [of an 
affection of the human body] does not express the nature of the mind adequately, or does not 
involve adequate knowledge of it” (E II P29 dem. / CWS I.471 / G II.114). But in the case of 
active joy, we are dealing precisely with adequate expression. The idea in the mind—some 
common notion, a unity of composition or a rule for the production of actual existents in 
nature—is adequate; in this idea, the mind itself is adequately expressed, as a mode of thinking 
capable of producing this adequate idea; this reflexive or bifurcated adequacy is experienced as 
joy, the mind’s passage to a greater perfection, the increase of its power, in an entirely active and 
self-affecting manner. In such cases there seems to be no partiality, no confusion, and no 
passivity. The mind understands itself as adequately expressed in its formation of adequate ideas. 
Adequate understanding, causal genesis, active joy, and the increase of power in this way 
form a conceptual knot responding precisely to the ethical problematic of becoming-active 
whose resolution is the conditio sine qua non of Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas and, arguably, 
his metaphysics as a whole. In it the categories of the clear and distinct are retained, but only 
after their immanent critique revealed their limits and they were put in their proper place, as that 
which provides indubitable truths about formal essences or possible existences, but without 
being able to reach the level of genesis, causality, or actuality. According to Spinoza, it is of the 
nature of reason to grasp things not as contingent, but as necessary—that is, from the perspective 
of their actuality and genesis, in the light of their sufficient reason, or sub specie aeternitatis (E 
II P44 / CWS I.480 / G II.125). Knowledge becomes adequate, the mind becomes active, formal 
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definitions are affirmed when we posit their individual existences as necessary. When a mind 
does this, its power can only increase, and as it reflects on its own power to do so, the cascading 
effects are active, affirmative, and joyful. These are only the first steps toward beatitude.  
 
5. The Persistence of the Inadequate  
However, things are not quite as rosy as this description might lead one to believe. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I want to focus on one final feature of inadequate ideas: their tendency 
to persist. It turns out that, on Spinoza’s account, inadequate or imaginary ideas are impossible to 
do away with once and for all, even when one successfully manages to form adequate ideas. And 
even when I recognize the necessity of an adequate idea of some thing, inadequate ideas of those 
same things continue to produce effects in my mind. An example is illuminating here: grasping 
the force and necessity of Spinoza’s demonstrations in Part I, I am able to recognize rationally, to 
adequately understand, that you and I are not really distinct things, but are only modifications or 
modes of one thing, namely the unique substance, God or nature; but I still cannot help but 
imagine, or inadequately think, that you and I are really distinct things. We might say that, 
insofar as this is the case, in my mind there are competing ideal accounts of the nature of things, 
one of which I am able to consciously recognize as rationally superior to the other, but both of 
which participate in constituting my mind insofar as it is a singular mode of thought. As we will 
see in the next chapter, this is extremely important in light of another of Spinoza’s characteristic 
gnoseological claims, namely that the will and the understanding are identical. If I cannot do 
away with inadequate ideas even when I have adequate ones at my disposal, these inadequate 
ideas will continue to play a role in constituting my volition and, consequently, determining my 
desire. 
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The sting in the tail, so to speak, comes in Part IV, whose very first proposition 
announces the problem: “Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of 
the true insofar as it is true” (E IV P1 / CWS I.547 / G II.211). The demonstration is 
straightforward. As we have seen, Spinoza argues that there is no positive form of falsity, but 
rather that it is the expression of an absence or a privation. Inadequate ideas are missing 
something essential. Consequently, “if what a false idea has that is positive were removed by the 
presence of the true insofar as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (by 
IIIP4) is absurd” (E IV P1 dem. / CWS I.547 / G II.211). If inadequate ideas, as I have been 
suggesting, are characterized by their partiality or incompleteness, then it is clear why true ideas 
do not destroy them: a partial understanding of a thing is not incompatible with its complete 
understanding. I can therefore restate what I take to be at stake in Spinoza’s articulation of ideas 
in terms of adequacy and inadequacy: the difference between an adequate and an inadequate idea 
of something cannot be expressed in terms of contrariety or contradiction. Rather, an inadequate 
idea is merely a partial expression of the complete idea of the thing in its full concreteness. There 
could only be a contradiction between an adequate and an inadequate idea of some thing if the 
inadequate were taken to be fully adequate. But this is not strictly implied in the nature of the 
inadequate idea itself. It affirms only what it involves, which cannot include the claim that it is 
exhaustive or complete in itself. To return to one of our geometric examples, the adequate idea of 
a three-sided figure as an isoceles triangle in Euclidean space is not incompatible or inconsistent 
with its inadequate idea as a polygon. If there were any genuine contradiction between these two 
ideas, as Spinoza says, this would amount to the absurd claim that the true stands in contradiction 
with itself insofar as it is true. Again, inadequate ideas are not false as such. Indeed, as Spinoza 
emphasizes, “insofar as they are related to God, they are true” (Ibid.). Thus if I form an adequate 
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idea of something, the inadequate idea of it that I previously had can remain perfectly intact. At 
best, all that can happen here is that I retrospectively recognize the inadequacy of my previous 
conception. But even this is not a necessary consequence. 
In the scholium to this proposition, Spinoza gives the example of imagining the distance 
from the sun: when we look at it, he says, we imagine it to be a few hundred feet away from us. 
“In this we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is 
known, the error is removed, not the imagination, i.e., the idea of the sun, which explains its 
nature only so far as the Body is affected by it” (E IV P1s / CWS I.548 / G II.211; emphasis 
added). My inadequate idea continues to exist, continues to play a role in constituting my mind, 
the idea of my body. In a way, this is simply obvious: it would be ridiculous if, upon learning 
that a geometric figure is an isoceles triangle in Euclidean space, I ceased thinking that it is a 
polygon. Or if, upon learning that you and I are merely modes of the single substance, I ceased 
imagining that you and I are different things. From the perspective of the concrete constitution of 
my mind as the idea of my body, which does not on its own adequately express or involve the 
ideas of the affections of my body, since those ideas must necessarily involve the natures of the 
external bodies affecting mine, there is nothing in an adequate idea that could ‘undo’ the fact of 
this real inadequacy. “And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived, 
whether they indicate the natural constitution of the Body, or that its power of acting is increased 
or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence” (E IV P1s / 
CWS I.548 / G II.211-2). 
This problem can also be put in terms of an important distinction in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of ideas. Insofar as it is a mode of thought, my mind is an idea—the idea of my 
body—but it also has ideas. Spinoza’s argument here is that having an idea does not necessarily 
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change the constitution of the mind insofar as it is an idea. As Deleuze writes, “as for this idea 
which constitutes our soul, we do not possess it. Or we do not at least possess it immediately; for 
it is in God only insofar as he also possesses an idea of something else.”32 Here the fact that 
increasing orders of reflexivity does not do away with the inadequacy of idea, which we saw 
above in our discussion of II P29, takes on its full import: even having an idea of the idea that I 
am does not change the nature of the idea that I am. If I manage to form a genuinely adequate 
idea of the idea that I am, we must say that I have an adequate idea of the idea that is my mind—
an idea that, on its own terms, is necessarily inadequate. As we saw, insofar as my mind is a 
finite mode of thought, there are a number of ways in which my mind is necessarily constituted 
by inadequate ideas. Consequently, even in the ideal best possible scenario, in which I form an 
absolute maximum of adequate knowledge, this bears only on the ideas that I have, but does not 
necessarily imply a transformation of the idea that I am. 
In other words, inadequate ideas are unavoidably, stubbornly persistent. “The force of 
any passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a human being, so that the 
affect stubbornly clings to them” (E IV P6 / CWS I.550 / G II.214). Inadequate ideas, insofar as 
they are modes of thought, involve their own affirmation, as we will see in the next chapter; their 
power to produce effects in the mind can only be countered by the contrary power of another 
idea, but this contrary power cannot be a function of the truth of either of these ideas, since 
insofar as they are positive, adequate and inadequate ideas cannot contradict one another. 
Throughout Part IV, Spinoza constantly reiterates the claim that in order for it to be possible for 
our minds to not be constituted by ideas that are inadequate, it would have to be the case that we 
were more powerful than everything else in nature (E IV P4 / CWS I.548 / G II.212). And this is 
                                                          
32 Deleuze, Expressionism, 145-6. 
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clearly not the case: human beings are not God, which alone is absolutely powerful; there are 
invariably an infinite number of things more powerful than us (E IV A1 / CW I.547 / G II.211). 
Thus the fact that our minds are constituted by, and inevitably involve and express, inadequate 
ideas, remains necessarily true no matter how many adequate ideas we manage to form. 
What then can be said about adequate and inadequate ideas with respect to the question 
of whether they are conscious or not? Here Proposition 8 is illustrative: “The knowledge of good 
and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it [quatenus 
ejus sumus conscii]” (E IV P8 / CWS I.550 / G II.215). What does this mean? In the Preface to 
Part Four, Spinoza had denied that the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ refer to anything positive in the 
nature of things. Instead, he says, they are “only modes of thinking, or notions we form because 
we compare things to one another” (E IV Pref. / CWS I.545 / G II.208). The only consistent 
sense of these terms, he then posits as definitions, is the following: things are good that “we 
certainly know to be useful to us” (E IV D1 / CWS I.546 / G II.209), whereas things are evil that 
“we certainly know prevents us from being masters of some good” (E IV D2 / CWS I.546 / G 
II.209). Thus when we perceive that some external thing affects us with joy, or increases our 
power to act, we call it good; and conversely, when we perceive that some external thing 
decreases our power to act, or affects us with sadness, we call it evil (E IV P8 dem. / CWS I.551 
/ G II.215). But, Spinoza now argues, an idea of a thing that affects us is not really distinct from 
that affect, or “from the idea of the Body’s affection” (Ibid.). In what sense, then, are we 
conscious here? What is it that we are conscious of? We are conscious only in the sense that we 
perceive that some external thing affects us with joy or sadness; nearly every idea involved in 
this perception, in my conscious apprehension of an external thing as the cause of my affect is, in 
fact, inadequate. Even if my perception that some thing is the cause of my affect is true, in the 
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sense that this thing really does cause an increase in my power to act, nearly all of the ideas 
involved in this affirmation must necessarily be inadequate. The idea of the nature of my mind, 
that of the nature of my body, that of the idea of the affection of my body, that of the nature of 
the external body affecting mine: all of these, as we have seen, must necessarily be inadequate, 
ideas that constitute my mind but which my mind does not adequately express as their cause. 
Indeed, this risks confusing cause and effect. My mind is constituted by them, not the other way 
around. All of these unavoidably inadequate ideas indeed constitute affects, thereby playing an 
important role in determining my mind insofar as it is a singular mode of thought. How this 
constitution of affects relates to the determination of desire will be the subject of the next 
chapter, but one can already see where this argument will lead: “A Desire which arises from a 
true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other Desires which 
arise from affects by which we are tormented” (E IV P15 / CWS I.553 / G II.220). 
What I am conscious of, according to Spinoza, is always a an encounter, an encounter of 
modes, or an ideal mixture obscurely involving the natures of things. My mind consciously has 
the ideas of affections, or of the modifications of our body by other modes of extended 
substance, which “indicate a state of our body, but do not explain”33 the nature of the external 
body that affects me, or the nature of my own body or mind. Consciousness, for Spinoza, thus 
stands in a peculiar relation to knowledge: knowledge is defined as knowledge of causes, but 
consciousness is always consciousness of effects. This can be put in terms of a ‘demarcation 
problem’: given the inadequate idea of an effect of which I am conscious, the idea of an 
encounter between my body and another, on what basis could I clearly separate out the distinct 
nature of my own body and that of the external one, moving from this necessarily inadequate 
                                                          
33 Deleuze, Expressionism, 147. 
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starting-point to an adequate idea? If I have the idea of something that causes me joy, how can I 
use this as the first moment of a process of distinction that leads to distinct, adequate ideas of me 
and the external thing? Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas teaches that there is no such process, no 
procedure that would lead back to the adequate ideas of the singular natures that must be the 
causes of this idea-effect. The only way to move from the inadequate ideas of modal mixtures to 
any adequate idea at all is on the basis of what these modes must share in order for their 
encounter to be possible, that is, their common natures, which can only be conceived adequately. 
The natures of singular things, whether we consider them as bodies or as minds, and the causal 
relations that really obtain between them, are never objects of consciousness as such. These can 
only be inadequately involved in constituting the ideas that our minds are, even when we 
consciously form and possess adequate ideas through common notions. Effects must necessarily 
involve the nature of their causes, and conscious knowledge of effects must necessarily involve 
the knowledge of their causes as well. But insofar as they constitute a mind as a mode of thought, 
these concrete causes are and must remain inadequate, involving positive ideal determinations of 
which we can only be unconscious. We may be conscious of the ideas that we have, but we can 
come to possess these ideas only under highly restrictive conditions. We have ideas consciously, 
according to Spinoza, on condition that there is an encounter (E II P16, 19, 23 / CWS I.463, 466, 
468 / G II.103, 107, 110). These ideas are the obscure effect of the interaction of modes, the 
encounter between our body and another external one, or the reflexive ideas of the ideas of these 
encounters. Even these consciously recognized ideas involve other ideas of which we remain 
necessarily unconscious. And as for the rest, the absolute infinity of finite and infinite modes of 
thought perfectly positive in their determinacy and powerful in their actual determination of the 
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The Unconscious of Desire in Spinoza 
 
Human minds are modes of thought, and the question of what they understand and how is an 
important one. But answering that question does not fully capture what Spinoza calls the ‘actual 
essence’ of finite beings, which is its striving. The striving of a human being to persevere in its 
being, to increase its power to think and to act, to produce the effects that follow from its nature, 
insofar as it is expressed both corporeally and mentally—Spinoza calls this desire. What does the 
persistence of the inadequate, as a consequence of Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas, mean for this 
conception of desire as the actual essence of individual human beings? In the previous chapter, I 
argued that Spinoza’s categorical framework of adequate and inadequate ideas, which is 
articulated in light of the ethical problematic that informs his metaphysics as a whole, namely the 
striving to increase one’s power, has the following significant features. First, the adequate and 
inadequate are not related to one another as are the true to the false. The inadequate is 
characterized not by anything positive on account of which it could be called false, but rather by 
its partiality: an inadequate idea does not fully explain that of which it is an idea, but clearly and 
distinctly expresses only some part or aspect of it. In particular, inadequate ideas tend not to 
clearly and distinctly express their own cause, which they must nevertheless involve obscurely 
and indistinctly. Error consists, then, in taking an inadequate idea to be adequate, that is, in 
confusing the partial for the completely expressive. 
Second, following Spinoza’s analyses in Propositions 24 to 31 of Part II, there are some 
things of which we can only form inadequate ideas. In particular, as we saw, the human mind can 
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only form inadequate ideas of the natures of external bodies and the parts of its own bodies, the 
nature of its own mind based on the ideas of its body’s affections, and the durations of singular 
things, which includes itself as well as external things. In each case, Spinoza shows us that the 
mind’s ideas of these things are only partially expressive of their natures because the mind, as 
the idea of the body through whose affections these things are known, only involves them 
partially. In other words, Spinoza shows us why we necessarily have inadequate ideas, instead of 
leaving their actual genesis and appearance in the mind essentially unexplained, in the manner of 
assuming their appearance as a mere uncritical doxology or a matter of inherited prejudices. He 
even, as we saw, explicitly rejects the theological gesture according to which the confusion of 
human minds is a consequence of the fall, for Adam could have conceived of God adequately. 
Third, this way of articulating the difference between the adequate and the inadequate has 
the crucial consequence that the formation or appearance of more adequate ideas by a mind does 
not in any way necessitate the elimination of their corresponding inadequate ideas. This kind of 
elimination, according to Spinoza, which would proceed by way of some contrariety, could only 
happen on the basis of some shared common nature, and, in terms of what they positively share, 
adequate and inadequate ideas must, in fact, always agree. This is what I termed the persistence 
of the inadequate: the fact that the mind can and does form adequate ideas does not entail that the 
mind will thereby be constituted by adequate ideas. In fact, insofar as it is the idea of the body, or 
insofar as it is a finite mode of thought, the mind must necessarily continue to be constituted by 
inadequate ideas, no matter how many adequate ideas it manages to form. 
This can all be summed up in terms of the unconscious of thought in the following way. 
For Spinoza, the mind is conscious only in and through the ideas of the affections of itself and of 
the body of which it is an idea, but, as a singular mode of thought, it remains constituted by, and 
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thus necessarily involves, much more than this. And that remainder, from the perspective of the 
mind insofar as it is conscious, can be identified as the unconscious dimension of thought in 
Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas. These are not merely ideas that happen not to be conscious, but 
ideas whose unconscious involvement in the mind is structurally necessary. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the Spinozist theory of desire in light 
of these consequences. My goal is to show precisely how, given the preceding, there is a 
necessarily unconscious dimension to desire that Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas helps us 
understand and explicate. To do this I will first sketch, in broad outline, the Spinozist critique of 
free will, and his way of thinking through the problem of akratic desire, or the problem of 
‘seeing the better but doing the worse’, which will help generically orient our reading in the rest 
of the chapter and indicate what conceptual terms require further elucidation, namely volition 
and desire. I will therefore need to account for two conceptual relationships in Spinoza’s 
gnoseology. First, there is the relationship between the understanding (or intellect) and the will 
(or volition). This is necessary because, up until now, we have almost exclusively been 
discussing ideas in terms of their being modes of understanding. Yet as we will see, Spinoza 
thinks that they are already, as such, also modes of volition. I will show how Spinoza argues for 
the counterintuitive claim that the understanding and the will are in fact one and the same thing, 
which involves his critique of any ‘faculty’ psychology and his argument that a volition is the 
particular affirmation always already involved in an idea. Second, I will need to clarify the 
relationship between volition and desire, since these are importantly distinct in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of ideas. Desire is the actual essence of an individual human being, whose mind is 
constituted by ideas whose affirmation is what we understand by particular volitions. In this way, 
I draw attention directly to the structurally unconscious aspect of desire, as the determination of 
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the nature of a mind’s striving to persevere by the persistently inadequate ideas that invariably 
constitute it. 
 
1. Spinozist Desire and the Critique of Voluntarism 
Spinoza’s critique of the concept of free human volition is, in some respects, quite simple: 
human wills are not exempt from the principle of sufficient reason, according to which 
everything that exists is necessarily determined to exist in the way that it does and not otherwise. 
The metaphysical basis of this critique, laid out in Part I of the Ethics, lies in the idea that the 
human being is a mode of substance like any other. Modes of substance are, as we saw in section 
4 of Chapter 1, perfectly capable of interacting with one another—indeed, they are characterized 
by their striving to persevere, and their capacity to affect and to be affected by other modes. In 
the seventh definition of Ethics I, Spinoza lays out the difference between what he understands 
by a free thing and a necessary one: “That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of 
its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or rather 
compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a certain and 
determinate manner” (E I D7 / CWS I.409 / G II.46). But only one thing really meets the criteria 
of ‘existing from the necessity of its nature alone’ and ‘being determined to act by itself alone’, 
namely, God, which is indeed free in this sense; all modes of substance will, by contrast, be 
necessarily determined rather than free. It is axiomatic, for Spinoza, that causes are determined 
necessarily to produce their effects (E I A3 / CWS I.410 / G II.46); from this, he says, it follows 
that determinate causes cannot render themselves undetermined (E I P27 / CWS I.432 / G II.68).  
Proposition 32 of Part I reads: “The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a 
necessary one” (E I P32 / CWS I.435 / G II.72). As the demonstration makes clear, Spinoza 
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holds that this is true whether we consider the will to be finite or infinite. If the will is finite, 
then, like all other finite things, it is determined to exist in a certain and determinate manner by 
external things and so to produce the effects it does necessarily (E I P28 / CWS I.432 / G II.69). 
And if it is infinite, Spinoza remarks that the determination of infinite modes is no less necessary 
than the determination of finite ones, referring to the notorious discussion of infinite modes (I 
P21-23).1 Significantly, in the first corollary to this very proposition Spinoza draws out the 
                                                          
1 The discussion of infinite modes is justifiably notorious. Spinoza says that there are both 
immediate and mediate infinite modes, where the first are always produced by the absolute 
nature of substance, and the second, while also having always eternally been produced, are 
caused indirectly, either by the immediate infinite modes themselves or by other mediate infinite 
modes (and subsequent mediations could ostensibly proceed ad infinitum). In their 
correspondence, Schuller asks Spinoza for examples to clarify what this means, and Spinoza 
responds in Letter 64: “the examples [of infinite modes] which you ask for: examples of the first 
kind [i.e., of things produced immediately by God] are, in Thought, absolutely infinite intellect, 
and in Extension, motion and rest; an example of the second kind [i.e., of those produced by the 
mediation of some infinite modification] is the face of the whole Universe, which, however 
much it may vary in infinite ways, nevertheless always remains the same” (Spinoza, Letter 64 / 
CWS II.439 / G IV.278). He then refers to the scholium to the seventh Lemma before P14 of 
Ethics II, which discusses the capacity for an individual retaining its nature in spite of its being 
affected in many ways; he then suggests that this capacity increases as the degree of complexity 
of the individual does, and that “if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive 
that the whole of nature is one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, 
without any change of the whole Individual” (Spinoza, E II L7s after P13 / CWS I.462 / G 
II.102). 
Still, just what Spinoza exactly means, and what conceptual work is done, by the infinite 
modes remains somewhat unclear and has been the focus of several investigations in recent 
Spinoza scholarship. See Charles Huenemann, “The Necessity of Finite Modes and Geometrical 
Containment in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” in New Essays on the Rationalists, eds. R. Gennaro and 
C. Huenemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Tad Schmaltz, “Spinoza’s Mediate 
Infinite Mode,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35:2 (1997): 199-235; Alan Gabbey, 
“Spinoza, infinite modes and the infinitive mood,” Studia Spinozana 16 (2008): 41-66; Don 
Garrett, “The Essence of the Body and the Part of the Mind that is Eternal,” in A Cambridge 
Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. Olli Koistinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009); and Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought, especially Chapter 4. 
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consequence that not even God produces any effects through any supposed freedom of the will—
namely, because God’s will is also necessarily determined to produce the effects that it does (E I 
P32c1 / CWS I.435 / G II.72). Thus Spinoza has no proper place in the great debates, in 
seventeenth century philosophical theology, about the problem of theodicy, insofar as its 
articulation requires a concept of free divine volition—a concept shared, in one contentious form 
or another, by Leibniz, Malebranche, and Arnauld.2 
However, the fact that things are necessarily determined to exist in a particular way by no 
means that we, as finite modes of thought, must necessarily understand these causes. In fact, 
Spinoza holds that just the opposite tends to be true: “all human beings are born ignorant of the 
causes of things” (E I App. / CWS I.440 / G II.78), and the process by which we come to 
adequately know any causes is a difficult one that is only rarely carried out successfully. It is in 
the epistemic gap between our consciousness of our volitions and actions, and our unawareness 
of the causes of these volitions and actions, that Spinoza identifies the source of the voluntarist 
conception of free will. “Human beings think themselves free, because they are conscious of 
their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which 
they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of [those causes]” (Ibid.).3 In 
                                                          
2 On this debate, see Nigel Abercrombie, The Origins of Jansenism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1936); Sleigh, Leibniz & Arnauld; Donald Rutherford, “Malebranche’s Theodicy,” and Denis 
Moreau, “The Malebranche-Arnauld Debate,” in The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, 
ed. Steven Nadler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Tad Schmaltz, “What Has 
Cartesianism To Do with Jansenism?” Journal of the History of Ideas 60:1 (1999): 37-56; and cf. 
Steven Nadler, The Best of All Possible Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God, and Evil (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008). 
 
3 Spinoza repeats this in Part III: “experience itself, no less clearly than reason, teaches that 
human beings believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and 
ignorant of the causes by which they are determined, that the decisions of the Mind are nothing 
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other words, Spinoza identifies an informal fallacy at the source of the concept of free human 
volition: from the (negative) lack of knowledge of a cause of something, namely human actions, 
it is (positively) inferred that there really is no cause of these actions. This argumentum ad 
ignorantiam is strictly invalid.4 
The third part of the Ethics seeks to explain the processes by which our appetites are 
determined, which is a matter of strict necessity even when those appetites are irrational. 
‘Irrational’ here does not mean, to be clear, that these appetites have no reason for being so and 
not otherwise. Rather, it refers to the fact that these desires are determined by inadequate ideas, 
or the imagination, since the images of things by which we are affected do not necessarily 
correspond to the real order and nature of things. To take the simplest example: love is defined as 
“Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause” (E III P13s / CWS I.502 / G II.150). 
However, there is no guarantee that the thing that I imagine to be the cause of a joy is in fact the 
cause of my joy, understood as my passage to a greater perfection or the increase of my power to 
think and to act. Indeed, it may be the case that, in reality, the thing I imagine to be the cause of 
my joy is in fact something whose nature necessarily diminishes my power to think and to act. 
Now, “one who loves necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves” (Ibid.), 
and so even if the nature of the thing I love is in reality such that it diminishes rather than 
increases my power to think and to act, this love necessarily determines me to act in such a way 
that I imagine is beneficial to it—because I also imagine that what benefits that which brings me 
                                                          
but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the dispositions of the Body varies” (E III 
P2s / CWS I.496-7 / G II.143). 
 
4 This precise informal fallacy also, and for exact the same reason, underlies Spinoza’s critique 
of so-called ‘miracles’ and the possibility of obtaining any knowledge of God based on the 
miraculous (TTP VI.16-28 / CWS II.156-9 / G III.84-7). 
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joy will also thereby bring me joy: “We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine 
will lead to Joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it, or will lead to 
Sadness” (E III P28 / CWS I.509 / G II.161). Thus Ethics III teaches us how to regard desires 
and behaviors both as necessarily rational, insofar as their existence and nature are a matter of 
necessity to the extent that we are determined to act in certain and determinate ways by desires 
structured by how we imagine things to be; and as potentially irrational, insofar as how we 
imagine something to be may not correspond to its actual essence or conatus, its real tendency to 
aid or restrain our power to think and to act. 
Of course, this is also not to say that the imagination never corresponds to the real nature 
of things. As we saw in the previous chapter, inadequate ideas are not false by virtue of anything 
they positively contain, but are inherently partial. Insofar as they are related to God, Spinoza 
reminds us, they must in fact be true in some way, expressing some real involvement of the 
nature of external things in my body and mind: “an imagination is an idea which indicates the 
present constitution of the human Body more than the nature of an external body—not distinctly, 
of course, but confusedly” (E IV P1s / CWS I.547 / G II.211). But when these converge—for 
example, when the thing I imagine to be the cause of my joy really does aid my power to think 
and to act, and so I am correct to love it—it is only accidentally, since the imagination does not 
grasp things through their causes (a conclusion without premises). Hence: “Any thing can be the 
accidental cause of Joy, Sadness, or Desire” (E III P15 / CWS I.503 / G II.151). The 
demonstration for and corollary to this proposition precisely disarticulate the real order 
according to which the nature of a thing in itself aids or restrains my power to think and to act, 
from the imaginary order according to which I attribute the increase or decrease in my power to 
think and to act to something that I imagine to be the cause of this modification of my power. 
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“From this alone—that we have regarded a thing with an affect of Joy or Sadness, of which it is 
not itself the efficient cause, we can love it or hate it” (E III P15 cor. / CWS I.503 / G II.152). 
And, once again, my love or hate for a thing determines me necessarily to act in a certain and 
determinate way towards it, regardless of whether it is in reality the efficient cause of my joy or 
sadness. This is why it should not be surprising that when Spinoza finally comes to discuss 
active joys, that is, joys that do not simply happen to us, but which follow from our own natures, 
the key difference is that they always involve the understanding rather than the imagination, 
adequate rather than inadequate ideas (E III P58 / CWS I.529 / G II.187). But the vast majority 
of affects defined in Ethics III are strictly passive, even those that are joyous: something happens 
to me from which it follows that my power increases, and I imagine something to be the cause of 
this increase and thus am passively determined to love it. 
I do not think it should be necessary to go through the entire series of affects enumerated 
in Ethics III in order to support my claim that the text is a rigorous account of how desire is 
determined by inadequate images of the natures of things and of causal relations, and how desire 
so determined necessarily leads one to act in certain and determinate ways. Everything essential 
can be understood from the example I have just given, in which confused love determines one to 
act in ways that they imagine to be beneficial for whatever they imagine to be the cause of their 
joy; mutatis mutandis, the same goes for confused hatred (i.e., the case in which I take something 
whose actual nature tends to increase my power to think and to act, to be the cause of my 
sadness). Spinoza says explicitly that he considers joy, sadness, and desire to be the three 
primary or fundamental affects, from which the rest follow as modifications or permutations (E 
III P11s / CWS I.500-1 / G II.148-9). Love and hate are the simplest cases of joy and sadness 
being modified by the imagination, or inadequate ideas, in which the mind posits that some 
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particular external thing is the cause of its joy or sadness. The rest of the affects merely involve 
more complicated variations of love and hate through increasingly complex systems of relations 
between inadequate ideas. For example, my shame is a sadness accompanied by the idea of an 
internal (rather than external) cause, arising from the fact that I imagine that others blame me, 
i.e., they experience sadness in relation to me, owing to actions that they imagine that I have 
performed (E III P29s and P30s / CWS I.510-12 / G II.162-4). It does not matter that I may not 
have performed the actions that others think I did, or that I may be incorrect in thinking that 
others blame me for these actions. When I imagine this state of affairs, I experience shame, and 
this sad passion determines me to act in a certain and determinate way.  
It is clear that insofar as affects involve the imagination, or inadequate ideas, they can 
arise in a manner that does not correspond with the real relation between one’s own nature and 
the natures of things that the mind imagines. And from this affection, my will to act in particular 
ways follows necessarily, whether or not I am conscious of this series of causes that really 
determines my will. As we have seen, positing that something is the cause of an affect is one way 
in which inadequate ideas determine an individual’s conatus. There are at least two other ways. 
The first is by resemblance, in which Spinoza clearly underscores the imaginary character of the 
supposed resemblance and separates it from the real order of efficient causality: “From the mere 
fact that we imagine a thing to have some likeness to an object that usually affects the Mind with 
Joy or Sadness, we love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is like the object is not 
the efficient cause of these affects” (E III P16 / CWS I.503 / G II.152-3). The second is by 
memorial association: “If the Mind has once been affected by two affects at once, then 
afterwards, when it is affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other” (E III P14 / 
CWS I.502 / G II.151). This is one of the ways, Spinoza tells us, in which something can become 
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an accidental cause of joy, sadness, or desire. Our imagination habitually associates together 
things based on our prior experiences of them. Thus, if I have experienced A and B together, and 
imagined that A was the cause of my sadness, this is already sufficient to determine my desire to 
avoid B just as much as A. Here again we can highlight the simultaneously rational and irrational 
character (in the sense indicated above) of such an affect. It is entirely rational, insofar as it 
follows necessarily from the inadequate associations of ideas that our mind habitually forms and 
reiterates, but potentially irrational, insofar as such habituated associations can be entirely 
disarticulated from the question of whether the nature of this thing has any relation qua efficient 
cause to the affect we believe it engenders in us. 
Is it surprising that these three kinds of operations of the imagination that give rise to 
various affections of the mind and that determine desire are precisely what Hume will identify as 
the principles of association, those habits by which the credible mind passes beyond what is 
given? The whole complex tapestry of Spinozist affects are all joys, sadnesses, and desires, 
coupled with the idea of something as its cause (causality), with the habitual association of 
another affect or object that we imagine to resemble it (resemblance), or with the habitual 
association with another affect or object that we previously experienced alongside it 
(spatiotemporal contiguity) (T I.I.IV / 10-13; EHU III.1-3 / 19-20). These ideal associations, 
these habits of the imagination that determine our manner of being affected and thus our desire, 
arise in the mind according to strictly necessary force. And when they do, they constitute 
modifications of our conatus that determine us to act in particular ways, whether or not we are 
aware of them. Indeed, as I will argue in my reading of Hume in the next chapter, these habits of 
thought are almost always formed unconsciously, and they tend to operate below or behind the 
threshold of our conscious awareness. 
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Spinozist involuntarism consists in the fact that even if we consciously recognize that, in 
any given instance, our affects are irrational insofar as the imaginary associations subtending 
them clearly do not refer to the real nature of the things imagined, even then, such recognition is 
not sufficient to undo the affective force these imaginary associations engender. Only another 
affective constellation, stronger than those that arise from these associations, is adequate to such 
a task (E IV P7 / CWS I.550 / G II.214). Inadequate ideas have a real determining power that 
must be considered a positive feature in its own right—not insofar as they are false, but precisely 
insofar as they constitute affects that modify the desires of individuals and lead them necessarily 
to act in particular ways. “Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of 
the true insofar as it is true” (E IV P1 / CWS I.547 / G II.211). And although adequate 
knowledge can also be said to have a determining power, this in no way guarantees that the 
determining power of true or adequate ideas will be stronger than that of confused or inadequate 
ones. As we have seen, the degree to which it may be said that an idea has a power to determine 
one to act in a particular way has only an accidental relation to whether it happens to truly or 
falsely represents the nature of its object. Indeed, to the extent that it is considered as having a 
power to determine one to act or to suffer actions, it simply does not matter whether an idea is 
adequate or inadequate, whether it involves understanding things through their causes or 
imagining them confusedly: “No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil 
insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect” (E IV P14 / CWS I.553 / G 
II.219). And so in outline, at least, it is clear how it is possible for us to see the better, but do the 
worse: too often, our habituated ideal associations incline us toward that which we consciously 
understand to be worse, by the superior power of the affects they engender in us involuntarily. 
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2. The Identity of Intellect and Volition 
By now we have a robust sense for what is at stake in the distinction between adequate and 
inadequate ideas, but how do ideas in general relate to volition, or the will? In fact, Spinoza 
argues, the will and the understanding are identical. Ideas just are volitions, insofar as they 
immediately and unavoidably involve their own affirmation. The complexities of this argument 
require a detailed reconstruction. Let us take as a point of departure Spinoza’s outright denial of 
free or spontaneous volition at the end of Part II.  
As we have seen, the human mind is a finite mode, according to Spinoza, that is, it is the 
idea of the body. Finite modes absolutely cannot be self-determining, which is a characteristic 
only of the absolutely infinite substance, God or Nature. As such, human minds are determined 
to act as they do by external causes. And no mode can render itself undetermined, in order to 
access any kind of undifferentiated pure possibility, which seems to be the condition for the 
possibility of spontaneous volition or free choice. Hence Spinoza writes: “In the Mind there is no 
absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is also 
determined by another, and this again by another, and so on to infinity” (E II P48 / CWS I.483 / 
G II.129). This proposition comes at almost the very end of Part II. As we saw in the last chapter, 
the vast majority of this second Part of the Ethics is in fact a typology of inadequate knowledges: 
a systematic account of the various ways in which the mind can only inadequately grasp what it 
thinks, or how we are condemned to imagine confusedly the natures of ourselves and the beings 
related to us, as well as the natures of those relations. But none of this matters for the 
demonstration of P48, which appeals only to a single proposition from Part II, P11, which is said 
to show that “the Mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking” (E II P48 dem. / CWS 
I.489 / G II.129). Once this is given, the demonstration need only appeal to the metaphysical 
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apparatus of Part One, which I recapitulated at the outset of the previous section and which 
explains that finite modes are determined by external finite modes in a chain of efficient causes 
that proceeds to infinity (E I P28 / CWS I.432 / G II.69). Minds are characterized by their power 
to think, but what they actually think at a given point is a matter of their specific determination, 
not any spontaneous volition or free choice. Thus, as Spinoza already argued at the end of Part 
One, “The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one” (E I P32 / CWS I.435 / G 
II.72). And the corollary to this proposition makes it clear that God enjoys no special privilege in 
this regard: “God does not produce any effect by freedom of the will” (E I P28 cor. / CWS I.435 
/ G II.73). 
Now in the scholium to P48, Spinoza explicitly lays out his rejection of any ‘faculty’ 
theory of the mind: “there is in the Mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, 
etc.” (E II P48s / CWS I.483 / G II.129). We can identify this as a consequence of Spinozist 
immanence in the attribute of thought. Just as substance does not exist outside its expression in 
modes, and modes are only expressions of the unique substance, so there cannot be said to be 
any power or faculty of the mind outside the actual expressions of that power. On Spinoza’s 
account, in the attribute of thought, what exists are singular modes of thinking substance, 
individual thoughts that we name as instances of understanding, desiring, and so on. To posit a 
distinct faculty or unique capacity for any of these kinds of modes of thought would be an 
unwarranted metaphysical posit. Part of the problem with such hypostasis is that there are no 
immanent criteria for its legitimate as opposed to illegitimate usage. If distinct ‘faculties’ of 
understanding and volition have sometimes been posited, why would there not also be a faculty 
of ‘loving’, as Spinoza’s formulation forces us to ask? Why not, for that matter, a faculty of 
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‘formulation’? Or of ‘hesitation’? In other words, it seems possible to posit a distinct faculty for 
every distinct kind of mode of thought.  
This problem is compounded in two ways, corresponding to two distinct multiplicities 
complicating the nature of mental affections. On the one hand, there are different objects of 
affection, and on the other there are different subjects of experience. According to Spinoza, even 
different modes of thought grouped under the same name (i.e., different instances of 
‘understanding’, or ‘desiring’, or ‘loving’, etc.) are sufficiently distinct that each would call for 
positing corresponding faculties if this move were legitimate. This is because, first, as Spinoza 
says, “There are as many species of Joy, Sadness, and Desire, and consequently of each affect 
composed of these (like vacillation of mind) or derived from them (like Love, Hate, Hope, Fear, 
etc.), as there are species of objects by which we are affected” (E III P56 / CWS I.526 / G 
II.184). Different objects inspire different loves. Nothing is explained by suggesting that I have a 
distinct faculty of loving for every such different love. Second, he writes: “Each affect of each 
individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one from the essence 
of the other” (E III P57 / CWS I.528 / G II.186). The fact that you and I, when we are affected by 
hatred (defined as a ‘sadness or a decrease in power accompanied by the idea of an external 
cause’), have different natures or actual essences (for, again, the actual essence of each 
individual is their singular striving or conatus), is sufficient to entail that the hates we experience 
are themselves really different. In short, nothing is explained by positing that the mind possesses 
distinct faculties of affection, which in any case could not be said to exist outside the specific 
affections that they are supposed to explain.5  
                                                          
5 In fact, then, Spinoza’s critique of the concept of ‘mental faculty’ here is essentially a variant of 
the critique of ‘occult qualities’ found in many early modern thinkers. Both Descartes and 
Malebranche argued that ‘occult qualities’, which, they claimed, were invoked by medieval 
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But P48 is not the end of the story, as there is another consequence of Spinozist 
immanence in the attribute of thought, more profound and radical than the denial of distinct 
mental faculties. Spinoza continues: “In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and 
negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” (E II P49 / CWS I.484 / G 
II.130). This claim is surprising, for Spinoza argues that the will is not distinct from the 
understanding. As he says in the corollary, the argument for this proposition amounts to a 
demonstration that “the will and the intellect are one and the same” (E II P49 cor. / CWS I.485 / 
G II.131). I will first turn to his demonstration for the proposition and then the unique 
demonstration he provides for its corollary, before discussing some of the wider ramifications of 
this claim for my argument about the nature of unconscious determination. 
The demonstration has three steps. It refers only to what we have just said about faculties, 
and a single axiom from the beginning of Part II, and can be formalized as follows: 
                                                          
metaphysicians in their efforts to give an account of the interactions of substances, do nothing 
more than (re)name the thing to be explained. Malebranche, for example, considers the question: 
‘why does rhubarb purge bile?’ and derides as explanatorily useless the response that rhubarb 
possesses the ‘purgative’ quality. “Philosophers cannot, through their principles, explain how 
horses pull a chariot […] and brushes clean clothing. For they would make themselves ridiculous 
to everyone if they assumed (the existence of) a motion of attraction and attractive faculties to 
explain why chariots follow the horses to which they are harnessed, and a detersive faculty in 
brushes to clean clothing, and so on with other questions. Thus, their great principles are useful 
only for obscure questions because they are incomprehensible” (SAT VI.II.4 / 455). 
Similarly, Hobbes critiques faculty psychology as a kind of occult quality argument in 
Leviathan: “For cause of the will to do any particular action (which is called volition) they [i.e., 
scholastic philosophers] assign the faculty (that is to say, the capacity in general that men have, 
to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called voluntas), making the power the 
cause of the act (as if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men, their ability to 
do them. And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but 
disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent (that is, of 
things whereof they know no cause; and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities 
(that is, qualities not known to them, and therefore also (as they think), to no man else)” (Thomas 
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994], IV.XLVI.28-29 / 463). 
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1. There are only singular volitions, i.e., particular affirmations and negations, in the mind. 
2. An affirmation or negation necessarily involves the idea of the thing affirmed or denied. 
3. The idea of the thing affirmed or denied necessarily involves this affirmation or negation. 
4. Together, 2 and 3 are supposed to show that the affirmation or negation of a singular 
volition involves nothing other than or outside of the idea of the thing affirmed or denied. 
That is, the volition just is the mind’s understanding of the idea of the thing involved in 
the volition. 
 
As we have seen, Spinoza denies that there is a distinct faculty that involves the power to will or 
not to will. Spinoza argues that when the mind wills, it does so necessarily, as a matter of its 
determination, not out of any free or spontaneous power of volition; and that, strictly speaking, 
there are only individual or singular modes of thought that we call volitions, that is, the mind is 
determined to affirm or to deny something with regard to an idea that it has. Spinoza now asks us 
to conceive some singular volition, and the example he gives is drawn from geometry. Imagine 
the singular mode of thought “by which the Mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right angles” (E II P49 dem. / CWS I.484 / G II.130).  
In steps two and three, Spinoza argues that the will and the understanding are identical by 
showing how each term in the relation involves the other. He approaches this first from the side 
of the will, showing how volitions always already involve ideas. He writes: “this affirmation 
involves the concept, or idea, of the triangle, i.e., it cannot be conceived without the idea of the 
triangle” (Ibid.). This step seems unproblematic, as without an idea of a triangle, it seems 
impossible to conceive of the affirmation that a triangle’s inner angles are equal to two right 
angles. Here Spinoza invokes II Axiom 3: “There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire, 
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or whatever is designated by the word affects of the mind, unless there is in the same Individual 
the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc.” (E II A3 / CWS I.448 / G II.85-6). His formulation of 
the consequence that follows here recalls the axioms from Part I that have to do with the 
ontological status of modes: “this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of 
the triangle” (E II P48 dem. / CWS I.484 / G II.130). In other words, it is impossible to conceive 
of an instance of volition without the idea of the thing involved in that affirmation or negation. 
Although this is so, it is still not obvious that a volition is nothing other than the idea of the thing 
itself. Could it not be the case that a volition ‘adds’ something to an idea, namely, the affirmation 
or negation, which is not already contained in the idea? No, Spinoza replies, for the following 
reason.  
In the third step, he approaches the identity from the side of ideas, showing how ideas 
always already involve volitions. “This idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation, 
viz. that its three angles equal two right angles. So conversely, this idea of the triangle also can 
neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation” (Ibid.). In other words, it is impossible to 
conceive of an idea without affirming that which it involves. The very nature of an idea, 
according to Spinoza, necessarily involves the affirmation of what pertains to it. In the example 
he gives, the nature of the triangle is such that its idea necessarily involves the affirmation that its 
angles are equal to two right angles (in Euclidean space), and the implicit denial of any contrary 
to this affirmation that would be contradictory. In other words, there is nothing that can be said 
to be ‘added’ to the idea involved in the instance of volition. What is affirmed or denied is 
always already involved in the idea insofar as it is understood. 
Spinoza therefore concludes, “this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of the 
triangle, and is nothing beyond it. And what we have said concerning this volition (since we have 
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selected it at random), must also be said concerning any volition, viz. that it is nothing apart from 
the idea” (Ibid.). The argument is that an idea cannot be or be conceived without the affirmation 
of what it involves, and the denial of any affirmation that would be in contradiction with what it 
involves; and that no volition can be or be conceived without the idea of the thing about which 
one makes an affirmation or negation.  
But is this example really ‘selected at random’, as Spinoza claims? For it must be 
admitted that the apparently compulsory character of the necessity of mathematical truths is 
frequently invoked by early modern philosophers as exemplary, and this would therefore seem to 
be a poor example for demonstrating the identity of understanding and volition in general. That 
is, typically when one speaks of volition, one tends to have in mind statements such as I want to 
do some x, which seems to have a different form than I affirm this characteristic of a given idea, 
let alone I affirm x characteristic of y mathematical object. What is at stake are instances of 
volitional desire. Are these also identical to the understanding? Does Spinoza’s argument apply 
in such cases as well? I think that it does, but the argument for why this is the case can only be 
addressed later, after I have clarified the conceptual link between volition (volitio), which is what 
is under discussion here, and desire (cupiditas) as such.  
The corollary to Proposition 49 reads as follows: “The will and the intellect are one and 
the same” (E II P49 cor. / CWS I.485 / G II.131). The demonstration is brief and direct. First, as 
we have seen, the will and the intellect are not distinct faculties, but instead are nothing other 
than singular volitions and ideas. Second, as was just argued in the demonstration to P49, these 
singular volitions and ideas turn out to be identical to one another. Therefore, the will and the 
understanding are just the same thing. This is what I would call Spinoza’s epistemic heresy: not 
only are there no faculties distinct from the mental affections that are typically related to them 
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(no ‘Will’ but only ‘wills’), but also there is no real distinction between the will and the 
understanding. In fact, we can say that the distinction between the will and the understanding is 
imaginary, or is itself an instance of the inadequate first kind of knowledge. From the 
perspective of adequate knowledge, we are able to recognize their actual identity.6 This is the 
case whether the adequate knowledge at play is of the second kind or the third. If it is the second 
kind, knowledge from common notions, we would see that understanding necessarily involves 
affirmation and negation and vice versa, insofar as this is characteristic of all modes in the 
attribute of thought. If it is the third kind, or beatitude, we would affirm that the essence of a 
singular mode of thought necessarily involves a particular understanding and a particular volition 
in just the same way. This is heretical because it undermines the basis on which moral judgments 
about singular volitions can be made. A person wills exactly what is involved in the ideas they 
have, and there is no way to decry their volition on the basis of an understanding that they do not 
have. If we think that the will and the understanding are distinct, two possibilities seem to 
present themselves: either we always do what we understand to be better, or else we are capable 
of doing what we understand to be worse by a sheer act of free will. Spinozist immanence in the 
attribute of thought denies both of these possibilities. 
Lastly, note that for the purposes of the present investigation, my interest lies specifically 
in Spinoza’s claim that human volition and understanding are identical, although it must be 
admitted that Spinoza makes the same identity claim with regard to divine volition and 
understanding. As Heunemann argues, Spinoza’s explicit claim that God’s will is not really 
                                                          
6 I think it would be highly productive and valuable to consider to what extent this manner of 
articulating the stakes of moving from inadequacy to adequacy in Spinozism—the logic by 
which things that are taken to be distinct through inadequate ideas, are understood to be identical 
through more adequate ones—anticipates and differs from Hegel’s conceptualization of 
dialectical negativity, or the identity of identity and nonidentity. 
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distinct from God’s understanding should be read in light of Descartes’ difficulty on the point.7 
Descartes clearly claims that “there is always a single identical and perfectly simple act by 
means of which [God] simultaneously understands, wills, and accomplishes everything” (PP I.23 
/ CSM I.201 / AT VIIIA.14). But elsewhere, while arguing for divine simplicity, Descartes 
seems constrained to treat them as really distinct functions, ultimately seeming to hold that their 
identity-in-difference is akin to theological mysteries like the trinity (e.g., PP I.25 / CSM I.201 / 
AT VIIIA.14). Spinoza recognizes no such difference. What goes for the relation between divine 
intellect and volition also goes for the relation between human intellect and volition. The nature 
of thought is such that they are necessarily identical. That said, it is specifically human volition 
and understanding that we are concerned with here, as it is in this connection that we see 
Spinoza’s theory of determination in the attribute of thought opening onto a concept of the 
unconscious of thought. Besides, as we will see presently, the objections to the identity claim 
that Spinoza considers in the scholium to II P49 all seem to take aim at the idea that specifically 
human volition and understanding are identical, and it is to these objections that he responds 
directly. 
 
3. In Defense of the Identity (Ethics II P49 Scholium) 
Spinoza is certainly aware of the counterintuitive nature of the claim that the will and the 
understanding are identical, as well as its heretical ramifications from the perspective of 
traditional formulations of morality. Indeed, this claim marks a truly radical break with 
Cartesianism. It amounts to a repudiation of Descartes’ entire account of the sources of error in 
                                                          
7 Charles Heunemann, “The Middle Spinoza,” in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, eds. Olli 
Koistinen and John Biro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 211-4. 
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the Fourth Meditation (MFP IV / CSM II.39-41 / AT VII.56-9). Thus, in the scholium, he lays 
out four objections that a philosophically sophisticated reader is likely to raise, and responds to 
each in turn. The objections are as follows: 1. the will is infinite, whereas the understanding is 
finite; 2. by experience, we seem to know that we can suspend our judgment; 3. ideas seem to 
admit of degrees of reality or perfection in a way that volitions in themselves do not; 4. this 
seems to commit Spinoza to accepting an unappealing horn of the the Buridan’s ass dilemma, 
according to which human beings do not differ from animals by virtue of their free will. 
 
1. The first objection is very nearly a paraphrase of Descartes’ Fourth Meditation. The claim 
is that while one can affirm infinitely many things, it is only possible to understand a finite 
number of things. Those who make this objection “think it clear that the will extends more 
widely than the intellect, and so is different from the intellect” (E II P49s / CWS I.486 / G 
II.132). In the meditation, as we saw above (Chapter 1, section 3; Chapter 2, section 1), 
Descartes draws from this the ethical lesson that one should only will—that is, affirm or deny—
with regard to what one clearly and distinctly understands. With regard to what is only obscurely 
or indistinctly understood, one should restrict the will, not rendering any judgment at all, 
refusing to make any affirmations or negations. And this would only be possible if the will and 
the understanding were not identical, but in fact constituted distinct faculties. 
Spinoza replies as follows: “I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, if 
by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny that the will extends more 
widely than perceptions, or the faculty of conceiving” (E II P49s / CWS I.487 / G II.133). First 
of all, notice that Spinoza refers to the domain of unclear and indistinct perceptions as 
constituting a nontrivial part of the determination of a consciously desiring mode of thought. 
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This reference brings Spinoza very close to articulating something like the Leibnizian notion of 
unconscious perceptions, which I analyzed in Chapter 1. Although Spinoza obviously does not 
have the concept of petites perceptions at his disposal, he clearly suggests that even those 
perceptions of which one is not clearly and distinctly aware contribute to the determination of the 
will. 
Spinoza’s claim is that unclear and indistinct perceptions of the mind, or inadequate 
ideas, necessarily involve volition in just the same way as adequate or clear and distinct ones.8 
The key difference is that what one wills based on inadequate ideas involves, according to 
Spinoza, imagined natures and relations, which may not correspond with the real natures of and 
relations between things. For an account of what that looks like, we will need to proceed to Part 
III, whose focus is precisely the forms of the determination of desire or the will insofar as it is 
based on inadequate knowledge or the imagination: that is, the affects. 
Finally, Spinoza asks whether it makes sense to claim that the will is infinite, whereas 
intellect or perception is said to be finite. “For just as we can affirm infinitely many things by the 
same faculty of willing (but one after another, for we cannot affirm infinitely many things at 
once), so also we can sense or perceive, infinitely many bodies by the same faculty of sensing” 
(E II P49s / CWS I.488 / G II.133). That is, the appeal to the infinity of volition is an appeal to its 
potential, not its actual, infinity: one can imagine affirming an infinity of things. But, Spinoza 
says, the apparently ‘finite’ capacity to encounter particular bodies, to sense and perceive 
determinate things, is also potentially infinite in just this sense. Thus if one wants to claim that 
the will is potentially infinite, in that there exists an infinity of possible objects of the will, the 
                                                          
8 This will be argued for directly in III P9: “Both insofar as the Mind has clear and distinct ideas, 
and insofar as it has confused ideas, it strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in its being 
and it is conscious of this striving it has” (E III P9 / CWS I.499 / G II.147). 
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same must be said about perception and the understanding. In other words, Spinoza argues that it 
is inconsistent to attribute actual infinity to the will, but only potential infinity to the 
understanding. Spinoza’s argument works whether or not one wants to attribute infinity, either 
potential or actual, to the will. If one claims that the will is infinite, then so too will be the 
understanding, and if one claims that the understanding is finite, then so too must be the will. 
There is therefore no ground here for affirming their real distinction. 
 
2. Next there is the objection that we seem to be able to suspend our judgment, which again 
echoes the Cartesian suggestion that we intentionally restrict our will in cases of unclear and 
indistinct perceptions, whose possibility, Spinoza says again, seems to be taught to us ‘by 
experience’. But of course, this apparent experience, according to Spinoza, is misleading. The 
suspension of judgment is a necessary determination of the mind, not something in our power as 
a pure faculty of volition.9 
                                                          
9 Whenever Spinoza notes that we have an idea or conception ‘from experience’, this should 
always be read as skeptical if not outright derisive, because experience, which necessarily 
involves the imagination and the inadequate first kind of knowledge, is very nearly misleading 
by definition. But, as we are exploring here, Spinoza nevertheless refuses to deny the force or 
reality of ideas when they lack a rational basis (in the sense I indicated above) and are ‘merely 
taught from experience’. In this regard, too, Spinoza is very close to Hume: what is 
philosophically required is an analysis of the structure of experience, a recognition of the 
epistemic illusions to which we are prone based on that structure, and consequently, as Deleuze 
argues, the development of concrete corrective rules that reflective reason can articulate for the 
purposes of circumventing or allaying these illusions (Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and 
Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, trans. Constantin Boundas [New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1991], in particular ch. 3; and Pure Immanence: Essays on A 
Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 41-3). I will return to these themes in 
Chapter 4. 
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There is another aspect to this second objection that comes into view when we consider 
obviously fictitious ideas. “Someone who feigns a winged horse does not on that account grant 
that there is a winged horse, i.e., they are not on that account deceived unless at the same time 
they grant that there is a winged horse” (E II P49s / CWS I.487 / G II.132-3). Since we seem able 
to imagine things without believing that they really exist, it seems possible for our understanding 
to encompass things that we do not affirm, which again seems to testify to the nonidentity of the 
intellect and the will. Thus these first two objections are the inverse of one another. The first 
argues that there is volition without understanding, and the second argues that there is 
understanding without volition. 
Spinoza flatly denies that understanding without volition is possible. One cannot fail to 
affirm whatever is involved in the ideas one perceives. This is not to say that we never ‘suspend 
our judgment’, which, as he concedes, is something that clearly happens on occasion. Spinoza 
argues that we the correct way to interpret this phenomenon is that “when we say that someone 
suspends judgment, we are saying nothing but that they see that they do not perceive the thing 
adequately. Suspension of judgment, therefore, is really a distinctive kind of perception, not an 
act of free will” (E II P49s / CWS I.488 / G II.134). That is, we ‘suspend our judgment’ in the 
same way that we ‘choose’ the acts that external causes determine us to perform, namely, we 
imagine this to be free, when, in reality, it follows necessarily from the nature of our bodies and 
their actual affections. We occasionally recognize that our ideas are inadequate. When this 
happens, there must be something that points to this inadequacy in the nature of the context of 
ideas in which the inadequate idea itself is situated. In such a case, to use Hasana Sharp’s 
language, something in the ‘ecosystem of ideas’ makes apparent the inadequacy of the idea in 
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question.10 This is why Spinoza, earlier in the scholium, wrote that when someone remains 
satisfied with false ideas, “we do not, on that account, say that they are certain, but only that they 
do not doubt, or that they rest in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that 
their imagination wavers” (E II P49s / CWS I.485 / G II.131). In other words, doubt, or 
recognizing that something in an idea is inadequate, is also a mode of thinking that can only exist 
as necessarily produced by a certain and determinate mode of thought. The mistake, then, is to 
imagine that this kind of doubt can be directly generated freely, as though one could simply 
decide not to affirm an idea present to the mind.  
The example of the winged horse clarifies this. In II P17, Spinoza argued that when the 
human body is affected by a mode that involves the nature of an external body, the mind will 
regard that body as actually existing until or unless that body is affected by a contrary affect, one 
that explicitly excludes the existence or presence of that body (E II P17 / CWS I.463-4 / G 
II.104). We can put this in terms of an idea’s conatus: each idea strives to persevere in its being, 
that is, to increase its power and to engender whatever effects follow from its nature within the 
attribute of thought. But the effects that a mode of thought can produce just are its affirmation in 
thought, and the modes of thought that follow from this affirmation. So a mode of thought, or an 
idea, strives to exist and to produce these effects, and will fail to do so only if some other mode 
of thought whose nature excludes it is present to the same mind, and then only if this latter idea 
is more powerful than the first. So, Spinoza says, if someone were to imagine a winged horse, 
and not perceive anything or imagine anything that would exclude the existence of the horse, 
they “will necessarily regard the horse as present. Nor will they be able to doubt its existence, 
                                                          
10 Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), ch. 2. 
169 
though they will not be certain of it” (E II P49s / CWS I.488 / G II.134). Spinoza’s adherence to 
the principle of sufficient reason demands that doubt only arises in the mind on the basis of some 
actually existing idea. Doubt cannot be spontaneously willed into existence, and it cannot follow 
directly from the idea that would thereby be doubted, no matter how ridiculous it is. 
For what is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of a horse? For if the 
Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as present to 
itself, and would not have any cause of doubting its existence, or any faculty of 
dissenting, unless either the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea 
which excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that its idea of a 
winged horse was inadequate. (Ibid.) 
 
Insofar as they are perceived by the mind, whether adequately or inadequately, Spinoza insists 
that ideas necessarily involve their own affirmation. One cannot even imagine something 
impossible without affirming what this idea involves. If I imagine a square circle, this imaginary 
idea involves its own affirmation. I must affirm that it possesses contradictory characteristics, 
and so that it does not and cannot really exist. Even the idea of this impossibility is a positive, 
determinate mode of thought from which real effects in the mind necessarily follow. 
Finally, Spinoza draws a parallel to dreaming in order to clarify what it means, on his 
account, to say that one ‘suspends judgment’. Frequently, when we have inadequate ideas, we do 
not suspend judgment but simply accept and affirm them; in the same way, we frequently take 
our dreaming states to express really present and existing things. But sometimes we recognize 
that we are only inadequately understanding, and, so to speak, suspend our judgment. As he says, 
this is like when we find that we recognize ourselves to be dreaming while we dream. But this 
does not happen because we put into play some mental faculty of stepping outside of our own 
dreaming states. Rather, something about the perceptions themselves, something about their 
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fantastic nature, and the discordance that this produces with the other ideas that constitute our 
mind, strikes us as inadequate. 
Thus far, Spinoza has denied both that we can will without understanding (objection 1) 
and that we can understand, or perceive, or imagine without volition (objection 2). Even 
obviously impossible, dreamed, fictional, or imaginary ideas necessarily involve their own 
affirmation by the mind that dreams of them, makes them up, or imagines them. This will form 
the entire basis of Part III, in which what is at stake is the determination of desire by imaginary 
and inadequate ideas. Such ideas may in themselves only be false due to a privation, but as 
modes of thought their very positivity involves the determination of the mind to desire and will to 
act in a certain and determinate way. 
 
3. In the third place, one might object, ideas as such seem to admit of degrees of reality or 
perfection, whereas volitions do not. This once again has Cartesian resonances, although they are 
more subterranean this time. It appears to be the case that the more perfection or reality a thing 
has, the more perfection or reality its idea will have (the disputant can even bolster their claim 
here by referring to Ethics II P7, P11, P13 and its scholium, etc.). By contrast, “one affirmation 
does not seem to contain more reality than another, i.e., we do not seem to require a greater 
power to affirm that what is true, is true, than to affirm that something false is true” (E II P49s / 
CWS I.487 / G II.133). This difference, between the differential degrees of reality attributable to 
ideas and the static degree of reality attributed to volitions, would seem to suggest that the will 
and understanding are nonidentical. Spinoza breaks this kind of objection into two separate 
claims: first, that the affirmation and the idea are distinct from one another; second, that an equal 
power of the mind is involved in affirming both that what is true, and that what is false is true. 
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He first responds that the difficulty vanishes once one recognizes that ideas always 
already involve the affirmation of what they positively contain. From the perspective of the 
abstraction called ‘the will’, it might be possible to say that all affirmations are somehow 
identical; but this extremely abstract conception relies precisely on the faculty psychology that 
Spinoza has already criticized. By contrast, from the perspective of the singularity of the mode of 
thought, it is clear that every idea involves a distinct affirmation precisely to the extent that the 
idea is distinct from other modes of thought. He gives an example: “the affirmation that the idea 
of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of 
the circle differs from the idea of the triangle” (E II P49s / CWS I.489 / G II.135). Because 
singular modes of thought involve distinct determinations, or concretely different ideal contents, 
the affirmations they involve must necessarily differ as well. Spinoza therefore denies that 
volition does not admit of degrees of reality or perfection. Though he does not say so explicitly, 
the clear implication is that a volition involving an idea with a greater number of ideal 
determinations must have a greater degree of reality or perfection, insofar as it is a mode of 
thought, than one involving an idea with fewer such determinations. That is, instead of 
evaluating the degree of perfection or reality of an idea versus that of a volition, Spinoza would 
have us evaluate the degree or perfection of a given mode of thought, which can be analytically 
considered in terms of its intellective or its volitional aspects. The error would be to assume that 
this kind of analytic consideration of the different aspects of a mode of thought somehow implies 
their real distinction.  
He then proceeds to the second claim: “I deny absolutely that we require an equal power 
of thinking, to affirm that what is true is true, as to affirm that what is false is true” (Ibid.). He 
refers to II P35: “Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated 
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and confused, ideas involve” (E II P35 / CWS I.472 / G II.116). As he says, there is no positive 
form of falsity, but only a deprivation of what is true; indeed, false ideas necessarily have a 
positive content. Consequently, when we consider the two cases in question—one in which the 
mind affirms that something true is true, and one in which the mind affirms that something false 
is true—it is obvious that in the first case, the mind’s power to think is greater, that is, what it 
thinks involves more reality or perfection, or it is more active; and by contrast, in the second 
case, it is comparatively passive and the idea it conceives is relatively lacking. The alternative to 
this would be to posit that there is exactly as much reality or perfection in the mind’s act of 
affirming that what is false is true as in its act of affirming a true thing as true; but in order for 
that to be the case, by hypothesis, we would in fact be claiming that the mind affirms a truth 
rather than a falsity. Therefore, on pain of contradiction, we must admit that volitions based on 
adequate ideas involve more reality or perfection than volitions based on inadequate ideas or, in 
other words, that the mind is relatively more active in the first case than in the second. This is, 
indeed, the very first proposition of Part III: “Our Mind does certain things [acts] and undergoes 
other things, viz. insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar as 
it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things” (E III P1 / CWS I.493 / G II.140).  
 
4. Finally, one might object, does not this conception of the identity of volition and the idea 
or the will and the understanding commit Spinoza to impaling himself on an unattractive horn of 
the Buridan’s ass dilemma? This infamous thought experiment has one conceive of a hungry 
nonhuman animal positioned at an equal distance from two equally attractive aliments, and then 
ask whether the creature would be able to decide to choose one and proceed to eat it. The two 
horns of the dilemma are as follows: either the animal does have this power, in which case we 
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must attribute free will to it; or else the animal does not have free will, and so it starves to death. 
The objection to Spinoza here is that the claim that one wills only what is involved in the ideas 
that one has seems to commit him to the second horn of the dilemma, and a human being in this 
situation would starve: “I would seem to conceive an ass, or a statue of a human, not a human 
being” (E II IP49s / CWS I.487 / G II.133). If, on the other hand, he allows that a human being in 
that context would proceed to choose one of the options present, then he concedes that human 
beings are capable of free will, understood as a capacity for voluntary self-determination. 
Spinoza leaves no room for confusion on this point: “I grant entirely that a human being 
placed in such an equilibrium (viz. who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food 
and drink as are equally distant from it) will perish of hunger and thirst” (E II P49s / CWS I.490 / 
G II.135). If this horn of the dilemma presents a disturbing possibility for some thinkers, it 
obviously causes no distress for Spinoza.11 
 
Spinoza’s position on this score is extremely clear. Ideas just are volitions; a volition is the 
affirmation of what an idea involves, and the negation of what it does not. In other words, he 
denies absolutely that we can divide ‘modes of thought’ into distinct groups of ‘ideas’ on the one 
hand and ‘volitions’ on the other. My next step will be to show how this relates specifically to 
desire. But already it is worth pointing out that this throws the analysis of the previous chapter 
into a new light: if there are in the mind ideas that are structurally and necessarily inadequate, 
and persistently so, then by this logic we must say that there are structurally and necessarily 
inadequate volitions in the mind as well. To say that a mind has an inadequate idea of a thing, but 
                                                          
11 See Justin Clemens, “Spinoza’s Ass,” in Spinoza Now, ed. Dimitris Vardoulakis (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011), for an extended analysis of the history and structure of this 
dilemma, and Spinoza’s response to it. 
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should nevertheless will something more adequately in relation to it, is an absurdity, akin to 
demanding that a square be circular. Given the persistence of the inadequate, the identity of will 
and understanding means that human minds, which continue to be constituted by and possess 
inadequate ideas even when they manage to form adequate ones, must to that extent continue to 
will in determinate ways that they themselves consciously recognize as inadequate. If inadequate 
ideas do not vanish with the appearance of the adequate, neither will the volitions that these ideas 
immediately involve. These are the very coordinates of the ethical problem of knowledge. 
 
4. The Unconscious of Desire 
What is the difference, for Spinoza, between volition (voluntas) and desire (cupiditas)? As we 
have seen, Spinoza uses volition in Part Two in a very precise and restrictive sense, to refer to 
the affirmation or negation of an idea, which is not distinct from its understanding but is in 
reality identical to it. But when it comes to finite modes across attributes, as we saw in section 4 
of the previous chapter, he grants a much more fundamental ontological or metaphysical status to 
desire, beginning in Part III. “The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is 
nothing but the actual essence of the thing” (E III P7 / CWS I.499 / G II.146).12 Spinoza argues 
                                                          
12 The concept of actual essence (actualem essentiam) appears for the first time here in III P7. In 
Propositions 30 and 31 of Part I Spinoza may have seemed to discuss actual intellects, but this 
appearance is misleading. Spinoza’s formulation there is: “Intellectus, actu finitis aut actu 
infinitus…” (E I P30 and P31 / G II.71). Here actu has the sense of ‘in fact’, qualifying finitus 
and infinitus, and not intellectus, so this should be rendered: ‘An intellect, whether actually finite 
or actually infinite…’ By contrast, Curley translates this as: “An actual intellect, whether finite 
or infinite…” (CWS I.434), citing Gueroult’s authority (Gueroult, Spinoza I: Dieu, 434). (I thank 
Rick Lee for pointing me to this issue.) In the scholium to I P31 Spinoza explained that he had 
used the language of actu “not because I concede that there is any potential intellect, but because, 
wishing to avoid all confusion, I wanted to speak only of what we perceive as clearly as possible, 
i.e., of the intellection itself” (E I P31s / CWS I.435 / G II.67). In other words, this formulation is 
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that this striving of each thing to persevere in its being will continue indefinitely, rather than for 
a determinate period of time (E III P8 / CWS I.499 / G II.146). Next he hones in on the 
specificity of human minds, and argues that they seem to have the added distinction of being 
conscious of the striving that they are: “Both insofar as the Mind has clear and distinct ideas, and 
insofar as it has confused ideas, it strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in its being and 
it is conscious of this striving it has” (E III P9 / CWS I.499 / G II.147). And in the scholium to 
this proposition he draws a series of analytic or heuristic distinctions: 
When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will [voluntas]; but when it is 
related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite [appetitus]. This Appetite, 
therefore, is nothing but the very essence of the human being, from whose nature there 
necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation. And so the human being is 
determined to do those things. 
 
Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related 
to human beings insofar as they are conscious of their appetites. So desire [cupiditas] is 
                                                          
strategic, and is not meant to suggest a distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ intellects; 
rather, it is simply meant to underscore that the thing in question is taken to exist.  
Similarly, Spinoza invokes the notion of actuality in Part Two in his discussion of ideas 
of singular things, but there he refers only to actual existence, and not to actual essence: “The 
idea of a singular thing which actually exists [Idea rei singularis actu existentis] has God for a 
cause not insofar as God is infinite, but insofar as God is considered to be affected by another 
idea of a singular thing which actually exists” (E II P11 / CWS I.453 / G II.91-2). He comes 
closer to the concept of actual essence a few propositions later: “The first thing that constitutes 
the actual being of a human Mind [actuale mentis humanae esse] is nothing but the idea of a 
singular thing which actually exists [rei alicujus singularis actu existentis]” (E II P11 / CWS 
I.456 / G II.94). Here again, however, ‘actual’ is a qualifier drawing our attention to the 
existence of the thing in question, and does not in any way qualify its essence. That actual is a 
reference to or qualifier of existence, whether as rei or existentiae, remains true throughout the 
rest of Part Two (see E II P13, P17, P26, P45 and their demonstrations).  
Consequently, actualem essentiam is a genuinely new concept when it appears here in 
this early proposition of Part Three, and it plays a central role in Spinoza’s theory of conatus and 
his formulation of desire as distinct from volition. 
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appetite together with consciousness of the appetite. (E III P9s / CWS I.500 / G II.147-
8)13 
 
Spinoza’s claim is not that appetite deserves the name of desire only when we are fully conscious 
of it, because this is actually impossible, and this impossibility follows as a consequence of the 
necessary and persistent inadequacy of our modes of self-understanding at the very least. That is, 
since, as we have seen, there are aspects of self-understanding that are necessarily inadequate 
and which therefore involve ideas of which we are unconscious, we are therefore similarly 
conscious of some aspects of our own appetite or desire and unconscious of other aspects. If we 
were fully conscious of and in possession of adequate knowledge of the natures of our mind and 
body, then we would also have fully conscious adequate knowledge of our desires—but this, as 
II P24-31 showed us, is not possible. Therefore, Spinoza’s claim is that we are conscious of 
certain aspects of our striving, but not all of them, and this complex of conscious and 
unconscious ideas is desire; by contrast, appetite names the striving itself, entirely irrespective of 
whether one is conscious of it at all. 
This may seem like a sleight of hand, but Spinoza himself suggests that we should 
understand him in this way. At the end of Part III, he provides a comprehensive enumeration of 
affects and defines each them in turn. The very first definition of the affects reads: “Desire is the 
very essence of the human being, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given 
affection of it, to do something” (E III DA I / CWS I.531 / G II.290). To this definition, Spinoza 
adds a substantial explanation: 
                                                          
13 Translation modified. “Cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia” (G II.148), which is a 
direct assertion. Curley significantly weakens this formulation: “desire can be defined as appetite 
together with consciousness of the appetite” (CWS I.500). See my discussion of Spinoza’s 
definitions in the previous chapter; and Klein, “By Eternity I Understand”. 
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We said above, in P9S, that Desire is appetite together with the consciousness of it. And 
appetite is the very essence of the human being, insofar as it is determined to do what 
promotes his preservation. 
 
But in the same scholium I also warned that I really recognize no difference between 
human appetite and Desire. For whether a human being is conscious of its appetite or not, 
the appetite still remains one and the same. (E III DA I exp. / CWS I.531 / G II.190; 
emphasis added) 
 
According to Spinoza’s own argument, then, desire has an unconscious component, even though 
his formulation of the definition in the scholium to III P9 might have led one to think that desire 
is defined as having an essential relation to consciousness. Indeed, here his language suggests 
that consciousness does not pertain to the essence of desire at all, and that it is necessary to posit 
a cause for the consciousness of desire distinct from desire itself. He continues: 
I could have said that Desire is man’s very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be 
determined to do something [that is, without the subordinate clause ‘from any given 
affection of it’]. But from this definition (by IIP23) it would not follow that the mind 
could be conscious of its Desire, or appetite. (Ibid.) 
 
The proposition to which he refers here argues that the mind can know itself only in and through 
its affections—that is, that it does not have unmediated access to itself, but can only indirectly 
grasp its own nature through how it is expressed in its encounters with others. This is why, as 
Spinoza argues in P29 and its corollary and scholium, the mind is commonly determined to have 
only inadequate ideas of itself; for as Deleuze puts it, “the inadequate idea always has to do with 
a mixture of things, and only retains the effect of one body on another.”14 Spinoza is being 
extremely careful with his phrasing here, because if in this definition of desire he did not include 
the reference to determination by a given affection, it would actually follow that it would not 
even be possible for the mind to become conscious of such desire at all. “Therefore, in order to 
                                                          
14 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 68. 
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involve the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same proposition) to add: 
insofar as it is conceived, from some given affection of it, to be determined etc.” (E III DA I exp. 
/ CWS I.531 / G II.190).  
We can only become conscious of the nature of our own mind, of our own determination 
and desire, in and through specific and particular affections and the ideas we form of them; 
desire remains fully determinate and positive, objective and determinative, whether or not we are 
conscious of some aspect of it through our ideas of our own affections. As Lorenzo Vinciguerra 
puts it: “If it is true that the body exists such as we perceive it [sentons], this does not mean that 
it also exists such as we are conscious of it [en avons conscience]. One must attend to this 
difference, which turns out to be necessary to understand the redefinition of cupiditas in the first 
definition of the affects.”15 This distinction also underlies how we must understand Spinoza 
when he discusses infants in the scholium to P6 of Part V, who “live so many years, as it were, 
unconscious of themselves [quasi sui inscius]” (E V P6s / CWS I.600 / G II.285), since he 
obviously does not hold that infants do not perceive, and clearly thinks that they desire.16 
Even if we assume the ideally best possible case in which we form all and only adequate 
ideas whenever their formation is possible, there are two ways in which inadequate ideas remain 
operative in the determination of the mind, as I argued in the previous chapter. The first is that 
there are things of which we can only form inadequate ideas. The second is that even in cases 
                                                          
15 Lorenzo Vinciguerra, Spinoza et le signe. La genèse de l’imagination (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 68 
(my translation). 
 
16 For a detailed analysis of Spinoza’s concept of infancy, and especially the apparently 
contradictory infans adultus (E IV P39s / CWS I.569 / G II.240) as an extraordinarily productive 
point of entry into Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas and politics, see François Zourabichvili, Le 
conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza. Enfance et royauté (Paris: PUF, 2004), especially chs. 3-5. 
179 
where we can in fact form adequate ideas of things, this formation is not itself sufficient to 
eliminate the inadequate ideas of them that we already possess. In both cases, the conatus of the 
inadequate ideas necessarily involved in our minds, their striving to produce the effects that 
follow from their own nature, will persistently continue to play a role in determining what we 
affirm and deny. Under these conditions, our desire or striving is determined not only by those 
ideas that we understand consciously but also by those of which we necessarily remain 
unconscious. In other words, in the constitution of the mode of thought that is an individual 
human mind, unconscious determinations play no less vital a role than conscious ones. The 
ineluctable necessity by which unconscious ideas are involved in the mind entails that desire is 
persistently determined by the imagination even when adequate ideas are formed, grasped, and 
consciously affirmed in their necessary truth. 
Spinozist desire, then, is profoundly unconscious. It is the actual essence, the concrete 
and determinate form of striving to persevere, of an individual person. But the particular nature 
of this striving is determined by the totality of ideas, adequate and inadequate, that constitute the 
mind, and all that they obscurely involve. There is nothing that anyone does that fails to express 
this desire in some way, even under conditions of extreme coercion. At the outer limit of such 
imposition, a person’s desire or actual essence is destroyed by the superior force of external 
causes incompatible with their striving as such, and they die: “No one, therefore, unless they are 
defeated by causes external, and contrary, to their nature, neglects to seek their own advantage, 
or to preserve their being” (E IV P20s / CWS I.557 / G II.224). In and through the things that 
one does, one’s desire is manifest, and can be made explicit objects of consciousness; the 
knowledge of an effect necessarily involves knowledge of its cause, and from the manner in 
which I affect others and am affected I must necessarily form an inadequate idea of the 
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unconscious desire that, as my own actual essence, is its partial cause. And this inadequacy of 
my knowledge of my own desire cannot possibly be eliminated. Spinoza holds that “the human 
being is conscious of itself through the affections by which it is determined to act” (E III P30 
dem. / CWS I.510-11 / G II.163). Any idea I form on the basis of how I affect and am affected 
by others must obscurely involve both the natures of myself and of others; there are no immanent 
criteria for distinguishing between what in this idea pertains exclusively to my essence, and what 
pertains exclusively to the essence of others. This holds even in the case of active joy, where the 
ideas formed can only be adequate, because the adequate ideas formed under those conditions 
are of some nature common to myself and the external thing, and not any of the singular things 
involved in the encounter (E II P16, P19, and P37 / CWS I.463, 466, and 474 / G II.103, 107, and 
118). And it is a direct consequence of Spinoza’s metaphysics that no ideas of an actual essence 
in its ostensibly ‘pure’ state, of a desire but not insofar as it is affected or modified, can even 
conceivably be formed, because this kind of pure, unmodified desire is strictly impossible, 
metaphysically speaking. Spinoza teaches us that one’s desire is in fact almost entirely 
unconscious, an unknown vector along which power is expressed in the endless play of actions 
and passions, the integral striving of the obscure set of adequate and inadequate ideas that 
constitute the mind as a whole.  
None of this should discourage us from seeking to form adequate ideas of ourselves. 
Indeed, if Spinoza is right, we metaphysically cannot help but continue to do so. But the 
conditions of the concrete determination of the mind will always prevent us from understanding 
our own desiring natures with total adequacy. No matter how adequate our self-understanding 
becomes, our desires will always involve an unconscious remainder. There will always be ideas 
of which we are not conscious and which yet play important roles in determining our desires, and 
181 
to that extent, we will be unavoidably passive and, in Spinoza’s sense, even sad. This result 
hardly fits with the caricatured portrait of Spinoza, the naively affirmative thinker of joyful 
becoming. The Ethics is a systematic monument to absolute rationalism, the coincidence of joy 
and understanding, the power and beatitude of lives led in common and under the guidance of 
reason; and yet it also testifies in no uncertain terms, and from the start, to the impotent limits of 
reason, the necessary obscurity of causes, the inevitability of unconscious determination and 
akratic desire, of lives unreasonably led, of confusion and sadness. But it would be a mistake to 
grasp these two poles of Spinozism as though they were extrinsically related or accidental; 
rather, they intrinsically and necessarily implicate and complete one another, in a reciprocally 
conditioning systematic unity. In these two chapters, I have almost exclusively explored the 
more negative aspects of Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas in terms of their consequences for the 
epistemic limits of consciousness and the obscurity of desire, and this might perhaps give a one-
sidedly negative impression of Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas. But Spinoza himself speaks to 
the practical necessity of this kind of focus on the negative, the inadequate, the involuntary, the 
unconscious: 
I do not say these things in order to infer that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or 
that there is no difference between the fool and the man who understands when it comes 
to moderating the affects. My reason, rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both 
our nature’s power and its lack of power, so that we can determine what reason can do in 
moderating the affects, and what it cannot do. (E IV P17s / CWS I.553-4 / G II.221) 
 
A practical ethics of knowledge requires a systematic account of the necessary limits and 
impotence of the mind, in order to genuinely affirm its real powers and constitute it as a site of 
joyful exploration. This is just what we find in Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas. 
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Chapter 4 
Passages of the Mind 
The Unconscious of Habit in Hume 
 
Thus far, I have argued that there is an unconscious of thought at the level of perception and at 
the level of ideas and desire, as attested to by my readings of Leibniz and Spinoza. But even if 
one were to allow that there are unconscious perceptions and desires, it might be thought that 
there is at least one aspect of thought in which consciousness cannot be denied: namely, thinking 
itself, the very movement of thought, the mental process by which the mind understands and 
believes; at least this, one might think, must be a matter of consciousness. But David Hume 
reformulates the way in which we conceive of the movement of thought: it consists, he tells us, 
in the mind’s passage from one idea to another. And it turns out that, in many ways, these 
passages are neither immediately conscious nor even readily available to conscious reflection: 
the mind passes from one idea to another on the basis of mental habits that are formed 
unconsciously, those habituated ideal passages are unconsciously and involuntarily taken, and 
even direct reflection on them does not clearly reveal the logic of ideal passage or the 
mechanisms of thinking. In particular, there are no beliefs that do not involve these unconscious 
habits of thought; and Hume argues that nearly every movement of the mind is a matter of belief, 
rather than knowledge. In short, habits, which are ubiquitous, turn out to be unconscious. 
This might come as something of a surprise. After all, what could be better known to the 
mind than its own operations, its own movements? And yet, Hume teaches us that we hardly 
understand how the mind works. What we can legitimately do, he suggests, is articulate the 
movements of thought in terms of what he calls the principles of association: resemblance, 
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contiguity, and causation. The mind seems to pass from one idea to another on the basis of these 
ideas standing in a relation to one another according to one of these principles: the idea of the 
Washington monument leads my mind to imagine the obelisks of ancient Egypt; the idea of a 
street leads my mind to imagine that of the sidewalk; the idea of fire leads my mind to imagine 
the heat that I believe it must cause. Even before we ask after the logical necessity of the causal 
relation that is said to obtain between the fire and its heat—a necessity that Hume, like 
Malebranche, will fervently deny—in each case we are dealing with an imaginary production, a 
movement of ideal transit whose operative principles remain stubbornly opaque, even when 
subjected to critical reflection. In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), Philo takes 
it as given that we do not really understand the logic of natural phenomena like the growth of 
plants or the instinctual behaviors of animals, but objects that the logic of reasoning is similarly 
obscure: “reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or 
vegetation […] The effects of these principles are all known to us from experience: But the 
principles themselves, and their manner of operation, are totally unknown” (DNR VII / 80).  
Everyone knows, as Deleuze says, what is obviously meant by ‘David Hume’ and 
‘empiricism’.1 But this obviousness is precisely why we should pause to ask whether or not the 
received wisdom corresponds to the real movement of Hume’s empiricism itself. The critique of 
innate ideas is not unique to Hume, which he shares with Aristotle and Locke,2 nor is the 
commonplace that knowledge for the empiricist is ‘based on experience’. Kant rightly saw that 
with Hume, empiricism takes on a singular new depth with the critique of knowledge of 
                                                          
1 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 35-6. 
 
2 See, e.g., Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 100a; Metaphysics 993a; and LEHU I.II-III; II.I.  
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causation.3 According to Hume, we do not and cannot have rational knowledge of causes. All 
that we know, all that can possibly be given in experience, are effects, and our inferences from 
them back to their ostensible causes are always less than rationally grounded. Deleuze has 
suggested that the formula for Hume’s empiricism is that relations are external to their terms.4 I 
might suggest a slightly different formula: causes can never be given. From the perspective of 
conscious thought, the causes and causal relations involved in synthetic claims about matters of 
fact must always remain unknown, obscure fictions of the imagination, never given as such and 
not even rationally deducible. These passages of the mind beyond the given, or effective belief in 
the existence and nature of things, are based on an involuntary process of habituation and 
habitual repetition that has no essential relationship with consciousness. 
In this chapter, I will begin by considering Hume’s argument for the ubiquity of belief; 
this involves showing why claims about matters of fact cannot be either intuitively or 
demonstratively certain. Claims concerning matters of fact are therefore not knowledge but are 
beliefs, and beliefs always involve the relation of causality at several levels. Once this is 
established, I reconstruct Hume’s multifaceted assault on knowledge of causation, which I break 
down into three distinct critiques: he articulates a critique of knowledge of empirical causal 
relations, a transcendental critique of knowledge of causation as a relation, and a metacritique of 
causation, or an exhaustive negative analysis of the possible origins or sources of knowledge of 
causes. The upshot of this critique, I show, is that relations of causation, and consequently all 
claims about matters of fact, are matters of belief, and this shifts the terms of Hume’s question. It 
                                                          
3 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Second Edition), trans. Paul Carus 
and James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 3-5. 
 
4 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 17-8. 
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becomes necessary to ask after the basis of belief, since beliefs are not rationally demonstrable. 
The answer to this question is habit, which I explore in the third section; I there argue that habit 
is a principle of synthesis without which conscious thought would be impossible, and that as an 
synthetic principle it is essentially unconscious. In the fourth section I discuss the problem of 
correction, that is, whether and how it is possible to ‘fix’ beliefs, arguing that only habit itself 
can be mobilized to correct the excesses of habit, and that once again this process of correction 
often takes place unconsciously. I suggest that if we consider habit in these terms, we gain a 
sense both for the unconscious of thought as an activity or process, and also for the inherent 
limits of conscious reflection on these processes. 
 
1. Ideal Relations and Association 
Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature (1738) by making an immediate distinction between 
two kinds of “perceptions of the human mind”: impressions, which includes “sensations, 
passions and emotions”, and ideas, the “faint images of these in thinking and reasoning (T I.I.I / 
1). The difference between them, he argues, “consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with 
which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness” (Ibid.). 
Impressions are forceful and vibrant; ideas are their faint copies, reproduced in the mind in their 
original order in memory, and disarticulated from one another in the imagination (T I.I.III / 8-
10). With this, Hume has already set the coordinates for reframing processes of thought in terms 
of passages of the mind. While memory is restricted to reproducing ideas in the same order and 
connection as their original impressions, with more or less accuracy, by contrast the imagination 
does not seem to be bound by any such restriction. He establishes as its anarchic principle “the 
liberty of the imagination to transpose and changes its ideas” (T I.I.III / 10).  
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The problem is that the imagining mind does not in fact seem to be nearly as anarchic as 
this liberty might suggest. It seems, rather, to follow observably regular patterns in terms of the 
ideas that it imagines. “Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou’d join 
them; and ’tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they 
commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one 
idea naturally introduces another” (T I.I.IV / 10). Hume calls these patterns the ‘principles of 
association’. These associations are neither simply random, as though there were no relation 
between the associated ideas, nor expressive of an inviolable necessity, as though they were in 
fact inseparable. We should, he says, regard them as a “gentle force” (Ibid.). The principles of 
association that he lists are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. In the Treatise he 
presents this enumeration simply, implying that it is definitive and final, whereas in the Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (1748) he is somewhat more reserved, suggesting that we 
might remain open to the possibility that other principles could perhaps be discovered—although 
these seem to be the only three he ever mentions (EHU III.3 / 20). 
In both discussions, Hume moves immediately to give examples of the three principles of 
association, and notes that they can enter into increasingly complex combinations with one 
another. In the Treatise, he then draws an analogy between this ‘gentle force’, by which ideas are 
related to one another, and gravity, precisely in order to underscore that these associations of 
ideas are effects whose causes we do not and cannot know:  
Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as 
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. 
Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, 
and must be resolv’d into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to 
explain. (T I.I.IV / 13) 
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This will be a constant refrain in Hume’s empiricism: the minimal systematicity, the orderliness, 
of ideas in the mind strongly suggests that some principle of ordering is at work; but this 
principle, its ostensible cause, is not something that we can know. Even before he enters directly 
into the analysis of the relation of cause and effect, he is willing to describe the operations of the 
mind as orderly effects whose ordering causes are unknown, neither given directly in experience 
nor indirectly accessible via conscious reflection. In other words, we are already entering the 
vertiginous terrain of Humean reflection, or self-reflexivity. The association of ideas by these 
principles, he will argue, are habits, effects of some mental process. But since we have listed 
‘causation’ as one of the principles of association, the idea of causation must itself be an effect of 
habituation. This self-reflexivity concerning the idea of causation is not an accident or an 
oversight, but is what grants Hume’s empiricism its peculiar depth.5 
Before we proceed to Hume’s discussion of causation in the next section, let me explain 
why it is such a central concept of his philosophical endeavor, which I would put in terms of its 
unavoidable involvement in any possible synthetic proposition, or any claim concerning matters 
of fact. In short, causation is implicitly involved in nearly every mental operation or movement 
of thought. It is necessarily at work in every thought that has to do with any matters of fact. In 
the Enquiry, Hume distinguishes between ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’ (EHU IV.1-4 / 
                                                          
5 Annette Baier says that, in an unsent letter, Hume allusively claims to have had some kind of 
revelation early in his life, indicating an entryway into a ‘whole new scene of thought’. Baier 
rules out some suggestions for what this may have meant, before writing: “I think that Hume’s 
new scene of thought more likely concerned the possibility of turning mental states on 
themselves, a project his Treatise is devoted to. This includes beliefs about belief, as well as 
passions concerning passions, and sentiments regarding sentiment” (Annette Baier, “Reflexivity 
and Sentiment in Hume’s Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. Paul Russell [New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016], 55). On Baier’s account, this meta-reflexive project 
essentially fails until the efforts of Book III, with the theory of moral sentiments. 
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28-9), a distinction that maps onto his dividing the seven ‘philosophical relations’ of the Treatise 
into two classes (T I.III.I-II / 69-78).6  
Relations of Ideas 
“such as depend entirely on the ideas, which 
we compare together” (T I.III.I / 69) 
Matters of Fact  
“such as may be chang’d without any change 
in the ideas” (T I.III.I / 69) 
Resemblance Identity 
Contrariety Relation in space and time 
Degrees of a common quality Causation 
Proportions of quantity or in number  
Table 1. Hume's Relations 
In the Treatise, Hume argues that the first four kinds of relation—resemblance, contrariety, 
degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number—are entirely determined by their relata 
(T I.III.I / 70). For example, I can say that there is a relation of resemblance between two 
particular objects of experience; but if either or both of those two objects undergo some change, 
the relation between them will change as well, perhaps to the point that it no longer obtains at all. 
This is why I hesitate to accept Deleuze’s formula for Humean empiricism (‘relations are 
external to their terms’) in an unqualified sense. These first four kinds of relations in fact seem to 
be internal to their terms. Hume himself suggests that knowledge of or propositions about these 
                                                          
 
6 Georges Dicker argues that there is a substantial conceptual difference in Hume’s critique of 
sufficient reason in the Treatise, where the theory of relations plays a crucial role, and in the 
Enquiry, where it does not appear at all (Georges Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and 
Metaphysics: An Introduction [New York: Routledge, 1998], 135). I side instead with Helen 
Beebee, who, by contrast, argues that although Hume “does not mention philosophical relations 
at all in the Enquiry […] it is clear that he still has more or less the same underlying view in the 
later work” (Helen Beebee, Hume on Causation [New York: Routledge, 2006], 19). 
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relations are analytic. “’Tis from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, 
which its three angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea 
remains the same” (T I.III.I / 69). Similarly, in the first Enquiry, Hume writes: “Propositions of 
this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is 
anywhere existent in the universe” (EHU IV.1 / 28). He describes the affirmations in these 
propositions as being “either intuitively or demonstratively certain” (Ibid.). We will return 
momentarily to the other kinds of relations, but first let us consider what Hume means by these 
two kinds of certainty. 
‘Intuitive’ certainty is said to attend knowledge of the first three of these relations: 
resemblance, contrariety, and degrees in quality. “When any objects resemble each other, the 
resemblance will at first strike the eye, or rather the mind; and seldom requires a second 
examination. The case is the same with contrariety, and with degrees of any quality” (T I.III.I / 
70). There is a kind of immediacy, and indeed indemonstrability, involved in knowledge of and 
claims about these relations. I cannot ‘demonstrate’ a resemblance or a contrariety, it is simply 
‘there’ or it is not, “without any enquiry or reasoning” (Ibid.). ‘Demonstrative’ certainty, which 
attends mathematical relations, is a slightly more complicated affair. It clearly has to do with 
quantitative relations. In the Treatise, Hume is willing to attribute this sort of certainty to 
arithmetic and algebraic relations, while he denies that geometric propositions have any such 
certainty at all. The difference, he says, is that in arithmetic and algebra we have at our disposal 
“a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers” (T I.III.I / 
71), so that the veracity of the conclusions we reach by deductive chains of mathematical 
reasoning remains assured no matter how arbitrarily long or complicated they are. By contrast, 
“’tis for want of such a standard of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem’d a 
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perfect and infallible science.” (Ibid.). This skepticism concerning the scientific status of 
geometry puts Hume in good company. It is precisely its reliance on concepts derived from the 
intuition of extension, which seems to lack an intrinsic measure, that made the infinitesimal 
calculus epistemologically suspect for mathematicians and philosophers of science from the 
seventeenth until the twentieth century.7 However, notably, Hume appears to walk back his 
reservations about geometry in the first Enquiry, where he tells us that “geometry, algebra, and 
arithmetic” are the sciences of relations of ideas (EHU IV.1 / 28). Leaving aside the question 
posed by the equivocal epistemic status of geometric knowledge in his work,8 Hume in any case 
seems to think that demonstrative certainty is ultimately reducible to intuitive certainty, but 
mediated by the principle of non-contradiction. In that case, I intuitively grasp the equality of 
two determinate numerical magnitudes (the ‘precise standard’) that a complicated, unintuitive 
chain of demonstrative reasoning confirms by means of the principle of non-contradiction. And 
                                                          
7 See Carl Boyer, The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1949), e.g., 269-70. This skepticism is not entirely unfounded. For example, 
it is possible to construct, as Bernard Bolzano did in 1837, a function that, while continuous 
everywhere, is nowhere differentiable—representable on a Cartesian coordinate plane as a 
continuous curve that has no tangents—which clearly flies directly in the face of geometric 
intuition. Clearly, if geometry is to be ‘scientific’, its concepts cannot simply be based on 
intuitions about the nature of continuous magnitudes.  
More generally, intuitions about the ideal infinite divisibility of extension provide 
occasions for all kinds of metaphysical speculation that Hume is by no means alone in 
considering suspect if not illegitimate. For an example of such speculation, consider Descartes’ 
argument for the metaphysical impossibility of atoms, or indivisible parts of matter, which is 
predicated on the intuition that extension is infinitely divisible (PP II.20 / CSM I.231-2 / AT 
VIIIA.51-2).  
 
8 For more on Hume’s apparent change of heart on the epistemic status of geometric propositions 
between the Treatise and the Enquiry, see Alexander Rosenberg, “Hume and the philosophy of 
science,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. Robert Fate Norton (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 80-4; and Robert Fogelin, “Hume and Berkeley on the 
Proofs of Infinite Divisibility,” The Philosophical Review 97:1 (1998): 47-69, esp. 56-9. 
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in any event, whether the certainty involved in a proposition concerning these four relations is 
intuitive or demonstrative, these propositions are all undeniably analytic, expressing only the 
intrinsic relations that necessarily obtain between given ideas.9 
What kind of certainty is involved in propositions about matters of fact, or claims about 
the other three philosophical relations, namely identity, spatial or temporal position, or 
causation? In brief, Hume’s answer is: none. First of all, as he is quick to point out in the 
Enquiry, the “contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a 
contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so 
conformable to reality” (EHU IV.1 / 28-9). If intuitive certainty is somehow indemonstrable but 
is immediately apparent, and demonstrative certainty involves the principle of non-contradiction, 
and if there are no other kinds of certainty, then there can be no certainty about these relations at 
all. This is because these kinds of relations are necessarily external to their terms: they “depend 
not upon the idea, and may be absent or present even while that remains the same” (T I.III.II / 
73). Claims about relations that are not intrinsic, but are rather external, to the terms they are said 
to modify are, precisely, synthetic, and not analytic. Therefore, ‘knowledge’ about matters of fact 
is necessarily synthetic.10 
                                                          
9 See Beebee, Hume on Causation, 18-21; and Robert Fogelin, Hume’s Skeptical Crisis: A 
Textual Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11-2. 
 
10 I put ‘knowledge’ in scare-quotes because, as we will see, such claims are not in fact 
knowledge for Hume but are beliefs. If in what follows I occasionally refer to ‘synthetic 
knowledge’, ‘knowledge about matters of fact’, etc., I do not mean to suggest that any 
propositions concerning matters of fact can meet the strict epistemic criteria for knowledge that 
Hume defines; rather this manner of expression simply accords with the psychological fact, 
which Hume analyzes, according to which I cannot help acting as though ‘it is cold outside 
today’ counts as some ‘knowledge’ I have rather than as a mere ‘belief’ that I hold. 
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Hume now makes the further claim that all knowledge about matters of fact necessarily 
involves causation. We know that the relations involved are external to their terms, and, 
consequently, that propositions about them are synthetic. When we think that such a relation 
obtains between two things that are actually present, whose relata are presently given, “we call 
this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any 
action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro’ the organs of 
sensation” (Ibid.). The activity of thought consists in the mind’s passage beyond the given. 
According to this way of thinking, we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the 
observations we may make concerning identity, and the relations of time and place; since 
in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either 
to discover the real existence or the relations of objects. ’Tis only causation, which 
produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one 
object, that ’twas follow’d or preceded by any other existence or action; nor can the other 
two relations be ever made use of in reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are 
affected by it. (T I.III.II / 73-4) 
 
It is not even thinking, in other words, to make the trivial affirmation that a thing presently given 
to the mind is identical to itself. And as soon as I make a non-trivial claim that something is self-
identical, that is, as soon as I affirm that the relation of identity obtains between something 
presently given and something not given, this would indeed constitute thinking, but such an 
affirmation necessarily involves the relation of causation. Here my mind passes beyond the 
impressions presently given to it, synthetically affirming that the same thing is their identical 
cause in each case. As we will see, such an affirmation, this synthetic passage of the mind 
beyond the given, is surely thinking, but it cannot be knowledge. It is unavoidably a belief, a 
habit of thought.11 Any “conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only 
                                                          
11 This is the sense in which Jacobi provocatively argues that Hume is a great advocate for faith, 
and not its adversary. See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and 
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on the connexion of cause and effect; nor can we otherwise have any security, that the object is 
not chang’d upon us, however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly 
present to the senses” (T I.III.II / 74). Hume reaches the same result in the Enquiry: “All 
reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By 
means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses” (EHU 
IV.4 / 29). As Beebee puts it: “if our reasoning concerning ‘matters of fact’—what is going on 
out there in the world—is to have any epistemic legitimacy, it must be causal reasoning.”12  
To summarize, according to Hume, certainty, whether intuitive or demonstrative, is 
involved only in those claims that pertain to the intrinsic relations that obtain between ideas 
considered in themselves. This is an extremely restrictive set of claims, meeting an 
extraordinarily strict set of criteria. It should therefore come as no surprise that his discussion of 
such claims is so brief in both the Treatise and the Enquiry. He holds that all instances of 
synthetic knowledge fail to meet these criteria. Even the most absolutely minimal, nontrivial 
knowledge about existing things, knowledge concerning the relations that obtain between things 
as matters of fact, is uncertain: neither demonstratively certain, because its contrary cannot 
involve any contradiction, nor intuitively certain, because it is by definition synthetic knowledge, 
involving the mind’s passage beyond the given. It is not just that such claims can involve a 
passage beyond what happens to be given to the mind. Insofar as knowledge involves the relation 
of cause and effect, it is a passage beyond the given as such. As we will see in the next section, 
                                                          
Realism, A Dialogue, in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, ed. and trans. 
George di Giovanni (Québec: McGill-Queen’s Univeristy Press, 2009), e.g., 268-74. 
 
12 Helen Beebee, “Hume and the Problem of Causation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. 
Paul Russell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 229. I think ‘epistemic legitimacy’ is a 
potentially misleading formulation here, for reasons that should become clear in what follows. 
194 
Hume argues that neither causality as a relation, nor causes as such, can possibly be given in 
experience. 
 
2. Secret Powers: Hume’s Critiques of Causation 
Hume’s rigorous critique of knowledge of causation is undertaken at several distinct levels. First, 
there is the critique of empirical instances of causal knowledge, in which Hume shows that there 
can be no certainty in the knowledge of any particular causal relation that the mind posits. I call 
this the critique of empirical knowledge of causation. Next, there is the critique of rationalism’s 
pretension to know with any certainty the validity or necessity of the principle of sufficient 
reason itself, in which Hume shows that there can be no rational basis for certainty regarding the 
principle that everything must have a cause. I call this the transcendental critique of causation. 
Finally, there is the critique of our idea of causation as an idea that must have some cause; Hume 
shows that we cannot have any direct experience of what could be the cause of our knowledge of 
causation. I call this the metacritique of causation. Before exploring these in detail, let me lay 
out the concept of causality as Hume understands it. 
Hume contends that the concept of causation must involve the following three essential 
features: contiguity, priority, and necessary connection. First, causality involves contiguity: 
“whatever objects are consider’d as causes or effects, are contiguous; and that nothing can 
operate in a time or place, which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence” (T I.III.II / 
75). In other words, there can be no action at a distance. Some form of contact is a prerequisite 
for causation. Second, the concept involves the “PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect” 
(T I.III.II / 76). Hume thinks that this should be obvious. However, he notes that some thinkers 
allow for the possibility of a cause immediately producing its effect, such that the two are 
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contemporaneous rather than successive. Indeed, this seems to be a fair characterization of how 
Spinoza conceives of the causal relation that obtains between God or nature as absolute 
substance and the immediate infinite modes that follow from it eternally (E I P21-23 / CWS 
I.429-31 / G II.65-7).13 Hume’s argument against contemporaneous causation is that, if it were 
possible, there would simply be no succession at all. If causation or the production of effects 
could occur all at once, then all effects would be immediately given; and consequently, there 
would be no way to account for why things occur successively in time: “there wou’d be no such 
thing as succession, and all objects must be co-existent” (T I.III.II / 76). But he also quickly 
notes that if this argument is unsatisfying, this does not amount to a serious issue; as we will see, 
the critique of knowledge of causality that he is about to lay out does not depend essentially on 
this aspect, but on the third and final one. 
That third feature is necessary connection. The fact that two things are contiguous and 
successive is necessary, but clearly not sufficient, for our attributing a causal relation between 
them: “An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being consider’d as its cause. 
There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much 
greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention’d” (T I.III.II / 77). This feature of 
the concept of causation, as many have noted,14 is one that Hume adopts directly from 
Malebranche, who wrote in The Search after Truth (1675): “A true cause such as I understand it 
                                                          
13 See above, Note 1 to Chapter 3. 
 
14 See, most significantly, Charles McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), ch. 7; see also P.J.E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume’s 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 4; Nadler, Occasionalism, ch. 9; Ott, 
Causation & Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy, ch. 25; and Clatterbaugh, The 
Causation Debate, 195-9. 
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is one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect.” (SAT 
VI.II.III / 450). When we posit a relation of cause and effect, we posit some ‘necessary 
connection’ that obtains between the relata, over and above their accidental conjunction. As Kail 
writes, “What else could there be, to causal relations metaphysically speaking, other than simply 
one thing following another? The only metaphysical modality that contrasts to brute regularity is 
absolute necessity.”15 To say that one thing caused another is to say more than just that they 
happened to be proximate in space and successive in time. It is to say that the one follows the 
other as a matter of metaphysical necessity, that there is “some power in the one, by which it 
infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity” 
(EHU VII.27 / 69). It is this third and final feature, necessary connection, that plays the most 
significant role in Hume’s three critiques of knowledge of causation. Let us now consider each of 
them in turn. 
 
1. The critique of empirical knowledge of causation. We do not have a rational ground for 
affirming with certainty that one object given in experience is the cause of another. The basis of 
this critique is the real distinction and thus conceivable separability of everything that is given in 
experience: “We have observ’d, that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that 
whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination” (T I.I.VII / 
18). Hume argues that everything given in experience can be considered abstractly, in isolation, 
and therefore can be thought of as being really separate from everything else given in experience. 
                                                          
15 P.J.E. Kail, “On Hume’s Appropriation of Malebranche: Causation and Self,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 16:1 (2007): 55-80, 62. Kail convincingly argues that Hume’s reasoning 
here does not commit him to confusing what analytic philosophers distinguish as ‘metaphysical’ 
and ‘logical’ necessity. 
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But since we are seeking a ground for the affirmation of a necessary connection, this separability 
means that our search will be in vain. 
Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; and whatever is clearly conceiv’d, after any 
manner, may exist after the same manner. This is one principle, which has already been 
acknowledg’d. Again, every thing, which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing 
which is distinguishable, is separable by the imagination. This is another principle. My 
conclusion from both is, that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and 
from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be 
consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing 
else to support their existence. (T I.IV.V / 233) 
 
This is sufficient for Hume’s critique of empirical knowledge of causation to hold. The real 
difference between perceptions given to the mind means that they, and the real objects that we 
suppose them to be perceptions of, can be conceived as being really separate and distinct. 
Consequently, whatever connection that I think exists between two perceptions or objects of 
perception will be less than necessary, since I can always think these objects separately. 
We can also put this in terms of the possibility for our conceiving any contrary of any 
matters of fact without contradiction. “The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; 
because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility 
and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality” (EHU IV.2 / 28). I believe that flicking this 
switch turns on the light in this room. But the connection between the two perceptions—I flick 
the switch, the light turns on—cannot be a necessary one, because I can conceive of one without 
necessarily conceiving of the other. Indeed, if the bulb has burned out, I will even experience the 
former without the latter. It is the nature of synthetic cognition, or knowledge of matters of fact, 
or claims about relations that are external to their terms, that their contraries cannot involve any 
contradiction in themselves. Hume imagines one billiard ball approaching another, asking: 
May I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? 
May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight 
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line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are 
consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no 
more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings a priori will never be 
able to show us any foundation for this preference. (EHU IV.10 / 32) 
 
This is why demonstrative certainty cannot pertain to any claim about empirical causal relations. 
Practically speaking, the principle of non-contradiction is useless in this context.16 
Up until this point, Hume’s critique follows Malebranche’s exactly, but Hume goes a step 
farther than the Catholic Oratorian. Having established that necessary connection is a key feature 
of the concept of causation, Malebranche continued: “the mind perceives a necessary connection 
only between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects. Therefore, it is only God who 
is the true cause and who truly has the power to move bodies” (SAT VI.II.III / 450). This is the 
basis of the occasionalist position. The mind can perceive no necessary connection between 
anything empirically given, or between conceivable finite beings. Yet it cannot avoid finding 
such a necessary connection between the will of God, which is supposed to be an infinite and 
infinitely powerful being, and the creaturely effects that follow from divine volition. Thus, the 
occasionalist concludes, only God is a true cause. Hume’s argument coincides with this 
occasionalist line of reasoning to the extent that he agrees that the mind can perceive no 
                                                          
16 It is worth noting how close Hume is to Leibniz here. Leibniz distinguished between ‘truths of 
reason’ on the one hand, and ‘truths of fact’ or ‘contingent truths’ on the other. The former have 
‘absolute necessity’ while the latter have only ‘contingent’ or ‘hypothetical necessity’. The 
absolute necessity of truths of reason can be grasped even by finite minds, since they can be 
deduced by means of the principle of non-contradiction. But the hypothetical necessity of 
contingent truths, truths of fact, cannot be deduced by finite reason, since their necessity is a 
function not of non-contradiction but the principle of sufficient reason, which involves 
something more than non-contradiction alone. Only God is capable of performing this infinite 
deduction. The kind of “connection” involved in truths of fact “is necessary only ex hypothesi, 
and by accident, so to speak, and this connection is contingent in itself when its contrary implies 
no contradiction” (DM 13 / L 310; emphasis added). Hume agrees entirely, simply adding that as 
a direct consequence we can have only beliefs, and not knowledge, about matters of fact. 
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necessary connection between any mundane things that are said to stand in a causal relation. But 
Hume further denies that the mind can find such a necessary connection between the will of God 
and God’s creations. It always remains possible, he argues, to conceive as distinct and separable 
the connection between such a putatively infinite cause and its effects without contradiction (T 
I.IV.V / 248-9). The relations involved being external to these terms, the synthetic character of 
propositions concerning them cannot be grounded on the principle of non-contradiction. Thus, 
demonstrative certainty cannot attend affirmations or denial about the necessity of any empirical 
causal relation. And since intuitive certainty, as we have seen, only pertains to claims about 
resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and quantitative proportion, it is not possible for a 
claim about empirical causal relations to be intuitively certain either.  
This is why matters of fact cannot, according to Hume, constitute objects of knowledge, 
strictly speaking, since he has defined knowledge as essentially involving the certainty that he 
has here entirely ruled out. Matters of fact, in which relations are external to their terms, 
constitute instead a synthetic domain of belief: 
Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? The 
answer is easy with regard to propositions, that are prov’d by intuition or demonstration. 
In that case, the person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according to the 
proposition, but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner, 
either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. […] But as in reasonings from 
causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and 
the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question, I still ask, Wherein consists 
the difference betwixt incredulity and belief? (T I.III.VII / 95)  
 
Affirmations about matters of fact, synthetic propositions about relations external to their terms, 
inevitably involve causal relations. These relations cannot be objects of knowledge or reason, but 
are instead objects of belief; and belief is, as we will discuss in the next section, a habit. 
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2. The transcendental critique of causation. Hume redeploys this argument about the 
indemonstrability of matters of fact at a higher level in the Treatise, in a discussion that is 
notably absent from the first Enquiry. Here his target is not the putative knowledge of some 
empirical causal relation, but the very principle “that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause 
of existence” (T I.III.III / 78). In his discussion he is clear that the ‘whatever’ here should be 
construed broadly enough to encompass both ‘new things’ coming into existence, as well as 
‘new modifications’ of already existing things. The principle in question holds that there must be 
some cause in order for things to come into existence as well as for existing things to change. His 
target, then, is the principle of sufficient reason, according to which there must be a cause or 
reason why everything that exists is so and not otherwise. But it is worth noting that his critique 
does not—indeed, as I will show, cannot—bear on the truth of this claim, but only on reason’s 
pretension to know that it is true or valid.17 
                                                          
17 I am here trying to sidestep the major debate, in recent scholarship, as to whether or not Hume 
is ultimately a ‘realist’ or not about causes and causal relations. The ‘New Hume’ interpretation 
holds that he is a realist about causal relations, skeptical of our ability to know them but 
committed to their actual existence, evincing a kind of skeptical realism. The ‘Old Hume’ against 
which this interpretation defines itself is said to be an anti-realist about causal relations, one who 
explicitly denies the real existence of causal relations in fact, and allows only that we posit causal 
relations by custom and habit, evincing a kind of skeptical idealism (see The New Hume Debate, 
eds. Rupert Read and Kenneth A. Richman [New York: Routledge, 2007], passim.). To move 
much too quickly, I think this debate might be missing the point. Hume’s arguments concern the 
unsurpassable epistemic limits that prevent us from being able to take a decisive stance on the 
metaphysical questions of whether or not there really are causal relations ‘out there’, and of what 
their nature might be.  
The debate also tends to psychologize the philosophical problem at hand, as though 
whether Hume himself believed that causes really existed is relevant for evaluating his 
epistemological argumentation. Hume argues that we cannot know whether there are causal 
relations or not, or anything about their nature if they do exist. In response, he is asked: but do 
you think there are, or are not, such causal relations? This ‘psychologizing’ question is 
importantly not the same thing as evaluating Hume’s arguments concerning the use of concepts 
of causation as a psychological fact and even as psychologically unavoidable. Here we might 
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Hume begins the discussion by noting that this principle is “commonly taken for granted 
in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded” (T I.III.III / 79).18 His question is 
whether it can be either intuitively or demonstratively certain. It cannot be intuitively certain, he 
says, because the claim is not founded on the relations of resemblance, contrariety, degrees of 
quality, or proportions of quantity. The principle does not express anything intuitively true a 
priori, nor intuitively obvious based on anything given in experience. Indeed, the principle’s 
universality is part of the issue here. It makes a claim about anything that could possibly be given 
in experience, and so nothing in experience can confirm or deny it as such. The universality of 
the ‘whatever’ in ‘whatever exists has a cause’ involves a necessity that cannot be intuited in the 
same way that I am intuitively certain that two people bear some resemblance to one another. 
As for the question of whether or not it is demonstratively certain, Hume argues as 
follows. In order to prove that it is demonstratively certain that everything must have a cause, it 
would be necessary to demonstrate “the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever begin to 
                                                          
begin to move in the direction of a strictly Humean doctrine of transcendental illusion 
concerning the existence of external bodies, of causal relations, of the soul, etc. 
That said, I suppose I tend to sympathize more with the ‘realist’ camp, since it seems 
somewhat more implausible to me to ascribe a robust metaphysical anti-realism to Hume, the 
active historian and moralist. But the point is that the metaphysical question as to the ultimate 
reality of causal relations is strictly unanswerable from within Hume’s critical empiricism.  
 
18 It is easy to show that Leibniz and Spinoza are wholly committed to extremely strong variants 
of this principle. For example, Spinoza writes: “For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or 
reason, as much for its existence as for its nonexistence” (E I P11 dem. 2 / CWS I.417 / G II.52). 
And Leibniz writes: “there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, 
without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise” (M 32 / L 646). Again, 
I want to emphasize that Hume does not deny that the principle is true but objects to the idea that 
it is an idea whose truth can be shown as a matter of intuitive or demonstrative certainty. See 
Harold W. Noonan, Hume on Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1999), 110. I think it could be 
shown that the principle is axiomatic for both Leibniz and Spinoza, so that Hume’s critique here 
does not, strictly speaking, bear on them. 
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exist without some productive principle” (Ibid.). But this cannot be demonstrated at all, because, 
once again, the idea of a thing as a cause and the idea of a thing as an effect are distinct 
perceptions of the mind, and the relation that the mind might posit between any two distinct 
perceptions can only be less than necessary. Based on the real distinction between our 
perceptions, and the conceivable real separation of the things of which we take them to be 
perceptions, it is  
easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, 
without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The 
separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is 
plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these 
objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore 
incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which ’tis 
impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. (T I.III.III / 80) 
 
Everything hinges, once again, on the real distinction of perceptions given to the mind. The 
rationalist metaphysician affirms that there must be a cause for everything that exists, but this 
affirmation cannot possibly be demonstrated. Demonstrative certainty requires the discovery of a 
contradiction in the contrary of what is to be demonstrated, but there can be no contradiction in 
the principle’s contrary. ‘There does not have to be a cause or reason for a thing being so and not 
otherwise’ may perhaps be called absurd in an everyday sense, but not in the philosophical sense 
of expressing anything genuinely contradictory. 
We may restate this Humean argument as follows, in order to highlight its transcendental 
character. What kind of claim does the principle of sufficient reason make? Hume argues that it 
is inevitably a claim about matters of fact. It would be a matter of fact if nothing happened 
without a determinate reason (as the principle of sufficient reason asserts), it would be a matter 
of fact if things sometimes did come into being without any cause for their existence, and it 
would be a matter of fact if, as Dicker rightly emphasizes, already existing things were merely 
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modified without there being any cause or reason for that modification.19 It would even be a 
matter of fact if the principle of sufficient reason really does express a truth, but only 
occasionally or under certain specific conditions and independently of whether or not we could 
clearly ascertain or enumerate these conditions. Thus, no possible articulation of the principle of 
sufficient reason can be demonstratively or intuitively certain. ‘There must always be a cause or 
reason for why each thing is so and not otherwise’ is inescapably a claim about matters of fact. It 
is not just an unavoidably synthetic claim, but one with an explicitly universal bearing for any 
possible empirical given. Consequently, it is indemonstrable by reason, and unverifiable by 
experience. It, too, is something that can only be believed, a habit of thought. 
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume uses the same reasoning as an 
objection to the classical a priori argument for the existence of God. According to that argument, 
God’s essence (or concept) involves its existence; consequently, its non-existence cannot be 
thought without contradiction; and so, God must necessarily exist. Not so, says Cleanthes: 
there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it 
by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a 
contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever 
we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, 
therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no Being, 
whose existence is demonstrable. (DNR IX / 91) 
 
Like the principle of sufficient reason, the question of whether or not God exists concerns a 
matter of fact. The theist claims that God does in fact exist, while the atheist claims that God 
does not in fact exist. Hume’s objection against the a priori argument for the existence of God 
here is thus not atheistic in principle. It is just a special case of the reasoning that leads him to 
deny the certainty of knowledge of empirical causation, as well as that of the transcendental 
                                                          
19 Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 134. 
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principle of sufficient reason. Absolutely no claims about matters of fact are demonstrably 
certain, because their contraries can clearly and distinctly be thought without contradiction.20 
Hume’s treatment of Locke’s attempted defense of the principle of sufficient reason in 
this section of the Treatise, “Why a cause is always necessary”, is particularly noteworthy.21 
Locke, he says, holds that “Whatever is produc’d without any cause, is produc’d by nothing; or 
in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can never be a cause” (T I.III.III / 81). 
First, why do we think that nothing cannot be a cause? The claim that ‘nothing is the cause of 
something’ does not, Hume says, actually express anything contradictory in itself. Second, there 
is a formal problem with the argument as well. The argument runs: given some existing thing, it 
must either be caused by something, or by nothing; but if we deny that it is caused by something, 
it must be caused by nothing, which is supposedly absurd; hence it must be caused by something, 
or, there must be some cause for any and everything that exists. But as Hume points out, the 
                                                          
20 Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof for the existence of God is quite Humean in this 
sense. Kant, like Cleanthes, denies that there can be any contradiction at all in the idea of a non-
existing God, against the defenders of the a priori proof. “If in an identical judgment I annul the 
predicate and retain the subject, then a contradiction arises, and hence I say that the predicate 
belongs to the subject necessarily. But if I annul the subject along with the predicate, then no 
contradiction arises, for nothing is left that could be contradicted. […] God is omnipotent—this 
is a necessary judgment. The omnipotence cannot be annulled if you posit a deity, i.e., an infinite 
being, with whose concept the concept of omnipotence is identical. But if you say God does not 
exist, then neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates is given; for they are all annulled 
along with the subject, and hence this thought does not manifest the least contradiction. […] You 
are now left with no escape except to say that there are subjects that cannot be annulled at all and 
that hence must remain. This, however, would be equivalent to saying that there are absolutely 
necessary subjects—the very presupposition whose correctness I doubted and whose possibility 
you wanted to show me” (CPR A594-5/B622-4). 
 
21 I leave aside his treatments of Hobbes’ and Clarkes’ related arguments. I also leave aside as 
irrelevant for our purposes the question of whether in this discussion Hume’s characterizations of 
the arguments and positions of Hobbes, Clarke, and Locke are fair. 
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logic of this argument begs the question, presupposing that there must be a cause for anything 
that exists, even if it is nothing, which is precisely what is at stake: “when we exclude all causes 
we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of 
the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions 
to prove the absurdity of that exclusion” (Ibid.). Hume’s point remains: ‘nothing cannot be a 
cause’ expresses a claim about matters of fact and is therefore totally indemonstrable. To the 
extent that the principle of sufficient reason invariably makes a claim about matters of fact, it is 
indemonstrable, and is thus an object not of knowledge but of belief.22 
 
3. The metacritique of causation, or, on the cause of the idea of causation. Now Hume 
changes the terms of the investigation. We know that empirical claims about particular causal 
relations, and the transcendental claim that there must always be a cause for any given existent, 
are neither intuitively or demonstratively certain. Nevertheless, we do have the concept of 
causation at our disposal and we constantly affirm that particular causal relations obtain between 
distinct objects of perception. Where, then, did we get this idea of causation from, and what leads 
us to posit the existence of particular causal relations? What accounts for the belief in this 
                                                          
22 I thus disagree with Kant’s assessment that Hume successfully managed only to submit the 
dogmatic use of pure reason to a rigorous skeptical censure, but that he did not take the crucial 
next step, the critique of pure reason itself, in which “what we thus prove is reason’s ignorance 
not merely in some part or other but in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind” (CPR 
A762/B790). In this section I believe I have shown just how Hume’s critical arguments have 
precisely the kind of universal bearing that Kant claims is missing from the reflexive analysis. 
Perhaps we can attribute this mischaracterization of Hume’s analysis on Kant’s part to 
the possibility that he had only read the first Enquiry and not the Treatise; Beiser compellingly 
argues on the basis of biographical and textual evidence that this is likely and, as I noted above, 
Hume articulates this critique of the rationalist arguments for the validity of the principle of 
sufficient reason as such only in the Treatise (see Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The 
Struggle Against Subjectivism [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002], 43-7). 
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principle, and for our believing that causal relations obtain in particular empirical cases, since 
this can be neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain? Hume’s answer to both questions, 
famously, is the same. The constant conjunction of distinct perceptions gives rise to the mind’s 
habit of inferring their causal relation. I call this part of Hume’s analysis his ‘metacritique of 
causation’ because it accepts as a premise that we have the idea of causation, whether as a 
transcendental principle or as an empirical postulate, and treats it as an effect, asking after its 
cause. To understand “the idea of power of necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; 
and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, 
from which it may possibly be derived” (EHU VII.5 / 59). Hume’s decisive arguments, as we 
have seen, according to which no possible articulation of the principle of sufficient reason, nor 
any empirically postulated relation of causation, can be intuitively or demonstratively certain, 
does not at all mean that his philosophical project terminates in a radically skeptical quietism—
Hume ceaselessly satirizes the dialectically self-defeating absurdity of Pyrrhonic skepticism 
(e.g., T I.IV.II; EHU XII.2-4, 21-4 / 131-2, 139-41; DNR I / 34-6)23—but leads instead to a 
reformulation of the question of human nature. For, their rational groundlessness and empirical 
insufficiency notwithstanding, we cannot but make use of these ideas, which always subtend the 
mind’s passage beyond the given. 
The only three possible sources for the impression of power or necessary connection 
(which, as we have seen, is an essential component of the concept of causation) are, Hume says, 
the following: 1. our contemplation of the interaction of external bodies; 2. our consciousness of 
                                                          
23 See Fogelin, Hume’s Skeptical Crisis, 55-7; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: 
Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), ch. 3; Stanley 
Tweyman, Skepticism and Belief in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), esp. chs. 1 and 8. 
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our mind’s power over our own body’s movements; and 3. our consciousness of our mind’s 
power over itself, to will at will. None of these, on Hume’s analysis, can possibly suffice, insofar 
as they all seek to locate the origin of our idea of necessary connection in singular instances. He 
argues, instead, that it can only arise on the basis of constantly repeated similar cases. This 
constant conjunction of repeated similar perceptions somehow engenders the habit of believing 
in the existence of causal relations. 
3.1) The impressions given to us of external bodies is quickly ruled out as a possible 
source for the idea of necessary connection. “When we look about us towards external objects, 
and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any 
power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the 
one an infallible consequence of the other” (EHU VII.6 / 59). The impressions given to the mind 
may exhibit contiguity and succession, but never necessary connection. We have seen that it is 
always possible for the mind to imagine the two objects as distinct and separable, and thus as not 
necessarily connected. But in terms of the impressions themselves, no necessity can possibly be 
manifest. Causal relations cannot be given as such; nothing that is given is given as a cause. “It 
is impossible, therefore, that any idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, 
in single instances of their operation, because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be 
the original of this idea” (EHU VII.8 / 60). 
Having ruled this out, Hume now considers the alternative: that the idea is derived from 
some impression of a power of the mind. This might be either the mind’s power to move the 
body, or the mind’s power to conjure ideas at will: “An act of volition produces motion in our 
limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by 
consciousness” (EHU VII.9 / 60). But this will not work either, and Hume’s critiques of these 
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alternatives reveal his close philosophical proximity to Spinozist involuntarism, which we 
explored at length in the previous two chapters.24 
3.2) Hume raises three objections to the claim that we have an experience of the mind’s 
volitional power over the body. First there is the obvious metaphysical interaction problem. We 
cannot conceive, let alone clearly understand or know, how the mind, insofar as it is a ‘spiritual 
substance’, could possibly affect or determine any material one. If we did have any conscious 
experience of “any power or energy in the will, we must know this power” (EHU VII.11 / 61), 
but, clearly, we do not. 
Second, we are able to will any part of our body to move, but only some of them actually 
do seem to act in accordance with our will. But from the perspective of our consciousness of the 
act of volition, there is nothing given that essentially distinguishes the two mental experiences. 
“Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver?” (EHU 
VII.12 / 61). If we were conscious of the actual power of the mind to move the body, the “secret 
connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable” (EHU VII.12 / 62), we 
would experience that causal power in the one instance and not the other, and thus clearly 
understand why we cannot move our liver at will. But we do not have any impression of this 
power. It is only by experience that we have come to think that the mind is able to move some 
parts of the body but not others, and we do not know why this is the case. 
                                                          
24 Hume’s rejection of these alternatives helps highlight his distance from Locke. He 
distinguishes between ‘passive power’, or the capacity to receive change, whose idea, he argues, 
can be grasped on the basis of the perception of external interaction; and ‘active power’, or the 
capacity to produce a change, whose idea, he argues, we form by reflecting on our mental 
activities: “if we consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so clear and 
distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our own minds” 
(LEHU II.XXI.4-5 / 221-2). Hume denies that we have such a clear and distinct idea at all. 
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Third, Hume points out that for any given apparent coordination between the mind’s will 
and the body’s movement, an extraordinary series of unperceived, unknown, and unwilled 
physical movements actually takes place. We can update his language about ‘animal spirits’ in 
making his point. I am in no way conscious of the mind’s power to cause neurons to fire, 
although extremely specific neuron firings apparently constitute an important step in the chain 
connecting my mind’s will to move one of my fingers and my finger actually moving. “Here the 
mind wills a certain event: Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally 
different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till 
at last, through a long succession, the desired event is produced” (EHU VII.14 / 62). Humean 
empiricism consistently emphasizes the mysterious obscurity of the apparently obvious clarity of 
everyday experience: see how much we do not know about what is involved in moving a finger! 
Spinoza agrees, of course. We do not even know what a body can do. 
Hume thus concludes that there is nothing given in this kind of experience that can 
provide the basis for our idea of causation or necessary connection. Even if there really is such a 
power of the mind to move some parts of the body at will, we do not have any conscious 
experience of it, it is not given to us. “That [the motion of certain parts of the body] follows the 
command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: But the power 
or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and 
inconceivable” (EHU VII.15 / 63).  
3.3) There remains only the possibility that we get the idea of necessary connection or 
causal power from our conscious experience of the mind’s self-determination in the mode of 
calling ideas to mind at will. The hypothesis is that “we are conscious of a power or energy in 
our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new idea, fix the mind to 
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the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we 
think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy” (EHU VII.16 / 63). Here Hume’s 
involuntarism is still more pronounced. Even if we leave aside the apparently problematic 
metaphysical problem of mind-body causation, we do not even have an understanding of how the 
mind does its work ‘in its own domain’, so to speak. The experience of mental volition with 
regard to ideas alone is also insufficient as a source of the idea of causation. Hume claims that 
the same arguments apply in both of these cases.  
First, we must ask whether we in fact know or have an experience of the causal power 
said to be at work that ties the mind’s act of volition to its supposed effect, namely the idea 
brought to mind. Hume argues that we do not. Once again, we have the experience of disjointed 
effects, two separate and distinct perceptions. There is nothing in the idea of one that brings the 
other with it as a matter of necessity. “We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, 
consequent to a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed, the 
power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension” (EHU VII.17 / 63). 
Second, just as there is nothing a priori that indicates which parts of the body can 
apparently be commanded to move at will, so too there is nothing a priori that accounts for the 
extent of the mind’s apparent power over which ideas are present to it at any given point. “Our 
authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the 
latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries” (EHU VII.18 / 64). Only by 
experience do we become acquainted with these limits, but this experience does not explain 
them. There is only the repeated experience that our mind does not seem to have the power to 
summon certain kinds of ideas at will. Hume argues that if we had a genuine understanding of 
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the causal power of the mind supposedly at work here, we would be able to give an account of 
why it extends to some ideas rather than others. But this is what we are incapable of doing. 
Third, Hume points out that the mind’s apparent ability to summon particular ideas is 
clearly conditioned by all kinds of circumstances whose relation to this power is entirely 
obscure. I seem to be better able to bring ideas to mind at will in the morning than late at night, 
or when I have not eaten too much, or when I am in good physical health: why is that? Hume 
insists that we simply do not know. Once again, if we had a clear conception of this supposed 
power of the mind, we should be able to answer these questions; thus our inability to do so 
indicates that our sense for the influence of such conditions is less than knowledge, and is instead 
only a matter of belief based on the repetition of similar experiences. 
Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? Where then is the power, 
of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or mental 
substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which the effect 
depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the 
will equally unknown and incomprehensible? (EHU VII.19 / 64). 
 
We frequently experiences the mind’s willing to think of an idea but finding itself incapable of 
doing so. We all know what it is like to know that there is an idea that one should be able to 
bring to mind (‘Wait, I know this one!’) but finding oneself unable, for one unknown reason or 
another, to do so at will (‘Ah, just tell me the answer…’). If the mind’s power to will the 
production of ideas were really known and clearly understood, Hume seems to suggest that this 
sort of experience would simply not happen. Or else, if it were still possible, then we would be 
able to give a satisfying account of how and why this power is limited in some contexts and 
under certain conditions, and not others. But this is something we learn by experience alone, and 
once again in the manner of running up against an apparent limit whose inner logic is not 
available even to direct and conscious philosophical reflection. 
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Hume’s critique of causation reveals vast, unknowable obscurities covered over by the 
apparent lucidity of everyday mental operations: the Humean corollary to Spinoza’s maxim is 
that we do not even know what the mind can do. All of the possible and seemingly viable sources 
of our idea of power or necessary connection prove to be totally inadequate upon inspection. In 
each case we have experiences only of distinct and separable effects or events, ideas present to 
the mind whose connection is invariably less than necessary, a connection external to the terms it 
synthetically relates together. The effective logic of this relation always remains entirely obscure 
and unknown. We posit that some events or perceptions are the causes of others; but strictly 
speaking, nothing is given to us in experience as a cause, or as causally related. The principle of 
the distinctness and separability of everything given to the mind means that at most, 
consciousness is only ever consciousness of effects. Causes are not and cannot be given to the 
mind as such. Nothing in individual experiences can even provide the occasion for our forming 
the idea of causation. Indeed, as Freydberg says, without our mind’s implicit usage of the 
relation of causation, we “would not have anything that could be called experience.”25 But this 
means that any search for the source of our idea of the relation of causation in experience must 
ultimately be futile. “The necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or 
power at all” (EHU VII.26 / 68). But if this is indeed how things seem to stand, Hume’s analysis 




                                                          
25 Bernard Freydberg, David Hume: Platonic Philosopher, Continental Ancestor (Albany: The 
State University of New York Press, 2012), 37. 
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3. Belief, Habit, Synthesis 
To recapitulate, Hume distinguishes between relations of ideas and matters of fact. Propositions 
about the former are analytic, expressing relations internal to and dependent on their terms, 
whereas propositions about the latter are always synthetic, involving relations that are external to 
their terms. Even the most minimal claim about matters of fact (that something exists or is some 
way) involves an at-least-implicit usage of the relation of causality, which, as we have just seen, 
turns out to be quite problematic. Hume argues that it is absolutely impossible for empirical 
causal relations to be affirmed or denied with any demonstrative or intuitive certainty. There can 
also be no such certainty in affirming the transcendental principle that everything must have a 
cause for its existence. Finally, all the possible candidates for experiences from which our idea of 
causality as a principle might arise, or in which its postulation in empirical cases would be 
sanctioned, revealed themselves to be inadequate. The principle of the distinctness and 
separability of all perceptions given to the mind, on Hume’s analysis, entails that the connection 
that the mind affirms between them can only be less than necessary. “On [the relation of 
causality] are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it 
alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony 
of our memory and senses” (EHU VII.29 / 70). The movement of thought consists in the mind’s 
passage beyond the given, and causation is necessarily involved in any such passage. “Yet so 
imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just 
definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it” (Ibid.). 
Hume’s analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that claims about matters of fact, insofar as 
they are inherently synthetic and unavoidably involve a usage of the relation of causality, cannot 
constitute knowledge but instead amount to beliefs. And beliefs are habitual, rather than rational. 
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Before we proceed, it is important to be clear on the sense in which beliefs can be called 
‘not rational’. It is not that they are irrational per se, but rather that their epistemic status is 
incompatible with the demonstrative procedures of reflection by which we establish that 
something counts as rational or not. For this, on Hume’s account, we would need to be able to 
make use of the principle of non-contradiction, but as he repeatedly emphasizes, the perfectly 
imaginable contraries of any matter of fact cannot involve any contradiction in themselves.26 
Beliefs held about the existence and nature of particular matters of fact are therefore not 
‘rational’ in the sense of being demonstratively certain, but they are also not ‘irrational’ in the 
sense of being ‘contrary to reason’, or as involving some absurdity. Consequently, it might be 
better to describe beliefs, for Hume, as being ‘a-rational’ or ‘non-rational’ than as irrational.27 
This is also why, when he later analyzes the ‘influencing motives of the will’, Hume contends 
that “reason alone can never be a motive to any passion of the will” (T II.III.III / 413). The 
power or determining force of passionate belief has its own logic, which is different in kind than 
reason’s demonstrative apparatus. 
The problem lies in whether and how we might be able to distinguish belief from fiction. 
As we saw, Hume characterizes the imagination as the mind’s reproduction of ideas based on 
impressions in abstraction from their original context. Unlike memory, which reproduces ideas in 
the same order and connection as the impressions from which they were derived, the imagination 
is not bound by any rules concerning the order of ideal reproduction. But it is obviously not the 
case that all imagined ideas are equally credible. Some ideal reproductions strike us as true, as 
                                                          
26 This is why I hesitate to endorse Beebee’s turn of phrase ‘epistemic legitimacy’ in describing 
‘causal reasoning’ in the quotation cited earlier (see Note 12, above). 
 
27 This is similar to the not-irrational status of inadequate ideas and affects in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of ideas, which we explored in detail in Chapter 2, above. 
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genuine historical testimony, as accurate descriptions of matters of fact: we believe them. By 
contrast, some strike us as obviously fictitious, as fabrications, as fanciful: we do not believe 
them. “Wherein consists the difference between believing and disbelieving any proposition?” (T 
I.III.VII / 95). It is impossible to adjudicate this question by means of rational demonstration, 
since both a credible and an incredible ideal description or representation of a matter of fact are 
non-rational in the sense described above. Their contraries cannot involve any contradiction, and 
consequently neither can be shown to be preferable by rational demonstration, “since in both 
cases the conception of the idea is equally possible and requisite” (Ibid.). In short, the content of 
ideas cannot constitute the principle of their credibility. From the perspective of their content, all 
ideas satisfy the conditions for being potentially credible, but only some are actually believed.  
If ideal content is not the difference that makes a difference between fiction and belief, 
what is? Hume argues that the answer lies in the differential manner of conception, that is, the 
way in which the idea is felt by the mind that conceives it.28 His explanation in the Appendix to 
the Treatise is worth quoting at length: 
an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the 
nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceiv’d. But when I 
wou’d explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am 
oblig’d to have recourse to every one’s feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of 
this operation of the mind. An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that 
                                                          
28 I follow Michael Gorman’s reading of Hume’s theory of belief in taking belief to be a ‘manner 
of conception’ and a ‘feeling or sentiment’ in the same sense, i.e., these are two ways of 
describing one and the same thing. Hume’s own formulations can sometimes suggest that these 
are two distinct conceptions of belief. Alternative attempts at reconciling these kinds of 
formulations, on Gorman’s account, fail. He argues, for example, that it is not viable to say that 
‘manner of conception’ answers the ontological question of what a belief is, but that ‘feeling’ 
answers the question of how we know whether something is a belief; nor is it viable to suggest 
that these parallel kinds of formulation express an uncertainty on Hume’s part during the writing 
of the Treatise that had been clarified by the first Enquiry (see Michael M. Gorman, “Hume’s 
Theory of Belief,” Hume Studies 19:1 [1993]: 89-102). 
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the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavor to explain by calling 
it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. […] I confess, that 
’tis impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make 
use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which 
is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy we 
can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes 
the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force 
and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and 
renders them the governing principles of all our actions. (T App. / 628-9) 
 
Several things are worth noting here. First, in attempting to describe belief, Hume clearly finds 
himself running up against the limits of language. He is reduced to a sort of indexical gesture, 
simply pointing toward what he expects is a kind of common experience. If there is nothing in 
the particular content of any given idea that can account for the idea’s credibility, then the 
principle of distinction between fiction and belief must be its ‘manner of conception’ or how it 
‘feels’. But feelings or passions, on Hume’s analysis, cannot be ‘defined’ as such. Consider his 
opening remarks on the first passions discussed in Book II of the Treatise: “PRIDE and HUMILITY 
being simple and uniform impressions, ’tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give 
a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a 
description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them” (T II.I.II / 277). 
As always, Hume wants us to be exhaustively attentive to correlations, while avoiding the 
mistake of expecting that the constant conjunctions given in experience will tell us anything 
more than that. In particular, they cannot provide either knowledge of a thing’s causes, or an 
essential description of the thing itself. We will follow this procedure for belief momentarily. 
Second, if belief is characterized as a manner of conception or a particular feeling, it is in 
terms of a superior forcefulness or vivacity compared to that of mere fiction. This of course is 
precisely the principle of distinction between ideas and impressions, as the latter are more 
forceful and vibrant than the former. The mind can conceive of an idea and barely be struck by it. 
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The manner of conception, the idea as conceived by the mind, is insufficiently intense to 
constitute something really believable. But we can easily imagine that same mind conceiving that 
same idea and being powerfully affected by it: here it is striking, it is vibrant, affecting, believed. 
Finally, the last sentence of this passage from the Appendix underscores how important 
this concept is for Hume. It should be clear why. I have been trying to explain the near-total 
ubiquity of belief, as an invariant element of any synthetic proposition. Belief is the name for the 
mind’s non-rational passage beyond the given in its commitment concerning any matter of fact, 
which, as we have seen, necessarily involves the principle of causation. Whenever I am 
committed to the existence or nature of any matter of fact, I believe it, rather than know it. The 
idea of that particular matter of fact, present to my mind, is conceived in such a manner that I am 
struck by its vibrancy and intensity, or I am forcefully affected by it, and what I believe, or my 
specific manner of being affected by particular ideas, determines me to act in specific ways. 
Consequently, our interest in shedding light on the logic of credibility is extremely high. What I 
actually believe, rather than simply imagine, will determine nearly everything about how I live; it 
shapes and structures, effectively determines, my entire manner of being. 
What is it, then, that accounts for the genesis of particular instances of belief? Why, in 
fact, does one idea strike my mind with sufficient force and vivacity that I believe it, while 
another does not? Hume’s answer is habit. Two points in his analysis of belief formation in “Of 
the causes of belief” are especially significant, on my reading. First and most importantly, belief 
cannot be engendered on the basis of single instances. Experiential repetition is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of forming beliefs. “We must in every case have observ’d the same 
impression in past instances, and have found it to be constantly conjoin’d with some other 
impression” (T I.III.VIII / 102). The logic of this argument is closely related to the critique of the 
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possibility of deriving the idea of causation on the basis of any given individual experience, 
which we explored in the previous section. There is no basis for believing anything given in any 
single experience. More precisely, there are no immanent criteria for distinguishing, in what is 
given in any single experience, between what is worthy of belief or expectation, and what is 
present only accidentally or contingently. This is why empiricism is necessarily experimental, or 
pragmatic. This is another way in which Hume and Spinoza agree entirely. Beliefs can form only 
on the basis of, and with regard to, repeatedly conjoined perceptions, for which some 
unassignable number of past experiences is required. 
Assuming that such past experiences have taken place, Hume proceeds to the second 
point: “the belief, which attends the present impression, and is produc’d by a number of past 
impressions and conjunctions; [this] belief, I say, arises immediately, without any new operation 
of the reason or imagination. Of this I can be certain, because I never am conscious of any such 
operation” (Ibid.). We have known all along that belief is involuntary, insofar as it is not 
something that the mind can willingly ascribe to any given idea.29 But we can now add that it is 
well and truly unconscious, a spontaneous function of the mind’s habits of expectation, which 
are formed in and through the repetition of sufficiently similar experiences. As Hume says, “the 
past experiences, on which all our judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate 
on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some 
measure be unknown to us” (T I.III.VIII / 103). The formation of habits of thought, and the 
mind’s actual passages from one idea to another in accordance with these acquired habits of 
thought, both ‘insensibly’ operate beneath or below the mind’s conscious awareness.  
                                                          
29 See Qu, “Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.” 
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I therefore want to distinguish between two ways in which the habit of belief can be 
called involuntary and unconscious on Hume’s account. On the one hand, there is its formation, 
which takes place unconsciously through the repetition of sufficiently similar experiences, in 
which distinct and separable perceptions are given as constantly conjoined, so that the mind 
comes to associate the two together in an increasingly invariable relation, calcifying into a felt 
necessity. On the other hand, there is its influence, in which all of one’s actions, including those 
that involve explicitly conscious deliberations, are silently informed by the obscure network of 
unconscious beliefs that the mind has acquired by habit. Hume describes this in the example of 
someone out on a walk who stops short of walking directly into a river:  
[he] foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these 
consequences is convey’d to him by past experience, which informs him of such certain 
conjunctions of causes and effects. But can we think, that on this occasion he reflects on 
any past experience, and calls to remembrance instances, that he has heard of, in order to 
discover the effects of water on animal bodies? No surely […] the mind makes the 
transition without the assistance of the memory. The custom operates before we have 
time for reflexion. The objects seem so inseparable, that we interpose not a moment’s 
delay in passing from the one to the other. But as this transition proceeds from 
experience, and not from any primary connexion betwixt the ideas, we must necessarily 
acknowledge, that experience may produce a belief and a judgment of causes and effects 
by a secret operation, and without being once thought of. (T I.III.VIII / 103-4; emphasis 
added) 
 
Habit is the principle in virtue of which the past is not yet even past, to paraphrase Faulkner. It 
selectively gathers together past experiences and makes conscious experience possible as such. If 
memory is the conscious reproduction of ideas based on impressions, and the imagination is the 
mind’s conscious reproduction of ideas based on impressions without regard for their order and 
connection, habit is the unconscious process that associates ideas together prior to their relations 
being consciously recognized. 
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It is important to see that the involuntary, spontaneous, unconscious character of habitual 
association is both Hume’s answer to the riddle of belief and also the basis for a new set of 
intractable problems for dogmatic rationalism. For instance, if we wanted to argue that the 
mind’s passage from causes to effects and vice versa is a rational deduction, rather than a 
habituated association of ideas, what would we make of the inferences of infants and animals? 
On the basis of constantly conjoined perceptions in past experiences, habit links the perception 
of fire with that of heat. Consequently, the mind develops the habit of thinking of heat when it is 
given an impression of fire. When a very young child knows to avoid touching a flame, does it 
make sense to attribute this pragmatic avoidance to a conscious rational deduction, which 
“appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and 
period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake?” (EHU V.22 / 53). If there were a 
rational deduction at work here, it would surely be even more embarrassing that we seem 
incapable of reproducing it in the explicit conscious reflection of our philosophical maturity; for 
as we have seen, on reason’s own account, the idea of fire has no necessary connection with that 
of heat. Hume wants us to see that more than anything else, it is only indefensible vanity that 
leads us to hold wizened human rationalism in higher esteem than the empiricism of children and 
animals (T I.III.XVI / 176-9; EHU IX / 92-5).30  
                                                          
30 Leibniz writes: “There is a connection between the perceptions of animals which has some 
resemblance to reason, but it is grounded only on the memory of facts or effects and not on the 
knowledge of causes. Thus a dog runs away from the stick with which he has been beaten, 
because his memory represents to him the pain which the stick had caused him. Men too, insofar 
as they are empiricists, that is to say, in three-fourths of their actions, act only like beasts. For 
example, we expect day to dawn tomorrow because we have always experienced this to be so; 
only the astronomer predicts it with reason, and even his prediction will ultimately fail when the 
cause of daylight, which is by no means eternal, stops” (PNG 5 / L 638).  
Hume replies: “It is impossible, that the inferences of the animal can be founded on any 
process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes, that like events must follow like 
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For Hume, reason is analytic, but habit is synthetic. Habit synthetically relates ideas 
together in the mind, but rational analysis finds no necessary connection between them. This is 
why it is a mistake to demand a rational justification for the habits of expectation that are 
involved in any belief. When it comes to matters of fact, reason can only inform us that the 
relations that habit has synthetically posited between ideas is less than necessary. In every case 
where relations are external to their terms, it is habit that synthetically posits them. This habitual 
synthesis, or synthetic habituation, is an unconscious process, one that necessarily takes place 
involuntarily, spontaneously, before and beneath conscious experience. As Deleuze writes, 
“Human nature means that what is universal or constant in the human mind is never one idea or 
another as a term but only the ways of passing from one particular idea to another.”31 Habit is the 
principle of synthesis that constitutes the human mind by creating these passageways leading 
from one idea to another, in advance of the consciousness that comes to know itself in following 
the paths of ideal association. 
If philosophy is in part a search for first principles, it is always illuminating to ask what 
counts as a principle for a given philosopher—that is, what they think can be given as a reason, 
and for which no further account can be given. For Hume, habit is such an explanatory principle, 
which cannot itself be explained. It is the gravity of ideas, a principle of human nature, the 
                                                          
objects, and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in 
reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruce for the observation of such 
imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a 
philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these 
inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their 
ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active 
parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims” 
(EHU IX.5 / 94). 
31 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 39. 
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synthetic force that relates ideas together, whose own operative logic remains inevitably obscure 
to the mind that consciously thinks along the paths of association. 
To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct 
in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with 
particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations. This instinct, ’tis 
true, arises from past observation and experience; but can any one give the ultimate 
reason, why past experience and observation produces such an effect, any more than why 
nature alone shou’d produce it? Nature may certainly produce whatever can arise from 
habit: Nay, habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force 
from that origin. (T I.III.XVI / 179) 
 
Hume no less than Leibniz conceives of the mind as a kind of automaton. It is the passage from 
one idea to another, which only under certain conditions we are are able to consciously notice. 
Once again, consciousness requires its own principle of sufficient reason, distinct from the 
principles of thought. The principles of thought are necessary but not sufficient for 
consciousness. Hume draws our attention to the obscurity and spontaneity of the mind’s 
passages, which are for the most part unconscious. The movement of thought along habituated 
associations of ideas does not require consciousness. Even when we consider an instance of 
genuinely rational demonstration, Hume asks why we undertake this demonstration rather than 
another; reason alone cannot answer this question, since there is no contradiction in our deducing 
irrelevant necessities. Thinking, whether it is conscious or unconscious, is always a habit of the 
mind. Neither the movement of thought as activity, nor the pathways of association themselves, 
are essentially the products of a conscious act; and consciousness is a habit of its own.  
 
4. The Problem of Correction 
When it comes to matters of fact, we form beliefs by habit, rather than obtaining knowledge 
through reason. As I have argued, these habits are both unconsciously formed prior to conscious 
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experience, and reiterated unconsciously in the mind’s passage from one idea to another. Belief 
is a matter of the apparently spontaneous, but in fact habituated, vibrancy and force with which 
ideas are syntheically associated in the imagination. The question is whether and how it might be 
possible to distinguish between better and worse beliefs, since, as we have seen, Hume argues 
that reason can neither confirm or deny beliefs, whose logic is that of affective force rather than 
deduction. Under these conditions, what possible recourse do we have when faced with the 
possibility that our beliefs might not correspond with the nature of things as they really are?  
Obviously, no direct recourse to ‘things as they really are’ is possible. In the final section 
of the first Enquiry, one encounters what I am tempted to call ‘Hume’s antinomy’, which has to 
do with the relation between things in themselves and things as they appear to us, in which 
human nature and reason turn out to contradict one another. On the one hand, there is what 
Hume refers to as a natural propensity to “repose faith in their senses” (EHU XII.7 / 133), to trust 
that things are in fact how they appear to us. In this mode of belief, we posit a direct relation 
between our perceptions and that which we imagine we perceive: we “always suppose the very 
images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, 
that the one are nothing but representations of the other” (EHU XII.8 /133). From the perception 
of a white table, I infer immediately the existence of a white table as its cause, an external thing 
whose nature I spontaneously believe does not depend in any way on my perception of it. 
But on the other hand, rational reflection undermines the putative connection between the 
thing and its representation in my mind. For this, Hume says, all that is necessary is that we 
notice some disparity in our different perceptions of one and the same thing. By now the refrain 
should not be surprising: the mind in its rational mode can find no necessary connection between 
a perception and some thing in itself that, as such, is not and cannot be given in experience. “The 
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mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any 
experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, 
without any foundation in reasoning” (EHU XII.12 / 134-5).32  
As in the case of the principle of sufficient reason, the question as to the nature of the 
relation between perceptions and the things perceived concerns a matter of fact. Consequently, 
only experience seems capable of providing any basis for gaining insight into the nature of this 
relation. But in experience, by definition, no ‘thing in itself’ is never given, making it impossible 
to determine this relation. Once again, only effects are given to the mind, not the ‘real 
existences’ that are supposed to be their causes. Thus the antinomy: 
Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may [the skeptics] say, in 
assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception 
or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to 
embrace a rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something 
external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; 
and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument 
from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects. 
(EHU XII.14 / 135) 
 
If anything, Hume’s articulation of this impasse is even starker in the Treatise. Habit and 
experience, “both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain 
ideas in a more intense and lively manner than others, which are not attended with the same 
advantages… The memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the 
imagination, or the vivacity of ideas” (T I.IV.VII / 265; emphasis added). The astonishing thing, 
                                                          
32 In light of this, it is hard to accept Kant’s description of Hume in the second Critique as having 
failed to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves: “Hume, taking objects of 
experience to be things in themselves (as, indeed, is done almost everywhere), declared the 
concept of cause to be deceptive and a false illusion…” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical 
Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002], 72). See also note 22, above. 
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and what makes this a genuine antinomy rather than just a ‘tension’, is that the same principle, 
that of the force of ideas in the mind, gives rise to directly contradictory conclusions. 
’Tis this principle, which makes us reason from causes and effects; and ’tis the same 
principle, which convinces us of the continu’d existence of external objects, when absent 
from the senses. But tho’ these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the 
human mind, yet in some circumstances they are directly contrary, nor is it possible for 
us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the 
continu’d existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which 
of them shall we prefer? (T I.IV.VII / 266) 
 
The problem consists in the fact that there is no available process by which to correct our habits 
of thought other than habit itself. In other words, there is no outside to habit: if habits of belief 
are unconsciously formed, then the process of correcting false beliefs involves nothing other than 
habit’s reflection upon itself, or the repetition of habituation. Once again, this process in no way 
depends on consciousness; like the formation of beliefs through habit, the habitual correction of 
beliefs is largely unconscious and involuntary. 
This issue had come up earlier in the Treatise, in Hume’s discussion of ‘unphilosophical 
probability’, that is, cases of belief that seem poorly founded. In this analysis Hume shows us 
how habit both constitutes a source of tendential error and the principle of its tendential 
correction. I want to draw attention to the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, “that 
deriv’d from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what 
we properly call PREJUDICE” (T I.III.XIII / 146). The example he gives is of racist generalization, 
where the imagination extends the associations we have formed with individuals to those who we 
presume to be ‘like’ them on the basis of nationality or ethnicity.33 Hume explicitly calls this 
                                                          
33 Spinoza similarly affirms the accidental character of our ideal associations and the irrational 
tendency to generalize them along tribalistic lines in our affects toward people belonging to, so 
to speak, specific ‘identity groups’—class and nation, Spinoza says, but we can easily add race, 
sex, gender, ability, and age (E III P46 / CWS I.520 / G II.175). I think that in this regard, 
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influence of the imagination on judgment an error, and seems to suggest that we should seek to 
eliminate it whenever we can. But why do we form general rules like this? The answer is habit: 
“it proceeds from those very principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects 
depend” (T I.III.XIII / 147). Unconsciously habituated syntheses make the mind’s passage 
between a pair of ideas forceful and lively, thus giving rise to belief, not just in cases that are 
exactly like the prior experiences on whose basis the habits formed, but more importantly in 
similar cases, in which by definition differences are also given. If this were not so, it would 
never occur to me to flick the switch in a dark room I had never entered before. But this means 
that habit will sometimes lead the mind to expect associations in cases where the given 
similarities are in fact irrelevant, and the given differences are decisive, as when I unconsciously 
pass judgment on a whole group of diverse people based on my prior experience of just one. 
This sort of confusion, in which the unconscious habits of association we form fail to 
distinguish between the differences that are relevant and the differences that do not make a 
difference, is unavoidable, according to Hume, whenever the circumstances in which our habits 
are formed are sufficiently complex. As it turns out, they almost always are this complex: 
In almost all kinds of causes there is a complication of circumstances, of which some are 
essential, and others superfluous; some are absolutely requisite to the production of the 
effect, and others are only conjoin’d by accident. Now we may observe, that when these 
superfluous circumstances are numerous, and remarkable, and frequently conjoin’d with 
the essential, they have such an influence on the imagination, that even in the absence of 
the latter they carry us on to the conception of the usual effect, and give to that 
conception a force and vivacity, which make it superior to the mere fictions of the fancy. 
We may correct this propensity by a reflection on the nature of those circumstances; but 
’tis still certain, that custom takes the start, and gives a biass to the imagination. (T 
I.III.XIII / 148) 
 
                                                          
Spinoza and Hume can and should be taken to task strictly on their own terms; Hume’s racism 
and Spinoza’s sexism are unjustifiable according to their own arguments. 
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Hume is describing the logic by which a mind draws inferential conclusions based on, to use 
Spinoza’s language, inadequate ideas. Here the mind is given an effect, and knows only that 
there are a number of possible causes involved. As Spinoza argued, the natures of these things 
must all be obscurely involved in the idea of the effect insofar as they really participate in its 
causation. By habit the mind associates the power to produce the object of experience with one 
or some of these obscure natures as its cause, but this association is not rational. As Hume says, 
reason can focus on the circumstances of the experience, and attempt to control for the many 
variables at play in the inference. But this sort of reflection can only be inadequately performed, 
because it is impossible to recreate the conditions of a particular experience, or repeat an 
experience, without any differences being involved besides those that the scientific mind wants 
to involve.  
More problematically, the principle according to which this process of correction is 
carried out, the attempted corrective reflection on circumstances, is itself a general rule, the 
general rule learned from experience according to which habits based on experience have proven 
to be unreliable. Consequently, the excesses of general rules for inferences based on unconscious 
habits of association can be corrected for only by contrary general rules based on unconscious 
habits of association. “The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of 
probability; and yet ’tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other 
unphilosophical probabilities” (T I.III.XIII / 150). Once again, there is no outside to habit. 
One final point to make here concerns the unconscious formation of habits of ideal 
association specifically with regard to other people. In Book II, Hume argues that we use the 
concept of necessity in the domain of human actions in exactly the same sense as when we use it 
to describe natural phenomena: in both cases we mean the mind’s expectation that similar effects 
228 
will be conjoined with similar causes, through associations formed by habit based on prior 
experiences. In a wonderful passage, he argues that this univocity is attested to by the unbroken 
chain of causes and effects one constructs while planning an escape from prison, as it includes 
both the solidity of the iron bars and the obstinacy of the jailor as reliable impediments in just the 
same sense: the mind does not mark a difference in kind between the ‘physical’ and ‘moral’ 
necessity of the two obstacles (T II.III.II / 406). But in terms of processes by which habits of 
association are formed, Hume notes that there is a relevant difference here. It is not a difference 
in kind, since the process habituation is the same in each case, but a difference in the degree, or 
complexity. Clearly, we are apparently unable to comprehensively control for the variables of 
differential experience even when it comes to the simplest experiments in physics.  
If this be the case even in natural philosophy, how much more in moral, where there is a 
much greater complication of circumstances, and where those views and sentiments, 
which are essential to any action of the mind, are so implicit and obscure, that they often 
escape our strictest attention, and are not only unaccountable in their casues, but even 
unknown in their existence? (T I.III.XV / 175) 
 
Here Hume appeals precisely to the obscure multiplicity of unconscious determinations of the 
mind in its moral assessments and inclinations. It should come as no surprise that when Hume 
comes to analyze the mind’s attempt to correct its habits of thought, not concerning physical 
causation, but having to do with moral sentiment and passion, comes to nearly the same 
conclusion. The habit of sympathetic partiality, which reason deplores as illegitimately 
restrictive, cannot be corrected by reason itself, but only by contrary habits of sympathetic 
extension; but these are two tendencies of the same process, and it is not even necessary that the 
mind be conscious of the process by which its sympathies are rendered more general.34  
                                                          
34 Marcia Baron writes that according to Hume, “When I take the general view [i.e., that 
according to which my sympathies become more extended and less partial—in other words, the 
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Synthetic beliefs about matters of fact, habits of ideal association and experiential 
expectation, moral sentiments, habit’s excesses by general rules and its self-correction through 
reflection: all of these are involuntary, on Hume’s analysis, and almost entirely unconscious. In 
their genesis and their effective reality, the passages of the mind are, Hume teaches, profoundly 
unconscious, only occasionally becoming the object of conscious reflection, and then only very 
inadequately. What is amazing is that the mind, this incredible product of the active processes of 
the unconscious of thought, unaware of this obscure activity involved in its every conscious 
passage, could have acquired the habit of mistaking its own apparent spontaneity for 
voluntaristic self-determination.
                                                          
perspective from which I become more moral], I need not be aware that I am doing so; I need 
have no notion that there is such a standard. I may not even be aware that I am correcting my 
sentiments” (Marcia Baron, “Morality as a Back-up System,” Hume Studies 14:1 [1988]: 25-52, 
35-6). See also William Davie, “Hume’s General Point of View,” Hume Studies 24:2 (1998): 
275-94. In a longer version of this dissertation I would have explored the unconscious 
dimensions of this passionate-moral dynamic in Hume’s theory in more detail. As it is, I can only 
mention it in passing.  
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Conclusion 
Obscurity and Involvement 
 
In the introduction to this dissertation I said that I wanted to argue for a devaluation of 
consciousness in favor of the unconscious of thought. However, I make this suggestion not 
because I think consciousness is absolutely unimportant, but based on my sense that 
consciousness has been relatively overvalued in philosophical modernity. I think that this 
overvaluation is clearest in moral and political discussions, where, for example, it is not 
uncommon to hear ‘ideology’ treated as a matter of ‘(false) contents of consciousness’. If that 
were true, the problem of ideology would be quite simple, barely a problem at all: a direct, 
rational demonstration of the falsity of the false contents of one’s consciousness would be all that 
is necessary in order to counteract or undo an ideological formation. First, as I repeatedly 
emphasized in my reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics of ideas, nothing false, insofar as it is 
positive, is destroyed by the appearance of the true qua true; more importantly, it is the affective 
determining power of an ideal configuration that is at issue in combating ideological formations, 
not veracity. But even beyond that, what this misses is that nearly everything important about 
ideologies are in fact operative at the unconscious levels I have been exploring in the chapters 
above. Ideology is only rarely a matter of what one consciously thinks, or thinks they think. 
Much more often, it is a matter of habits of thought, manners of perception, and the structures of 
one’s desires, none of which must necessarily be conscious at all. Indeed, as we have seen, for 
the most part these operate unconsciously, informing and shaping the conscious experiences, 
understandings, volitions, and desires of minds that remain unaware of them.  
How are we to think the relationship between the unconscious of thought and conscious 
thought? It seems unfounded to posit a relationship of resemblance between the two, a 
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conclusion for which there is no clear epistemic basis. But leaving aside the extent to which this 
might be unwarranted speculation, there is a serious argumentative issue with positing their 
resemblance. In general, one invokes the unconscious in order to try to account for actions and 
desires that seem to be inexplicable in terms of consciousness. But to the extent that the 
unconscious of thought is assumed to resemble consciousness, neither can be used to explain 
what the other cannot account for. That is, it is the ostensible difference between the two that 
would make it worthwhile and valuable to shift the analytic framework from one to the other, 
and their resemblance does not allow us to think this difference meaningfully. But on the other 
hand, it also seems incorrect to say that consciousness and the unconscious of thought are 
entirely indifferent to one another. That is, if they were totally indifferent, there would again be 
no point, analytically, in invoking the unconscious where consciousness seems incapable of 
accounting for a particular mode of thought. In other words, if there were no determinate relation 
between consciousness and the unconscious, referring to the latter would be a non-sequitur. 
What I want to suggest in these closing pages is that the concept of involvement can be 
usefully invoked here. The unconscious of thought is always involved in a variety of determinate 
ways in a given conscious mode of thought. Involvement does not presuppose resemblance, and 
it is not a matter of indifference. It is a name for a kind of implication, a specific form of causal 
dependence, a metaphysical relation between a condition and what is conditioned that is not 
merely extrinsic and formal. If we take a particular instance of conscious perception, for instance 
my perception of the sly glance of another, we can articulate the various ways in which the 
unconscious of thought plays a role in this perception rigorously in terms of involvement. The 
synthetic habits of anticipation and association I have unconsciously formed concerning similar 
perceptions are involved in the manner in which I perceive this glance, and my desire, only some 
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aspects of which I may even be aware of, is involved in determining the affective character of 
this encounter. Indeed, these unconscious habits of thought, the network of ideal and affective 
associations unconsciously involved in my mind, make possible my conscious perception as 
such. But what is it, in particular, that is actually involved in this way? Whatever it is, it is not 
clearly and distinctly accessible, as indicated by the analyses above, which is why I propose the 
concept of obscurity as the necessary complement of the concept of involvement when it is a 
matter of the unconscious of thought. In each case, the actual modes of unconscious thought at 
work are not clearly and distinctly expressed, but are instead obscurely involved, at the level of 
consciousness. Obscurity and involvement are categories for adequately thinking the 
unconscious of thought, categories common to the analyses of Leibniz, Spinoza, and Hume 
explored in the chapters above. Articulating the unconscious of thought in terms of what is 
obscurely involved also has the virtue of not implying that it is somehow ‘false’. Indeed, that 
which is obscurely involved in the constitution of conscious thought, to the extent that it is 
positive and determining, to the extent that it is real, cannot meaningfully be called false at all. 
Leibniz showed us a way of thinking about the actual infinity of perception. On his 
account, as we saw, each perception is subtended and constituted by an actual infinity of 
unconscious perceptions. At a certain point, these imperceptible differentials of perception, by 
entering into relations with one another, cross a combinatorial threshold and constitute a 
conscious perception. It is, I argued, a kind of transcendental or retrogressive analysis that leads 
us back from conscious apperceptions to these imperceptible differentials of perception. Two 
things remain entirely obscure at the end of this analysis, namely the unconscious perceptions 
themselves, and the threshold of apperception or the limit of conscious integration. The obscurity 
of the unconscious perceptions involved in any possible case of conscious perception cannot be 
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clarified by means of conscious reflection. As we saw, these ineradicably obscure petites 
perceptions gave Leibniz the theoretical means to deny equilibrium or indifference. What does it 
mean that conscious analysis or reflection cannot reveal the reason why the soul is inclined 
toward one of two apparently equally attractive options? If, with Leibniz, we hold fast to the 
principle of sufficient reason, it means that consciousness encounters a limit in this analysis, 
testifying to the obscurity of causes from the perspective of the effects—conscious perceptions—
that must necessarily involve them. Deleuze writes: “If, with Kant, it is objected that such a 
conception reintroduces infinite understanding, we might be impelled to remark that the infinite 
is taken here only as the presence of an unconscious in finite understanding, of something that 
cannot be thought in finite thought.”1 If Leibnizian apperception is marked by the clarity and 
distinctness of its conscious perceptions, there remains an actual infinity of perceptions that 
continue to affect us although they do not cross this threshold of conscious integration.2 
Still, the question remains: what is the principle according to which some infinitesimal 
differentials of unconscious perception cross this threshold of integration and manage to 
                                                          
1 Deleuze, The Fold, 102. 
 
2 “The reality of matter consists in the totality of its elements and of their actions of every kind. 
Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon bodies: it results from the 
discarding of what has no interest for our needs, or more generally, for our functions. In one 
sense we might say that the perception of any unconscious material point whatever, in its 
instantaneous, is infinitely greater and more complete than ours, since this point gathers and 
transmits the influences of all the points of the material universe, whereas our consciousness 
only attains to certain parts and to certain aspects of those parts. Consciousness—in regard to 
external perception—lies in just this choice. But there is, in this necessary poverty of our 
conscious perception, something that is positive, that foretells spirit: it is, in the etymological 
sense of the word, discernment” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. 
Palmer, in Key Writings, eds. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey [New York: Continuum, 
2002], 99; emphasis added). 
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constitute apperception or consciousness, rather than others? If conscious perception is 
constituted by the integration of differential unconscious perceptions, what is the principle of 
individuation that expresses the sufficient reason for a given integration? The fact that this 
threshold is obscure and singular in each case does not mean that we can say nothing more about 
it. In fact, this threshold is the effect of a prior habituation: the synthetic repetition of 
unconscious perceptions creates the conditions for their conscious integration. Habit draws the 
imperceptible differentials of perception into relation with one another. It establishes this 
threshold as a condition for differential integration in conscious perception, which also allows us 
to think the threshold’s variability: habituation variably sets the limits for conscious awareness or 
perception. Variable habituation makes different aspects of the same perceptive multiplicity 
more or less susceptible to integration in conscious perception. 
Habit, as we saw with Hume, is itself an unconscious process. It must be unconscious and 
involuntary, first of all, since it precedes conscious experience and makes it possible. If thinking 
is the mind’s passage from one idea to another, habit establishes these pathways in advance of 
conscious thought. Once again, this analysis is retrogressive and transcendental: habit must have 
already been actual in order for conscious thought to have been possible. Habits of thinking are 
clearly involved in my consciousness of moving from one idea to another, but the principle of a 
given habit or association can remain totally obscure to me. Moreover, the principle of 
habituation itself is entirely obscure and involuntary. This does not mean, as I suggested at the 
end of my chapter on Hume, that all habits are on equal epistemic or normative footing. But 
conscious efforts at correcting habits of thought are complicated by the fact that all of the criteria 
for evaluating the epistemic legitimacy or normative value are themselves habits of thought that 
may stand in need of correction. What we might wish for, under these conditions, is some kind of 
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finally clear rational standard by which habit might itself be submitted to objective evaluation, 
but precisely this is what Hume quite consistently refuses us. In each case, the general rules by 
which a given habit of thought might be corrected are themselves habits of thought, involving 
their own obscure principles and unconscious associations. There is no outside of habit itself, no 
final point of reflection or critical analysis at which we are able finally to reach a clearly 
objective level of thought that does not involve the obscurities of habit. 
Finally, unconscious habits and perceptions are always obscurely involved in desire, 
which Spinoza calls the actual essence of the human being. Spinoza is the great philosopher of 
involvement, for whom it is axiomatic that “knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, 
the knowledge of its cause” (E I A4 / CWS I.410 / G II.46). An adequate idea not only involves 
the idea of its cause, but expresses it clearly and distinctly. An inadequate idea cannot fail to 
involve the idea of its cause, but only does so obscurely. In practice, Spinozism is a metaphysics 
of impure mixtures, an ethics of obscurely involved causes. My mind is the idea of my body, but 
my body is not causa sui; its nature involves causes that it only obscurely expresses, and the 
ideas of these causes are similarly involved in my mind only obscurely. As I argued, the vast 
majority of Part Two of the Ethics is an account of the necessity of our inadequate ideas, a 
catalogue of ideas in which the ideas of their causes are necessarily involved, but only obscurely. 
Similarly, Part Three concerns affects that only obscurely indicate the natures of the modes that 
give rise to them. For instance, my conscious joy is the effect of an encounter between my body 
and an external one; the ideas of both of these natures must be involved in this joyful affect, but 
this affect cannot tell me the nature of either of these bodies. It is not that I cannot form adequate 
ideas on the basis of affects, but this is only possible by a retreat to the generality of common 
notions: what I form thereby is an adequate idea of is the nature common to the modes in the 
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encounter. The natures of the modes that, in this encounter, constitute the causes of the affect, 
remain obscurely involved in the affect itself. 
Why would the nature of one’s desire need to be conscious? Spinoza teaches us to regard 
each encounter, and the affects that we undergo, as possible occasions for the development of 
adequate understanding. In every affective experience, one’s desire is necessarily involved, but 
only obscurely, as one cause among several that cannot be clearly disambiguated by conscious 
analysis. In a joyful affect, what do I know about my body and the nature of the external body 
that affects it, other than that they form a positive unity of composition together? This is the 
sense in which Spinoza is also an empiricist: the ethical imperative of increasing power demands 
an experimental pragmatics, in which one seeks to form adequate ideas, not of their own nature 
in isolation, but of the natures of the individuals constituted by their encounters with others. If 
you and I cause each other joy, this only obscurely tells me something about my nature and your 
nature, since the ideas of our natures are only obscurely involved in the idea of the individual 
that they form together; but it can clearly tell me something about our common nature. Even if I 
form the adequate idea of that common nature, so much must remain only obscurely involved in 
my conscious knowledge and experience: the idea of my nature, the idea of everything external 
involved in the encounter, the perceptions or affections of which I am not aware, the habits and 
associations that determine my desire and affective sensibility. 
In section 3 of Chapter 2, I drew attention to the striking parallel between Hume’s 
principles of association and Spinoza’s account of the way in which desires are determined by 
imaginary ideas. Resemblance, memory, and causation are fictions to the extent that they are 
based not on rational deduction or analysis but on the contingency of encounters; they are, 
however, effective fictions, to the extent that they necessarily participate in determining one’s 
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desire. If Spinoza countenances an experimental pragmatics of encounters, it is because he 
recognizes the contingency of our habitual associations as an opportunity rather than as cause for 
alarm. Experimentation is the only means for correcting our habits of thought by attempting to 
control, however imperfectly and incompletely, for the obscure variables involved in complex 
encounters. And it is the only means for attempting to correct our rules of correction. 
The metaphysics of ideas in early modernity grasped the nonidentity of thought and 
consciousness and explored the unconscious of thought with astonishing rigor. The unconscious 
of thought is not merely the negation of consciousness, but has its own positive and determinate 
elements and logic. It is not an abstraction, but is concrete and singular in each case. The 
unconscious habits of ideal association and expectation, the unconscious of desire, the 
imperceptible perceptions that affect sensibility beneath the threshold of conscious awareness—
these are all invariably different and distinctive for each mode of thought, each monad, each 
mind, based as they are on the singularity of the differential experience of each. The obscure 
logics of the unconscious of thought, as imperceptible perceptions, as what is involuntary in 
desire, and as habits of ideal and affective association, can be articulated and expressed in formal 
terms. However, real thought, whether it is conscious or unconscious, is never merely a set of 
formal structures. It is always concrete and determinate in its singularity. It must fall to each of 
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